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Cl'Ul.P'l' ER I 
MIC111AEL BORODIN 
Tb.O Cl11B,~§§:l, Qou)!llqnis:t Ji'e,);'ty ••as begun through tha 
_______ ,.,",.~~~ ~ " ' " ~ ,, ~' "·~·"'- '"" ... _., _ _,.,,,..~·~~ ---
:n_;;;.:~~f~£:!:~.£~§, .. ,9.-i:,.J~h!il .... J!Qmj,u:li.~.:r:n .Jn.,.J,,ggg.1 -varst..iifies -and·- its 
'-----a.:tsregal'd for the rights of China. coupled with the dealer• 
ation of Ki',rakhan, Vict:~•Comm:.tssar for l:<~oreign Affairs of 
Soviet RtlSSia, were instrumental in bringing about the 
Organization. This decle.rration promised tl:>.at Hussia \·;ould 
renounce all the adV!.tntages. privll~!.$ElS• and concessions 
extorted from China by the Tsarist regime. 
X:wo PJ:'Of~ssors .at.J'eklng t,rtJ,ive:lisltY1 .. Qha11~t~:-~~1,u2 
and ~:1 Te.:"'Cllt19e .t'f.?tl11~G;Cj. .. a soc;i.et;~ J:Q~ th~ §tudy ... ().f 1v1~:~~xism. 
:t1?-. .. 1'l!?Yt> ... J,.~~. ~~~~E:;?:"_Y'!>.*.~·~r.!:~!&i' &fliC!.~~:t,~!"t.,.:g;(3El":!.';~.~ ?!.~~.~~ .. 
:Far Ji;ag:t;e.r,n ... :euJuaau, .. o:r. ... tha--Com;tnt"illnt ar:civad in G.hanghai 
" •" < ''' >'"'- _,,, --~ •;'C""i-'"'•~•'···-'""'">•'''·'~'>.'<Y 
for a meeti~ .. 'J;J.:th . .,.Chan. While i•he Russian v1at1ted Chinese 
_____ , "·'··-···--"""'"""""~""·-~.,~" 
Coiilmunlsm to enter the political wa:t~ on all fronts, Chen 
counseled moderation. He a.,greed to sponsor !l group lrnot1n 
-~--------~--...-.--~----<~.,--.. ~.--.-~ .. ~----"""'""'~-----·~" ... ., ... _"''~'-'''""'"'~""'""'-
~t> ..... ~~~.-7f.9~--t~_c..;!,~ls.~ ... Ji?~!!.~.. §.~~~t?.l.l!t~.~~-.. ~f: ... fl: O()t:\~.!~E~: 
tion ();f:Jit§.QQQ.()Q ~ Jnonth f'tom .. t.l1e . .Qo;m;!',.n~~rn. this 
,.• ,,-• "'- - ' ' '• •'·• ,,.,_,,,,.,"-'...,.''-"''·''"••' •On·"·•.>•··'" 
1 Victor A. Yakhontoff, 'I'he Qhin!).ls;;s ~~oyili.lts, p. 6. 
2 D·ee Chapter VIII, page 150, for a biogra.phieal 
sketch of Chen Tu-hsiu. · 
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'l'sinan, and o~~~~ !l!l.PQ:rt@~ g$,t;:l,~-~.a 'l'hese :;;ocieties 
--... ~~---~"-~"~·,~-"'"'' ,_,·,··-""'"'""•'"""'' .. . - -~.----~·-·'e"-~'''"•''""''-•"' ,,, ..• ,._._,_.., __ ., _____________  
~~-:!>~.1>.-~~'13'!. !l!-3~le_roi:!§ .. §J·I:!Q,~utJL.itn4 .... 1:!n¢1§~YI~~~- y~a:;~-~-~ 
influences from people o:r a.ll classes before finally 
~;y;~-~;-~iyj,ng_ ~to. a .. p~~llmi~~ ;~ijt~: , ....... · ..... , . 
____ ,_____ -------- . 
------
-------
-----------During the last__:lieek of Jul.y, 1921, thirteen men met 
"':""'~"""-'"''""''·""'"'""'"'·"""''~'-"' ........ .., ·- ~ .. """-~'"""'""-=='"'"'"'''"~-$-}.~,·--. ""~'"'"'>'<-' _,...,_,,,_.,,_,~ -'"'''''"''-""'"'''""' 
,Shanghai. 'fhase man vlal'e Communists from the di:f.fer~1nt 
_,......_,_A"""'-'..»~- ..__,,,_,,,,._...,,,"!~-,•.-., "'-"''""''··••.·~·• "'"""'-•'-~~-"'~·- .-•.><r;•\'' ,,._,__ ·•:<'"-'7,,,,,._,,, .. " "''"'"', ,-,·~•o·,,,,,_,. <-"''"''~''•· ~ .•'' C/>"• ·-•·· '",•< ., ,,,_• • ' ,-.'-"'·~-· ,._., 
sections ... :;,1,' g11*AI:!:. Q5l:P;t ..• Q.nc sttengthen;lng ... tJ~.e, .. ..Par:t;y .. 
-----·'-"--·'·"'"''"'o•<'-'~''< '' "'"' ' - ' '-- • 
struoture. 'l'he con:t'erenoe lasted four days and dealt with 
tules t:tnd questions oi' organization. At this time there 
were not ov:er one··t~und:c.e.d .. ..r.aal .... ~ in tha "hole 
-------~·"" 
land. 4 outside aid •~as necessary to sustair< the movement. 
This same year. 1921. the young party Joined the Thi:rd 
~!l~'!!!l:?:HS,ln~l..!<hQ~5~l:JY.~tl!~~~ng .. :\ih.~.<J'i#.!'t;t<;'!_f()?C __ ,:J.:~.~-::.~.--~?.~£~:t':­
a_:;3,:~~.~~;;.Ja.L~hit .. !J.~·~;-t1t~51!.. 
The All-Chinese Congress of ·rrade Unions mat for 
--~-.••·•·->~,.,.,,,_,_,, ___ ~,~~~-•--·~--·~,__., ·" '~'""~~"n""''" "<--'"-'"'"'"""' ~ -,,-,,·,~ ... -c"• " '' '- '" "''" '•-. "_-,,~,.,,.,.' ""~" '., '•''• .,- • 
increasing strength or the Communist group as the head of 
3 Robert s. Ililegant, Qhipa 1 s Had £;Iasters·, p. 43. 
4 Robert c. No:rth, and John H. I'aasohe, "Moscovl end 
the Chinese Comrllunists," l?acii'ic @pecta.toJ>. 3:141, Spl'ing. 
1949. 
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a working class movement. Later, in 1922~ there arrived a 
; , r 
missiOl"). .from Russia as an indi(mt1qn of the growing rapport 
between the two count!iiss. 
Doctor Adolph A. Jo:ffe, leader of the mission, held 
a series of' oon:t:ersnces vJith Doo't;()r_Sun_Yat-ssn--in-Janueiy ;-----
~------------
1923,-as-a-resu:rt ot which a deola.rntion ~~as published to 
----- . ' 
the ef'teot that both. men 
, • • considered that neither Communist organiza• 
tion nor the system of soviets can be introduced into 
China at prast:mt because the neoe:osary conditions do 
not eXist there. 
and that 
• • • tho most important and most pressing problem 
o! t~hina is to achieve her natiom;l ugifica.tion and 
to realize her cornplate independence. 
writing fo.r the January, 1923, issue of' tr1o 
magazine 1,.,}. Villi?; J\.s;e • · Jof'fe a:ttempted to explain tt1e 
polioies of the u.s.s.R. in China. His explanation for 
such inconsistencies of' lrlOX'd and faot a~:> the presence of 
Russian troops in Outer Mongolia g&.l'li>X''alized the theme of 
11national interest," but did not elaborate on the s~cific 
threat ot this region to his country. He stressed the 
financial exhaustion ot the Soviet Union and cited her need 
5 Yakhontoff, 2:12• ·cit •• p. 7; ~: ~'~?llingt;on, Koo, 
!,1emo;yeud~, presetrte(l to the t.ytton CouJm:LSs:ton. p. 761. 
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:ror control of the Chinese 8a<?te:r11 RailVJay "until suoh time 
' 
as she can build a nev1 :.ra:Urc.md in her Ol•m territory. "6 
His appeal \Hl.S sent to ·tb.{l Chinese intellectuals • "the true 
representatives of thepeople.o:t China," .for an understand-
ing of Russian interes.ts.'~ 
China every .fet1 months. No one sa&med to be able to find 
a foothold to start work. 1n saptemblilr, 1923, Michael 
""'--·--·~,.,..__~~-~~~ ...... - .. , .. ..--.~.,.., .. ~ . .,.~.~~-·-·=--·"*~··"•"'""~-..... ~--.. 
Borodin was sent :f'rorn MOsOOiiJ to China as political adviser 
.-·'""""''-~~•. '"'-·~~.·«. "'< ''""''''"'"'~~·'~"-·""'-'"''""'•"'""•-~"'''"''"~''-·"'·'-'' •"•·-····· _ .. _.,, .. , ••• ,,,_,, • '""'''"'~·-··-., ,, •• ,.,., '-"'•'"·'"'•"- , .••• " ,_.,;·,~.!..,, · ··'-'•'"·•O•'•"'"'"'~"""'"''-'m"'O"""'""'--'"'"""'~"·'·"''·'~·. ''''"'"•' 
to the Kuomin:l;i~J .. n.Oanton_.. It is in this man ~md the 
-"~_,. _ __...,,,,..,.-.""'""·~"''"'''"''.'...,"' ·""· . . '. - - - ' ' - - . 
po1vers 1,-;hictl b.e posse::med that Russiti :rnalie he:r first 
concerted and partially successful effort for control of 
the "Middle Kingdom." All that tu1.d gone before •,:as but a 
nibbling at the skin of the fruit. This we.::; a b:l.t~ to the 
core. 
Mr. Bo:rodin was the first soviet agent to conceive 
ot an e:t.'facti ve 111athod of' working in China. He se:rved 
Doctol! sun faitllfull:r • never 1~hile the doctor lived 
fOl'111e..rding the cause of the Communists, even apparently 
------
6 O.n Iillay 31• 1934, an agreement was signed by 
Wellington Koo and L. rc1. Karal.man providing for the pro-
visional management o:t the Caines a .IT-astern Rall\<Jay; Cf. 
"1\.gl!eements Bet1~een the nepublic ot Ch:!.na and th.e u.~~s. R. 
and Annexes," m rioan Joryal 9.£. Inte:rmati.on§l ,"kaw 4,.41X; 
SUP•t (~pril, 1925 , P• 66. 
7 Pu A. Jof'fe• 11 Hussia 1s Policy in China, 11 Li;t£ini jge, 316;73•76, January 13, 1923. 
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opposing foJ! a time the Communist l'a.rty of. China. 
Counseling moderation, he gained a :reputation. tw an 
unselfish adviser. · n:t.s plan for the reorganization or the 
Kuoraint~:>.ng 1tJI'l.S a.ccepted Nith great enthusiasm. 
~1~~l_(J.?lll!ll~~~~_s~.,F',I:J.l.':.~.~-~l!l~!»:'!l~~.s .... 2:f:t!l.f.§lil .... 11.9.. J!!*ll ... lt.hS~ 
KU,?.l!~~:ll:.~a1~ .. :l.:!3£1,y;!,gq~;uy, .... t~t!ilY • .I:'l§l'.'il. ... ~~:\!.~.~-.~-Doctor-sun­
neve:r suspected that this was the first step tot1a.rd the 
5 
co11quest of b.:ts group; .for • af!:,~,t: .. ~ll~.J5:~.9ll!tf!~!?:H& h,§,l;i, .Q§!~. 
~-~r&.sm;!,~~!.l-.. b¥····J3.o.too1n.., .• o.a .. a.lo.ne. .. ,;t,n .. ,.cl1;l,:n§".!al15l!lP stood .fully 
~ ''" "''·''·'•''-<•-•··•-··'•"' 'd-:,"<"-''-"'''"''•'"-<'•-"~''"'" 
~1!~ ... :!'!.2?:!b~ili.lit .• Sl.t: .. 1\ne .•• sy,at,GJ),I.•···.a.oo. ..... l:l$l. ... .Q,Q,gl,4,"nl.l:~.J,nto •. l\:$!y 
J;J;?.:;:,;,~.~-~E!@ .. t~1Q~e ... 111M .... owftd .... h:!.m ... allegianoa. He~':l!:'.~ti. 
~.l':l.~~!ll~'!~gou ... m:J.<!. ..... !'o:c.ce.. R:.tx,14Sl ....... autl .... ru:J..Q w~:;L ... <3@.~Y .. VIhE3fLh§ 
played on ... :t.ti'l .. sectional, . .;le~J.o.usies .oi'.tl:l;;:LJ)hinese 
----···· .. ··'- ----~''"·'·"" 
P~()p;l,e .~. 
Yd.chael Borodin 1~as bor11 in Russia and came to the 
United stat<1lS as an illiterate boy to escape the 
opp:ression of the Tsars. For !H1hile he lived in New York 
and then moved to Boston where he became connected with a 
branch of the Carnegie Institute. '.Cra.vel:l.ng to~ est 1 
Borod:t.n settled in Chicago and. opened a schOol to teach the 
English language to foreigners. He married Fanny Orluck, 
8 George E. 0olwlsky • 11 Borodin and His Methods •" 
tralas-facif!£; 14:5• April 9, 1927. 
6 
Em American citizen, wt10 bore him two sons. The. boys v1ere 
rsgisterecl. under the nama o:f' Gl•usenberg; \llhen they attended 
the .ft~nerican Sohool in Shanghai. Their father was one• 
time kno>m as M. Berg in the midi~ast. 9 
There is a possibil:l.ty that Borodin \>Has a~1 .1\mer.:tcen---- - -
citizan._o:c:rviet-consu1ar-~1uthorHies at ~Jhanghai made 
~--~-
ttlis claim early in 1927 .~o J. :B. Powell in his book. 
lJ&Y ·rwa.ntx·Eive };earJ.l. in Cl;!.iiJiih lends o:reden.ce to this 
report.ll I was v.na'bl(l to g;et ar1y information f.rom the 
United Ctates Government to verify this claim. r<'hile the 
question me.y be academic the:re has been some use made or it 
by Kremlin propagandists. 
The Borodins were ohal'ming 1 intelligent~ r'il source-
i'ul. ai'l.d devoted people. Michael Borodin might have been 
onG of Chicago •s la.wye:rs t but t.ha dr iva to see the 
proletariat in pow:;:r '~as in him, and he used his organizing 
ability to that end. His major interest vJhile in the 
United States \v&.s in the revolutionary activities 
directed against the ·.r:sarist reglmes. .'4. conte.mpore.ry 
--------
9 J. B. Powell• "~dohaal Borodin, ClErverest Hevol• 
utionist in ttle world Today, 11 C!lipa l~eek:).j! Rev;!,§\~, 41:159 .. 
61, July ~6 1 . 1927. 
10 New York Times, Ap~il 6, 1927• p. 2:4. 
ll J. B. Powell, My ·rivlmti•Five Years J.!l China, P• 
127. 
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recalls that tbe RusBian students in tlw United Btat®s at 
this time t<ere not very popular. 
right lvith the Un:!.hd Ste.tes.ll3 
They could .find nothing 
7 
.-~ 
tion, Borodin t s Chicago school undertook to-f~:lJ:.-:~.'aaic~.:;:L;-
---------~ 
Bnrodin ditl not join tile Communist :Party unt:l.l l9ii;l. 
on h:Ls return to RUssia, h:l.s natUJ.•t.W. inclir,atiol'l ~;as tol1ards 
the ~J!ensheviks .13 Hm~avex • the Comint;er.n needed people 
vets$d in foreign lar:;guag!:W• and Borodin's lmo;~ledge of 
English ~lnd spanish made 111m a logioal onoioe for 
th.are served six months in prison for passport :t:~ue~ifioa­
tion. Upon his relaase he want back to Mosco~J. Solnetiws 
ls.tar he \'ia.s dispatched to C.birw. 
Y..:tonael Borodin brought to Carlton MoiH:JO>-;•s ptoposal 
to xepudiate old treaty rights held by RUssia and to. 
provide China wlth civilian and military experts to help 
u: ltath!ill'ine E. Bo1~den, Archivist. Vnlpare,iso univer .. 
s:i,ty • Ind:l.am•• in a lette:r to che author. 
13 David J. DaUin, ~ ~ g,t ;1,1uss:ta J.n. ~. 
P• re12. 
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her in the 'building of. a strong national state. Ha :round 
at Canton an inactive government, a supine Kuomintang, 
w.are .rudiments o:f llll army, uno. a waa.lt Couaamust Patty. 
Bo:rotiin decid(;)!'i the h:ey to his position vlOuld be the 
modal ot.' tha Russian __ Colll!llunist-cparty-a:s-Taras- the 
xelut :tons betvJaen t:1e Pa,rty and -t;he government wsra 
concerned. 
organizational. T.tte loosaly•knit Kuoru:tnta.n.g scatt,•red 
ttu:ougb.ot<t the oountl'y had to be welded into e. po,,ve:r.ful 
people vJith tho idea o:t' unity, d(~visod thG ~ H:iA Gim l• 
Doct;or sun, klO\iail'al', ><~as a sick and tired mnr,, dyint; \Vi ttl 
necessary .t'o:r tl1.e t'ollmling that h:1d to bo bu.:i.lt. It is 
of. 11 ttla wonder thut Sun int;roduced Bor.odin as a 11 (J;I;;nius 
ot: orga.nizatlon. who undertrcood ~~lzy i\:uds.lism had become 
established during the Hey:ublican period. ,,14 
------
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Having \von a position of respect for. himself' and 
his work, Borodin advised tlla placing of discontented, 
w;\lstarn .. eduaated orientals in. t11a sacretruiat o:t' t;he ne<~ 
9 
K~:~.omintang, These men soon Cl:l.!llEl intQ pivotal prominence in 
1 
l 
the shaping of policy. ~-­The rules set down. ~Y'_Ho:rodin--t~e:re 
intent 
-------
c' adhe~Y<i!r-y-:respeo~~--communism took over, 
' ~---
~~~ on driving foreign capitaJ.ist nations from Ch:l.na. As sun 
Yat-sen lay on his death bed. l'lusaian advisers pushed the 
young Kuomintang into demending an investigation of 
Christianity. This led to ·the expulsion oi' all C~istians 
from the Party and from all Nutiom•11st territory .J.5 
.ll.nything -vJit!1 the imprimatur of sun Yat-sen needed 
no other .;ndorsement to insu:t'e the whole•hearted support 
of south Ghina. So it was with ·t:;he Hussien advise:r:s. 'J:hey 
were invited by Doctor Bun, who gave them hie colu~dence. 
To Borodin he gave three years of .friendship. l'lillions of' 
farmers and coolies • cvho could not und.erstatlct tl1.e 
political issues involved, thought it su.ft'icient recommen-
dation for a man that he ••as a f':rien.d of sun )~at-sen.l6 
15 lbid. • P• ill6. 
16 John M. Roots • ''Cb.inese Head and Chinese a:erut, 11 
~. 27:96, l!~bruary. 11127. 
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\ These Russians were spread throughout Nationalist 
\ Pexty activities. The majority v1exe engaged in the 
! 
training of young offioen at the ,,,:hampoa Military Academy. 
Here political indoct:I'imttion was mixed with military 
exercise. Every member of the Academy had ·co be a member 
\ of the Kuomintang. It tvas not enoL1gh that lle l:.:ll,Q"VLhow_to 
----:\ :t'Ight. He had to know ~~hat he was fighting for, alld he h~1d 
) to place loyalty to the Party e.bove all else. ll political 
representative was assigned to each company in J•eeping with 
the Russian p&ttern. ·rrl.is representative t~as charged >•lith 
the responsibility for political orientation of tl'le 
troops. 
His job ;vas !Mlde easier by the excesses o:t.' tl1e 
foreigners in Cilina 's brief contact with the western 
world. Unequal treaties, axtra~tsrritoriality. and the 
impoverished conditions of the masses ~Jere propaganda 
enough. Here was a government ready to right these 
wrongs, renounce all its pl'ior claims, sand in hlfllpers to 
load the Chinese to a better life. Incidents lil<:e the 
killing oi' f:l.ft;y Chinese in the Dhameen Affair at Canton 
in 1926 by the Brit:l.sh1'7 intensified the ef.f'orts o.f the 
17 !b!d. 1 P• 92. 
propagandists. Britain became the primary target of 
Borodin 1 r, expulsionist IJrogram. 
1l 
t'lun Yat-son died in March1 19:~5, at l?eiping. :u.ven 
before his burial a :fight broke ou·t to detel'mina >Jllo t~ould 
be leader in t;he Kuominta.ng. ,;,bile the members argued, the 
Russians seized control and evolved a party cri,;al:liza_t;io=n,._~~­
which 'made 1Jlicha.e1 Borodin p~lrty dictator. NGither the 
:radioals nor the militarists had ~Jide support in Ctlina in 
1926. The great me:rchant•t;rading class t~a.s hostile to 
radicalism in politics and economics and the :farmer~ 
peasant clas~; was apathetic• bent only on getting a 
1iving•l8 !Wen up to the spring of' 1927 the Communists 
constituted no more than 5 per cent of 'the Kuominteng 
membership.19 Influence was exe.rted througll control of' 
Party ,machinery. Box odin had been trained in the Russian 
system ot organization, and his efforts bore successful 
results. 
:Jlt has been said that a social and economic revolu-
tion had never occurred spont<meously in China because 
she had no o;rgenized capitalism o:f.' her own.20 The Chinese 
18 "Russia's Hand in the Chinese Fuzzle," ~it.ergy 
J?iie§t, 84:18, March 14, 1925. 
19 New Yorl;t :j:'imes, April 10, 1927, Bection 9, P• 1. 
20 "Contrasting Viet1S of Clune,'' IJ.y:!.ng A&it 332:776. 
May 1, 1927. 
I 
claim their xavolution began with the Taiping Hebel.lion. 
and that t;ha Boxer outbreak and the overthrow oi' the 
12 
Monal'chy ware only phases of one continuing moveme.nt. 
Howevel' 1 not until 1924 1 when the Kuomintang adopted a 
constitution that t;pecii'ica:Uy oontemplatad revolution and 
reconstruction. did t:he_f'orce-become-con~·nrious-and _____ . ----
organized. '.Che nationalistic tmd basic anti-i'o:ceigll 
feelings of the people were channeled thl':'ougtl the :t.'e.rtile 
ground of Communist propaganda. this propaganda was not 
of the flag 1t1aving, poster pasting, slogan spouting 
variety. Perhaps the most important kiurl t>as ttmt typit'ied 
in th& story by ;uuba.ssado:r Kharakhan: 
Propaganda, of course I do propaganda. Last 
summe:r when student delegations flooded Pekint:~. I 
l'ecaiV<ad tl:l.am alJ •• fad them just such tea. and aakes as 
I am offering you. and talked to them. That 11as 
propaganda• especially v1hen those same s·tudents 111ent 
to your Americml Legation and were :received by a third 
assistant t.mde.r .. seo:retary who ·;~as obviously .:!.n a hurry 
to get away from them so he could play golf. It v1as 
propaganda. last ;.mek ~Jhen \·Je lowared our l~mbassy flag 
to haJ.f•mast on the annive.rsa.ry of mm Yat•sen•s d1.mth• 
while no other legati~1 remembered to honor the first 
President of China.2l . 
Geor~e E~ r;okolslcy described Russia as "the Gain 
amen~ m;.tions" in April, 1927.22 !:.Vary hand v1as against 
2l Lewis s. Gannett, "Bolshevism in China," Nr.:tion, 
123;171, August 85, 1926. 
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b.<al' ~>nd ner h.."lnd was D.gs.iilSt everyone. China alt>o :felt -·-··1--~~-.... :..t ••• -~·--···-· 
tb.e ostracism or th~J~§/ii!< .... <mi.Lit •. was .... .onl.y .. nf;l,:f<~J~.lJilli!iL.~lh!'l 
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a_<:~!~L:~•.!!':h .. J'.~-~.mt.<t.+!AEJ:;ts. .. t~~~!~.~ --~~l·~---~:?I~~ .. J)S~.t1f!.;t;.J;.~g1~.-.. ~~Jt~~t'!!.~\ 
~- &!.!:!!! .. !!5l.l:\~!"' :e11e ;:;ov.:l.et Union kne'~ what S:la must do to 
win Chinese f'ri~ndstlip tor she had b<1en on tl1a "outside" 
-----
-~ 
since th<> r-avc.:Lu·tion..<Jt'--:l..~<l!l'-l".n(Ctfii)'j;;r.•i'lD:.;y ·-or H:rsst . 
( ... ······· .~1. sas;;ion o:t: the etilarg•l<l rt:xecl.lt1\Je GGii!w1tt.ee oi' 
/ the COt&mwlist :rntldx-;.a.tioxual, held in l•losco·~~~ :.tn ?Jovacib'*r I ru:td Oeo<nnbGr or l~J:.Hi, t:!evotad muoh oi' lt$ f>ttf.lnt.Lcn to the 
Chi!lEHHl c a:t tl.lttt:cm'l. !t adopted a clOt ol' t;hm><>s c•LJ.ia:l \•Hilt<ll 
l. I~<JtJl'k~l'l.n:l ... e 1dtl1 :J:!>.rlict>.l:> in contro;11 '") as to 
insure ~Jonti:n"ed <!.l:f'1'ort elcrne; li!liS or non~ee.pitalil>t 
dcvelcpm.ant. 
· :a. Slii!i&EI control of the whole Nationalist mov~lment 
by <.m.tori!){l; t!h.<.l Cnnton Go'ii'Ell:Om<:>nt. 
3. Once entnnahl!d in tl:l.~ sovarrm.<eut c1mcantrat•~ 
on thG paasm1tx:,J • 
4. Identify nationt\l libe;ration \vitn the agr~>Xil!'ul 
:r.avolut1on.:13 
Despite. th<> pl'otllsta.t:tom• of Hu:>CJian otf'ici~lldolll cUscl~>im-
\ l ir.~£ !:lorodin, thei:a is mJlpJ.tl o1Jidanoe 110 tmniou on th!l 
~Offllllllnist :Party p:rok~:r,am~ . 
Solll,. tmti•l:lolst<avilt jmll'llCll.htr; t'lg:rue tht\t soviet 
1 
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---i 
I 
l 
I 
1 
I j 
u 
!I 
!! 
14 
to a Hussien monthly published in Par:!,s declares t~t 
China is immune to Bolshevik teachings by Vil'tue of her 
cult1.1re, .traditions, and xegligious views. 
l;Jl:'ite:r, V, Vilenski Siberi~tkov, .remarKed: 
Another .soviet 
l'l<l a:re not mrer-optimistic and do not; expect an 
, immediate So<li;.c<11st . revolution in China. When the ... __ _ 
Ch.tnese revolution took plac_e, .thG.Chinese-bourgeosle 
were still-too-"laak-to-taKEi power :tn their hands. But 
------tl1~bourgeoaie kno;o1 that the morrow will be their 
day •••• The historical process wil~inavitably bring 
the Chinese bourgeosia to rule • • • • 
Nevertnelass, ~he Collllllunist faction of the Kuomintang oame 
close to achieving its aim in ths Gatly yeats of the 
struge.;J.e f'o:r yJowar. F;xaept :Cor Chiang :Kai•shek and ·t.he 
seacoast me:rchants they might not h1Wa hl:.'.d to wait for the 
morro\~. 
~r tJ»a:~Clt.J:tt.lilli£>.~-J.U .. :ll.h.!l..Jll.ijUQ.UM~Jit'!i ~w.;g.~ •• ~L!}.§ ... J..,~!! .. 
~.. l1'l'o~_n.; s ... £ff!.~! .... ~.~ ... ~h'il ... il:i'i~A:-.i1Q.it§11. •. §.li."Qoot.gn .••. l!i:Lc.ha.el. .. 
~~!<:J~J.~ -~flo!!.~~q_Jill!il ...• ~.litiia'l}lit<Al!l!itUt ..... Q.f ...• ~ •• JJl1l.i.1l.~.i.~~ ... .acllc.ol .. .a~. 
~!~~E'?.~.~}Y.*.'t)J .•. Qi:);l,.!:J,Xl!i. .• Kai~,Shak .. -ti,S ... .J;l.t1n9~\.:p,~;l,,. Up to thi:r·ty 
J)lsshln:s \~ere as·signad a.s advisers to tl:lis school. In 
Vf!Elrcb 1 1927 _ military graduates of Nhe.mpoa nmnba:red fi va 
tb.our~e.tld and formed the nucleus oi' the Kwantung Army. 25 
---
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According to Bo:rodin this ravolutionarx a.riny was ths 
___..,_,.,.......,,_.,_~"< .. , ........ ,.,,.,.,..,_,_,._,,,:_,,,,<,~-..~ .. ,,...,.,,,_, .... ,..,_~......,.,,. .. ,,"""'"""''"'-'"'"'""''',.,..,''~""-'~-·'-~'>""'nO.,-,'- •"'"'""''~·· ~~ '~' • _.,,.,,,..,,,_,~..,.=·>,""'"'"'-
means tor bringing China .. unl'.\ltt: .one rule. certainly this 
.._......,._., ... _._.._,,.._.,...w,«""""''''''""''"''""""''""'<'J"''"""''~'"~"""'~'"'''r,·•e•~·""''~"' • -~" '·'·""'"'"''<>0<"'"·"''''"''""'''"~'""""""' ~-----·--··--··-~·---.."~·~....,-.,...._ 
e!.! .. ~!E!.~ ... ?.~~.~ .. J;.~.~ ... £±:~~~!EE! .. J.:!!~:r.J£.~;}.y __ ~,Q ... ilJd.ll.~ll~.E!t!!!H?!~.-. 
:f.~:tliJt£.:!!.;1. on~ruld=t.o .. ..ax~...mlli-11Ull.d~n.t.~.Y.:PJ;ll,~~-4.J:J;.2l!t. 
Russia.26 Eye-witness aocow1ta testify to the element of 
'"'""''""'"""'"""'''•'"''~·"''' 
idealism v;hich parvuded this f'orce. 27 Til9 ~laticm~\lists- -----
----------
----.rougfi.t :f'or a cause; other troops \vare chiefly mercenary. 
OVe:t' the entranoe of' the h'hampoa Military Aoademy a motto 
in gilt cha:ractel'i:J proclaimed-... 11 Ha who seeks po1ver or 
riches need not enter here." Ttlosa \vho did enter b~llieved 
in this motto and acted as though they did. A .:report 
coming out o:C Canton LTJ 1926 s·poke of the inability to keep 
men hol':lpitalized for any length of' time. '1We are needed•" 
they t~ould say 1 end Hmp off in ·ella direotion of the 
!'ighting.28 
If idealism existed in the l'!lllks • dissension was 
evident on the part of t.h<; leaders of the. movement. Chiang 
had not been impressed by his Mosco~J visit, and took a roa.d 
that opposed the policies of BoroO.in. 
de~Jth_he led an unsucoesstul attempt to ou;<;;t the Hussian. 
26 ~why Canton Jiinbraced ~3oviet Russia.," Lite:~;ar:l( Qigest, 92;17, February 19, 1927. 
' 
'l:.7 Roots, .2J.I.• git-. p. 159. 
28 !&2.· cit. 
warrants were issued :for the arrest or all Communist 
leaders, but 1:lorodin •s prompt seizure o.f the Central 
Executive Committee·ot the Kuominteng resulted instead in 
the expulsion o.f' 124 conservatives~ A_~Gii!J!ll.lll9J:L.\:Ifl,S 
pass~. gi.,Y~ll!L_~_:_ea~.~~---f~.!.§i!>Q!!! •.. ~.~---~~!l~--~-;:!I}}.I;, .. ~.hi~! . '1.-~-~ .• ~~-
16 
-~_tr_:>~~!~---~~!~~-~-~-~~--- £~ .. t!:1~tJ'1':t~.§lW.r Making an uneasy ____ _ 
----tzuce-iv1tlrCniang-the Central Executive Committee then went 
on record with a statem€nt saying it could not work .with 
the gove:rmnm. t at Peking, and thert the only govermnent <Jith 
which it could work was that o:f' the soviet Union.29 
Borodin•s influence reached its peak in the period 
immediately :follo~.o1ing the death o.f sun Xat .. sen. Using such 
incidents. as the Shanghai r!ot30 he sti;red the people to 
express their ~lti•foreignism in violence. Great Britain 
1r1as the focal point o.f' infection according to this Russian 
adviser, Md he directed his cleverest efforts towar<:ts 
destroying her power. Since Great Britain v;as the ma;jor 
29 Yokantof:f, im• cit. , p • 72; Harold M. Vinaoke • A 
W,stgry Q1: the l'l'q;: ~ .tn Mod§::t:n 'l'im§s, P• 444; gt. waln 
2:14• ill•, p. 216. 'l'his au·tl1or states that Chiang attempted 
a coup d'etat three days after SUn's death. 
30 Shanghai ~~nicipal Police fired on a Chinese mob, 
May 31, 1927. Moscow trained Li Li•san ha.d spurred school 
boys to agitate against Japan which resulted in the 
destruction of the Nagai \Vata Y..aisha !V'lill. Vlaln, £m• ill• • 
p. 218. 
17 
po'W~r in China a.t tha'l; time and, had made nume:rous mistakes 
in its J.'elation \1ith the Chinese people, his tasl1: was made 
easier. British journalists recogn:lz ed the internal .force 
ot Chinese xenophobia but accused the Bolsheviks of fanning 
the revolutionary .f'lames.31 British political leaders were 
more specific in their accusations and more inclined to 
----:stress---t1Te-HlrlifS~ian in:t'luence. In a speech betoxe the 
House of Commons on May 24, 11ilZ7 • Prime Minister c;tanJ.ey 
Be..ldwin c.i,.ted instances or Hussian activity in espionage 
dmsigned for ~~or1d oonquest. Concerning the role o.f' 
:SorodJ.n in Cl\ina he says: 
On February 1, J.est /J.92iJ Mr. Hos<mgolz1 ·the 
s:oviet Charge d 'Af:l:'aires in this aountry • informed his 
government that it "Was essential to give a short 
eXplanation to the press that Mr. Borod:l.n was not a 
Soviet representative and was not in the service of the 
Soviet Goverm1ant. but a. private citizen in the service 
ot the Chinese Government. 
On February 3, Iilr. Hosengolz published a statement 
ih the J.lfiilll 'f'§J:\lgl'aM to the e.t'fect that liiJr. Borodin 
is a private indiViduaJ. who is not and never has been 
in the service of the soviet Government • • • 
On Febru~y ll., Sir Hobert Hodgson, tile British 
Charge d 1 Af!'_aires at Moscow, made inquiries of JYll'. 
Litvino.ff ~Acting Foreign l"linister o.t' the soviet 
Governmeny to which Mr. Litvinotf replied that • , • 
Borodin was a Russian Communist ••• and that as i'ar 
as th<J allos;a.tio!'l. that Ml'. Borodin was a representa• 
tive ot the Soviet Governrr~nt it was without 
31 "Red Russia' .s Hand in China," Lita~tqX .pii!iHzJ:i, 
86 :l7, July 25, 1925 • quoting from the London ~El'<l Htate§-
i!!.in and the li;a;i.lY tel§graph. 
,-
. 1----
foundation and the Soviet Government has no kind or 
conneotion ~lith or responsibility for him. 
Mr. Baldwin continues, 
le.. 
Yet there j,s in the possession of' His Ma.jesty•s 
Government a telegram dated November 12 last year, from 
the Commissariat ot Foreign Affairs to the Soviet 
·representatives in C;lhina. in the :f'ollowing terms: 
l. Until a Soviet representa.tive is appointed in 
Peking Comrade Borodin is to take his orders direct 
-------;£-r-om-~1o-seOt·r. -------------- ---
2. The Far Eastern Bureau is to be in:f'ormed that 
··all o:f.' its decisions and measures regarding· questions 
or general policy must be agreed on with ~~chael 
Borodin. 
s. Comrade Borodin•s appointment as i;t1.e oft'ioia.l 
Sovie~..,representative in. China is considered inadvis" 
abla. "' 
The United States car11e in tor a lesser share of 
abu.se; a share relative to her power in Chino.. Borodin 
opined that the UnUed States was "rapidly becoming as 
imperialistic as Great J3ri taiil. 11 :53 Ho\vEiver, he noted ·the 
changed attitude of the masses towards .foreigne:rs and 
listed three possible reasons for this1 
l. AmerioiJUl and British t~arships in Chinese 
waters. 
2. A need for /f.i.ormalciJ in order to get :f'oreign 
loans. · 
:o. Unions no111 had better control of' the '~orkers.34 
32 toot,~ 'J:imes, r•1ay 25, 1927, P• 4:3. 
33 Ibid •• Y~rch 11, 1927, p. 1:2. 
34 I!la• • P• 5. 
-----
----------
-----
------------
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one cogent reason perhaps purposet'ully ignored 'by 
:Sorodin was his insecurity a:t this time and his need for 
stability in govel'l'lll!Emt. Dorodin•s rise had been 
meteoric; his :t'all threatened to be the same. In J'uly 1 
1926• he v1as aD . .twunced openly as the chief adviser o:f' the 
Canton Oovern:rllt1nt. Mr. Norman. !.merican adviser to sun, 
19 
----
\'J0Xlt home. VJi·tnin one month the people of China began to 
feel that ·cne Russians were not sincel'e concerning Chinese 
purposes 1 but only using China as a tool in tl'le machinery 
ot World Revolution. 35 Chio.ng K!.ti•shek and the Wes·t had 
long lla.rboroo. StH.lh views. Tr1e pattern sat by the 
Spartacist Nlovement in Germany,. BaJ.a rom in Hungary • coolr 
in Britain, and the assistanoe given to Kemal Pasha in 
·ru:rkay were too !'amilia.,r to mistake in the Orient. 
Nevertheless • whatever the feelings ot the people, it 
seemed that having accepted Russian assistance to further 
their aims, they must also accept tba Russian system of 
coz;trol. 
(
""" ColYilllunism sp:t'ead .from the o.t'iginal centers of 
Shanghai and Canton into the 1-Jhole country. Orgal:l.ization 
\~,on a regional level ren~ained vary loose. Quanels among 
------
~!:,UI:~.!:!~!~LP.QW!lonplaca.- .. and .. ..t.heJ:a .. .lilil.S.);J,Q,.,.§.~!:".l2?.~t:,gx .. jl.Q 
f~g=<?.~ • T.£!~ ... !!!9~'\! •. .:l.,Hglii:!P:~J,.~~"~:t~.~.IL.~ ... ,~l .. ~§.;;'t:l ..... tf'!:~ 
!!.~t'."!!l4J!,li.§.-ci: .. ;t.he ... .S.Q.uth. Wldar .. Ob.i.e.ng ... Yi~ml§.n,. ....... Jl:!'lr e was 
>---"~.··-,,_.,,, __ ,_"''''"'''''"· 
t!!!~.S~n:t.e,:c ... ot:.~.!l'.o.st. :tie:VJ:llut.i.oner.~ ... ac.ti,;r,:l;ty:,. .As L. s. 
Gannett wxot;e in 1926: 
Red Canl;on, they call it in Shanghai; and in Hong• 
80 
------~k,;;;on;;"g~t;;;h~e:y talk of. the CantoneS_E!_!l,S lilolshevili:~ .. _ _Xou ___ _ 
hear mysterious stories oi' their Httssian advisers, 
their Russian trained army. their Russian ammunition•· 
and the nearer you conle to Canton the more ha,1.r-raising 
the stories. People tJee visions oi' four hundred 
million Chinese linking arms t~itl1. a hundxed ~nd fitty 
million liussians to :l:.:tght the ~lest ern :¥orld. o6 
Ideally the Communist Party strives to gain about 
3 per cent o.f the total population in a.ny country. By 1927 
the Communist Party in China had a good start to·wards 
e.ttaining this goal. Just before the b:r<>ak \~ith the 
~---.. -----------··~-··-"--
" "•<'•""•""- '-'" •"""""~"-~-"'• •>-""''•"- _,.,., •. ,~.••'"•""'""'"' 
~~()!l'liq'!;§!,fl~ ... !t~!LJ:i.9mmunists..hatlti;l,~~Y ... t~;;:~~~9 .... ~9:!t.!:'LJ.\l.~!!!P~£.~. 
and a ;I unior en:r~;~e .. u,~ ... S!~.;r.:" ... t..b;l:t:!t~:::tJ,.:JUlL .. t..l,lQllliMl.n~ I.Inde~.-
"'~""'---'"""·~"'"""'"''~"""'''"'"';">\·,~·~N-'"'.,r""''~"""'~- - ~~" 
t_ge i.m:.J,..q,<tlJ.£.~-J;~.f_,t,oo.. .. ~;r.t.y •.. .w.a~-43't.sGG1-GOO~.~:,:.\WJ,Q!;!, 
•vorkru:'~U...lgQ.,..Q.l;ill_.mam.bQJI.s..~~th.a.. .. ;p.E~a<>~lt.~uniml.S ... 37 
~IJilitaristically the main souroe of opposition to 
!lorod.:l.n came from Ghiang F..e.i-shek and his 'i/hampoa of±'icerea 
troops. Chiang, having compromised Nith the radicals in 
:36 L. -"• Gannett, "!n Red Canton•" Asia, 26t488, 
June, 1926. 
37 Yakhonto.:r.r, .2!1.• cit• p. 741 quoting from Foreign Policy Association Report, prh :30 1 •. J.9:53, by T, .&. Bisson 
and from thOse t:tguras given by Dr. w. Koo til tus r{qmoxa,nd§· 
21 
May, 1926, pursued his campaign in the North. The idea of 
a Northern Expedition had been conceived by .Sun Yat-sen back 
in 1921 ~hen he was elected President by a special 
~arl1e.ment. Nothing ~as done in the succeeding years 
because Chen Ohung-ming 1s revolt i'l.ald up the schedule. 
Sun, himself, had to leave Canton, and the expedition ~as 
----··-
suspended until Chen was defeated in 1924 and 19?35. Ea.l'ly 
in 1926 the campaign against the North began in earnest. 
Soldiers joined the war as crusadeu to :t.'ight the rabble 
rec~uited by wu Pei•fu and otnsr war-lords.38 By November 
ot the same year, [J\~atot~, two hundl'ed miles to the east oi.' 
Canton, had fallen. In. a speech before the 5\m.tow Chambe:r 
of Commerce on November 16, Chiang rea.fi'il'mea his anti• 
Co!lllllunist stand thereby crystallizing agaill his struggle 
with Bo:rodin. 
VJhen the year 1926 began the Communists were as 
strong as ever in the Kuolnintang. At the central E:x.ecuti va 
Collllllittee Congrees, January 1 through January 20, a strong 
tie with Russia was urged. Still Borodin felt,J~~--.!1f!!t~'tEIQ. 
----~-~~ . ......_~, .. ~·--'"'~»-'"~-~-~·>'-"~'~ 
~aka _pls,g~ __ .f..Q~:: ..... a ... ~B,;.~e .... ~~ ...... ??.'::~!~~~~~-.-~~ .. :~.s~ .... :~:~~r:: .... ?~fl}e 
to a s.tlowdovm at C!tnton. i:Jith this 111 mind he v;!,sited 
~-,e_,,.._-. .......... ~.._~=""'"""''~"""""'"'~''"""'"'"<"o"•o•\•'O''"'"'''-"'· •\' "> •·c·,,, . .,,.,_""'-"''"•"·''-""•''·'•-"'f''•:-'c7:::CC-~_.,/ .. •-~:, '"''-'"'··" -_,o<•:-'c~•''-'"'' _,.,.,,.,"fl'" -
General Feng Yuhsiang in !Viongolla. During his a:b.~.§:\1.£!% 
~--.... -~,..,_,~-----""~~"-' 
!38 H. H. Chang, Chi@g ~ ... .§W, PP• 161-2. 
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Ch~~~-t~~;~l:c <::?!l~rol. o:t: the Government and ousted. the 
C..~~~~~-~.-~.! ~-~~-~~.¥-...... ~!.~~~!!: .... ,~::,!~.:~!~w•'::~ .. ,.£1?Z\.~~2:.,,.9J!!,~ .. l~, 
~s+_inq.u1~,JJ~'"J.;l,.9JJ'l~. 
As the GeneraJ.:Lssimo 's influence incrlilased :Elorodin •s 
had to diminish. The :t'anta.stio ease with \~hioh the t:r.oops 
o:r Chiang marched to conquest a:fter oonquest runa.:oec tr.~ 
world and unifiaatmn:nl.ii1ese-behincLtlj,J:ri. _ _EJ August 0 1926, 
Changsha >1as captured and Wu :Pei~:f.'u retreated. trom 
lr1uchang. By septen1ber Cl:liang ~~as master of' the Yangtze 
Va.lley around Henkow and immediately direct.ed tlis atten-
----
tion to Kiangsi .Provinpe to the southeast. The capitt:J.l. of 
that province, Nuchanli:h ~m:s captured on the nineteentrl. 
I\lukiang, to ttJa north, tollowed suit soon at'ttlt. 39 The 
tuohun, sun Chuan•tang. master of Chekiang and Kia:ngsu, ~~as 
liquidated in early 1927. By the n>iddl<> of F'obxua.ry Hangchow 
wa.s taken and in March. soocl:low, Nanldng, and Shanghai \-J<mt 
to the Nationalists. 
Th<a soldiers of Chiang '11e:re d1:f':t.'exent from the 
troops of the vJar·lords. Their training at t'lhampoa had 
mS.de tneru unique in the annals of Chinese legions. 
Gonsidering themselves as liberators and se.rVt:U1ts of the 
-------
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people, tneir 'b$havior tocvards the conquered popl4laoe was 
ftiendly.and above reproach. A typical reaction of 
skeptical forei~n correspondents was voiced by H. o. 
Chapman in his IWt Cll!twse Heyo:Wtign :!,926-.fU: 
It was round that Nationalist soldi'lrs never 
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looted • • • • The villagers and townspeople rubbed 
tt1eir eyes 1n amazement; the prope.ganda \4as true ai'ter 
-----al~ these men >1ere one ~;d.ttl the common people. 
'l'he people--:~:ac1.pxocat~d this attitude 1dth open 
cordiality, and it was not uncromrtJOn-to-see, __ ve•1 hours 
aftel' the ocoupation o:t' a town or village • the solaie&s-~ _ 
.fraternizing in a mo~st friendly \va.y vJith the shop-
keepers and !'amilies on the stree·t front.40 
The real ground>vo:rk fo:r capitulation c•ilas laid lo~ 
l'e!'ore the troops arrived. First, conditions 111ere right 
for a change. second• the Communists lmm·l ho><J to 
capitalh;e on evidences o:r discontent. A well Ol'gen:l.zed 
underground operated in <Jacl:l prima:ry city sel.ectacl on the 
itinerary of Chiang. As, soon as the Nationalists ;ve.re 
r~;~ady for the assault the banners and slogans VIera uni'u:rlad 
to demoralize the dl!l.fanding troops. Mob demonstrations and 
parades werG staged to walcome the Generaliss1llio• 
After thG O!>ptu~a of the \vuhan area, Cl:l.i::mg; l{ai•shek 
ask<:Jd that tl>a ~ove:rnmant be moved th<l:lW that h>a n<ight be 
abll> to continue his f'ight !:com a base close to ·the canter 
of the activity. l3orodin sat1 his JJ0\1e:l.' slipping from him 
40 ~ •• p. 171. 
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and either he or his leftist tollolfJa:ts determined to ta.l1:e a 
stand. securing control o.f Iw.nko'~ the CoiUlllunists took 
possession of' the masses and used them to furtha:r: the 
cause of revolution. A general strike was aallad tor 
November. 27 • 1986• Hl<ieh struck tar:~: or into the hearts o.f 
concentrated (Jn the B:ritisht and irr<ranu.ary~.-.l"tB7, the 
~~--~-
British concessions at Bunko11J and Kiukiang ware ente:red. 
Mr. Ow;m 0 1Mdley ivafl dispatched from Peking,,to HnnkoN by 
the British GQvernment and immediately entered into 
negotiations ~<d.th Eugene Chen, Minister of' l!"oraign Ai'.fairs 
tor the Han!ww Government. By ag;raemiilnt;s rea.c.lled on 
j 
~ 
~ 
~~---1 
~~ 
;~=~ 
F'ab:cuary 19 and r'lalloh >~. the administration of the diapt~ted l 
concess:ton<J Wlre handed over i;o the Hankot~ aut;hoxities. ] 
This neW£l ~>las tavol•ably received by the poptllace and str..,ng;~ · j 
: ' 
thGnec1 the Cor'>l!llunist position. 
$ho:rtlS' the:reai'ter a series of grave cJ.acJhes v1:ttn 
.foreigners occu:n•ed culminating in the '11>Ju,nlting Incident" 
of lvhlrcll ;:;4, l~/~7.41 Pressure outside China mount;;~d 
against the tactics of tilfl COllllnunists. The Nhole 
Kuomintang Party h<:>..d to sl1oulder responsibility :f'oi' the 
aations of i·ts oxt:r:em:tsts. 
41 Yakhonto:rt. J..9.g. • .sU• 
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\1hila Borodin vJas busy consolidating his position in 
the Ylmgtze area a.n{l a.ttarnpting to establish a "Red rt 
regime in Cb.ina, Chiang was going on v1ith hi$ rnilita:ry 
campaigns do-.m the :t'iver. But, no matter ho>' far he ·1~ent 
the Communist influence wfii.S tn.ere •with t1im and oi'ten before 
___ ___.him,_.._.. For the capture of Kiangsu m.nd Chekiang J?rovinoas 
Chiang had to rely on Ho Ying-chin and l?ai Chung•hsi. 
Marching along vJitl:l these tl>JO men were Cheng Chien and his 
soldiers. Cheng had pronounced Communist sympathies and 
:rushed into N8nk1-ng on !-le,rcl'l. 24, looting and plundering the 
city in the m;me of the Nationalist Army. If' this >~as an 
organized plot to cause serious international complica.tions 
f'o:r Chiang Kd•shek and tl1ereby enhP.nco tl:lEl :standing of 
I. 
Borodin, it be.ckfi:red. Chiang assumed full responsibility 
f'o:r what Md happened in Nan .. l!:ing and on A.prll 18 1 1927, 
formed a ne•11 government in that city Nith ·the support O:f' · 
the Shanghai bankers and the blessings o£ the Powers. 
I 
Thj.s Government \~as destined ·t;o eclipse the rise 
of &nkow and >~I:W for t'itlenty years to xul.e Oh:l.na. It 
condemned Communism end the 111etbods employed by the 
Russian advise:rs in gGtting control of the people. Boroo.in 
faced a virtually impossibl" task. On .April 6 trte Peking 
police, under instruction !'rom Uh>m.g •rso .. lin, raided the 
Soviet Embassy ancl confiscated property purporterl to show 
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that Borodin had complete control of the KUomintang; at 
He.nkow and ~ias using this organization to .:further the air11s 
ot the U.s.s.R. According to one writer this evidence 
proved "beyond all question the complioity of the soviet 
Government in ·the anti-foreign agitation and its continuous 
----J.'~ntt3l'J'e!'ence_in_China•s Civil lla.r."42 Tlle :publication of 
----
these dooUinents '"as a serious blo-w to tt1e plans of the 
Rus.;;:!.ezis. Many of the Kuomintang members dl'lserted their 
standard. 
As i:f' this were .not enough, an Indian Collllllunist, 
Mane.bendra Natl1. Hoy, head o:t' the F·ar .Eastern Gection oi" the 
Comintern, rl:lvealed in a casual conversation that tha 
·rw:rd International had a new progrem :f'or China. Ttlis 
included: 
l. 
2. 
5. 
J?oasant oontiscat:lon oi' land. in Hunan and Hupeh. 
iUimination of the lett td.ng ot the KUomintang. 
'.Cha Gommunist Party of Chinfl was to replace the 
Knornintang. 
A court viaS to be created to punish anti• 
corlllllun:lsts. 
tm. armY ot 70,000 was to be :raised in Hunan and Hupah.~a 
4:3 ~. SJJ.!i.. 
, __ 
---'-
News ot these indiscreet statements hastened Borodin•s 
downfall. On July 13 the Executive Corlllllittee of the 
Chinese Communist Party issued a manii'esto declaring that 
it had withdrawn its representatives from the National 
Government. 44 On the same day tlle Kuomintang members in 
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Hankov-J met_e.nd_o.utlaw.®d-Cow..mu~..i-sm-_-and--the-ComJnUn-1-st-rarty-.45---
Borodin 1 s policies ·were repudiated. All that remained tv as 
Dl APril, 1927• Chiang had instituted a purge of 
Communists from hiE; govermnent. A message had been sent to 
Moscow denouncing Borodin. He was accused of using !:lis 
advisership to create dissension among the membersc~p of 
the Kuomintang. A~~ Umes dispatCh carried ·~he 
ne111e; of his detention in Hankow, closely i~atcMd by troops 
and laborites.46 
Nevertheless, political expediency had to be served 
as evidenced by the t'ollot~ing item out of HankO'I'Il 
soviet sympathizers are assured, however, that on no 
accot.m~~ill the Chi~se people cause the late l'rasi· 
dent •.s Sun !at .. sen 1 w policy or allying •~ith too soviet. 
to be fected by M. Borodin alone.47 
44 Xakhontotf, ~· ~·• p. 75. 
45 Chang, log. ga. 
46 ~ 'WlS, TJ.msl!h April 21, 1927, P• 1:1. 
47 J..Q.s • .!i!.U· 
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In retrospect it is easy to f'ind l!ea.sons f'o r· 
Chinese antipathy towal'ds Communism. Jo:f'f'e, Dorodin1 and 
othe;)IS :l.n 3.923 .. 24, made much of the fact that Cl"lina v1as not 
ready to accept Communism. In 1927 she ><as still not :ready 
for accept!mce and ~;as abll!l to blunt its aggressiveness by 
____ f'_orJ::e of' arms and a disJ.ike of .t'o~·eJ.gne:r: s • evan the 
Russian variety. 
By the and or J'\lly pressure had built up a:r.ound 
Boroclin nml. Lw decided to leave Hankow. This decision may 
have been made :f'or him although accounts as to ·what 
actually did happen are not clear, varying f'r·om auttlOl' to 
author. 48 The consensus seems to be that he vms :forced 
out. This vie'' is substantiated i'u:rther by Boroc.tin t s Otin 
attitude tot1ards leaving his post. On July 14 he asserted 
that he did not e; peot to depart ani did not desire to 
quit. At tho same t:trne he emphasized that M tias only an 
employee o.f" Hanko>~ and so must abide by ·che Government • s 
d.ec1sion.49 
l!'or all the poli tica.l. maneuvering, ttle slogans, 
the striltas, and tho ideals, an army t~on for Borod:J.n, and 
an army was his do1rmt'a11. Generals Chiang and I•'<mg 
48 Chang, bo. ,gj,j;,.; Yakhonto1':t:, $l.J2L .£l.ll.. 9 p. 76; 
Vinacke, £ll.• s.a,., p. 447; McNair and Laah, I!a;Ji. Eastern 
Inte;:ne,t.iona;}. .J:l&lat;t,ons, p. o06. 
49 New ~ ~wg~, July 14 1 1927, P• 4:3. 
Yu•hsiang met at Suchow on June ~9 and 20 .and. agreed on 
plans tor dealing with the COJmnunists in tb,e National. 
Revolution. Thea~ plans \ciElrEl publiClized in a. tel.egram 
sent by Genere.l J)'eng to Chiang Kai-shelt: 
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1. Bor<)din1 w11o has already .resign~.n'l• should return 
to his own country immediately. 
______ c--ae-ThC.lSE:l-IDi-Jmbar.s-of-tha-CtJntr-al-E!xecutiv.e-Con'l!vni-ttaa--
who wish to go abroad f'or a rest should be allot1ed to 
do so. The others may join the Nanking Government, if 
they desire.BO 
Replying to ttus allianoe Borodin said: 
If the Chinese leaders Who have been my :t'riends and 
:f.'ello\v t~orkers :f'or four long years believe that the 
moment has oome ·when they can contim~e their fight 
without my help• than I shall submit, for ! have play-
ed my part and given my advice. l have no intsntlon or 
fighting for Cor!llllunism in China--the t:!.me is not y<rt 
ripe. 
I oame to China to .fight :f.'or an idee.. The (tl.'StJl.lll ot 
accomplishing world revolution by freeing the people 
o:r the East brought me here. :aut China itself • with 
its age-old history, its countless millions, its vast 
social problelllS, its in:t:inite ca.paaities, astounded and 
Qverwhelm.ad me, and my thougtlt;s of world revolution 
gradually sank lnto the background. 'l'b.e revolution and 
the .i'igb.t for freedom in China became en end. in itselt 
end no lont?;er a means to an end. JYly task was to grasp 
the situation, to start the great wheel moving, end as 
time passed it has carried me along •~ith :tt."1I myself have become only a oog in the great machine, 0 
Numerous reports oi' Borodin•s illllllitlent departure 
.filtered out to the :-,'estern. Norld.. As early as ))Jiay 21 
60 ~ ~ :r:tmes, June 24 1 1927 • P• 1::3. 
51 A. K. Nielsen. "Borodin •s Swan Song," ;&;:l.vtng ~. 
December l, 1927 1 p. 999. 
there were two • one that he had aJ.raa.dy fled thl'ough 
Ku:!.kiang to Nanchang, and the other that his airplane was 
moored off the. rla!llburg-Amer ican landing. 52 
On July 12 Ma.dama Borodin was released from prison 
in Peking ~Jhere she hod been held since li'ebruary after 
be.j~ taken from the steamer Pamiat Lenina .• 5:3 Papers 
taken from hex and translated by Chang Tso•lin supposedly 
led to the raid on tlle offices of the Russian Commercial 
Agencies and t . .te Chinese Eastern Hail way • 
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. :/lotually • Eorodin left HankovJ on July 28th. 1"1:. was 
announced he vJould return to nussia by vm.y of. Chenchow, in 
the Province of Homm, then t;o the Province of' She.nsi ru1d 
on through Mongolia.54 
:tie reaohed Vernindinsk station on the 'rrans .. Siberian 
Ra111flay on Octo bet 1. 1927. It had 'taken him ova:c t'> month 
fpr the (oilauous jouxney from Hankow t sltirting and finally 
crossing the Gobi Dr~sert.55 A 111eek latel1 he nrrivetl at 
MosC0>1l end the curtain o~Ulle down on a career of intrigue that 
had mad.e MiotuJ.el 13orod1n t11.e foremost pov;el' in Chinese 
ez -~ nm§<~t May ·~l 
"' ' 
1927, P• 7:2. 
53 w. XQrM; umes, July 14. 1927. P• 4•3; waln, ~· 
oit •• P• 27' • 
54 m ~ J:imellh July ~J9 t 1927, p. 2·13. 
politics. In 1928 he ;vas seen in »4os<l0>1 "unhonored· and 
without employment. a virtual prisonex in tlle soviet 
cap1ta.l."56 Later he became aditol' of a small English 
papal' t tho !'WScQ<i wail$' New ;a. 
'.1hatavar elsa may be said of Boxodin, he must be 
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____ giJlen-cr-edit-tor-th.e-L'rliti-al-s'UCce-sses---o.f-th~3-Revolut-iona-l'.Y'-----
Jll'my. Hi:J l:Jas the brain tllat launched the idea• that 
organized ·the p:r:op8lJianda• 'that devised the tactics ,and that 
started the revolut:tona:t'y movement. Hot more than any 
other, t·Jas tho man >1ho ma.d<ii the Clu.nesc bury their privata 
intxigues and special interests so fa.r as vms humanly 
possible a11d fight together for an ideo.. :,ithOut Borodin 
the Army would never have gone beyond Canton. For all the 
idealism of his ltJOrds the p:raotlcal welding of' ·tnis force 
wao his greatest aohi<:Jvemant. 
PJ;·ominant in tb.e Common Hoom o;f' ttle 8un Yat·san 
University in [1loscoH hangs a crimson banns: lJith a quo-tation 
in Chinese and Russian: 
Very soon ~~ill come ·the day Hhen the U.G.s.n. vJill 
be ablu to greet in a pov;eriul and free Cll1na a i'l'ientl. 
and ally; and both theso allies, in the great struggle 
tor the li.beration of the oppressed ~eople ot the 
world, 111ill go i'or<~ard hand in hand. 7 
56 Chang, 2..12.• m., P• 180. 
57 Hoot;s • .Qll• cj.t., P• 91. 
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1927 vJas not; to be the time. Borod.tn had i'a.t.led to 
b:r:l..ng about the ultimate victory. The conservati,Tes in the 
Kuomintang ·t;ooict the xeins or govm:nraent and set out to 
unify China. 
COt~1UNIS1' PHEi>SURE POINTS 
1927-1934 
' !-----
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After the expulsion of Borodin, the serious split in 
the Kuomintang became evident. All hope of cooperation 
between the communist aml conservative factions was given 
up, if indeed there had been anything but a fa.lse hope from 
the start. 
On August l, 1927, ttw T11entieth Army • under Ho Lung 
and Yeh Ting, with the help of Chu Tehr led an uprising :l.c=n __ _ 
Nanchang and the beginning of what was to be the Had Army 
was organizad.2 A aett1orununt oi' these troops set up the 
first soviet Republic of China at It~iloi'ong and 
participated in the abortive Canton oo~Q d•et~ of 
Deoe!nber 3.4 li~hile this Canton Comuns lasted only three 
days, Party members believe it tum a p:ro:f.'l.ltmd effect on 
ColiUllunism in China.3 lt gave the Reds a "sounding boar(l" 
for the prOOl8lllation of a policy tlwt promised much to the 
peasant and working classes. These promises spurred the 
agr~ian revolution. 1'he drive to ob·ia;in land gave impetus 
to the movement. Abstract doctrines were neither he~eded 
nor understood. 
l See Ctlflpter VIII, P• 158, for a biographical sketo:; 
of Chu Teh. 
2 JJ:de;a.:r: Snow$ ~§tar ova; China, p. 149. 
3 V. A. Yakhontofi", ~ Ch:tne§B Bo:yieltS. p. 81. 
Early in 1927 Mao Tse~tung4 had traveled from 
Shanghai to Humm to inspect the i'armers' associations. 
He spent thil•ty ... two days in thin Province ~tnd there laid 
the seeds for ·the. continuing struggle a.gains1; the 
Kuomintang. Collll!lunism has ll~ad~ m03 t headway in those 
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~----'"'r=egions_wbiclLha:v_e_th"Lh:i.g_hast~propor-tion-of'-:!.'arm--tenancy ----
as distinct from farm ovmership. 5 Ml\10 real:!. zed this .from 
the start. As secretary of the Kuomintang Peasant 
Colll!llittee 1 he had gathered enough matsrl.al on J.nnd owner• 
ship in China to convince him the peasants ware ready to 
revolt. .Poor peasants, numbe:dng 66 per cent of the 
pQpulation, o~med lO par cent to 15 per cent of' the 
cultivable land; another 15 per cent \v:il.S mmed by the 
11middla peasantry"; th.e remaining 70 per cent vJas owned by 
absentee landlorels t ri<:lh peasants, and money-o;mers. 6 The 
burden of taxation .fell heaviest on thos.til who tilled the 
soil. E;x:horbitant demands were ma.de on the peasant •s 
meager holding~:>. The lo.ng•snffering masses needed only a 
lead.er to tal~e lJll:',tters into their o•m llands. 
4 Sea Chapter VII!, p. 156, for a "biograpltlc!~l 
sketch of Mao Tse"tung. 
5 Joseph Barnes and F. w. Field, »ehind the ~ 
E~stetn goQt'J,ict, p. 26. 
6 Robert Payne, Maq :~s§.,~• P• 89. 
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Getting the revolt under,~ay 1r1M one thing, sustain .. 
ing it quite another. Chiang Kai•she11:1 determined to 
protect his rear from dissident peasants. as he began l:liS 
march to the nortl<• laid plans for military action. The 
Communists themse;lvGs offe:t'e6 a disunited front. They 
___ __;c..,o,u,.l...,d..__,....a,gree on no detai:l.ect p:roo:eou:re to follmrJ. Thel'e we:t'e 
those who favored agitation by the proletariat instead of 
revolt by the peasants. d\s a result t.he whole movement was 
doomed to failure. 
Rocrults tor the peasant•1:Jorker army 1t1ere d:r·awn 
from the paas!il1try• Nationalist dese:rrters 1 and the Hanyru:lg 
miners. 7 ·rhis latter group according to one description 
, • • a race LSat7 apart. Pock•markad, fearless, 
revolutionax ies '6'y Instinct, nearly all oi' them deat' 
beoe,use und.erg:r.ound explosions of dynamite ha(l sl1atter .. 
ad their eardrums •• , • They thirsted for war agaigst 
the :Kuomintang. or against any authority whatsoever. 
Ouch were the spea:cheads of the ne\1 army. 
By september an attMk 111as :ce~<died upon ChsngsJ:w, but 
the oi'i'ensive 1 which cante to be 2mown as tilw Autumn Crop 
Upris:!.ngt failed. MEw \·JE<s captured by some "min•tuan" rmd 
------
7 snor,1 1 ;Loc. s!'!i.· 
= 
= 
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almost e.xeoutecl. He escaped at the last mamant into a field ~ 
arter unsucaessfully.attampting to bribe his captors. 
Remnants of this peasant army retreated ·to Chingkanshan 
for the ~~inter of 1927•28. 
Chingkansll.lm is a broad pina .. cJ.ad mountain on the 
spurs and olit:i.'s, and in the >virrter is covered by .fog, one 
thousand men, the nucleus of the Cc.mmunist Al'l1lY, took over 
the numerous Buddhist temples on the mount.ain1 came to terms 
~lith the local b!md.it chieftains, and set about expanding 
their influence, 
Other Chinese Communist a:11mies were be;tng formed, 
The f2,oviets were spreading also. From Kiangsi. Hunan, and 
K\~antung to Fulrien, Hupeh, tmd Kw:mgsi they axpanded 
. 
west11ard to l~zachwan ~1.m'l mve:!.chot•l. But, it vJas tha axmy o:t' 
Mao, living in the tEmples above the cliffs of Chingltanshan 1 
whieh was ·f:;he main strength of' the Communist Party. 
It 111as cold on Chingl(a.rlshan in the winter of 1927. 
Food end clothing >>ere scarce. Men uta:rved and f:colile. 
Stnall looa.l forces constantly attaeked tb.e Communists 
despite efforts to reach an agreement. With only two 
hundred ri.f'les and a. short supply of ammunition, the chance 
for det'ense o:f' their position d.epended on the untenability 
of its approaches. 
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This Army had taken heavy losses in its battles with 
the Kuomintang and c:oul.d not arford to take any more. '.rime 
was needed to :regroup ancl to replenish d\vindling reserves. 
Villagers had to be enlis'lied fo:r .future cP.mpaigna. 
Meetings •~e:re lleld at vihiah the peasants 1r1era urged 
____ t•oJ_efli£Jlri'bute ·t;he lend. Rice \~as planted ·in the moun• 
-----
tains against ·the day \~hen the Army ~Jould be forced to hold 
out in ttlis stronghold 1111 th their o\m food. It \~as du;l.'ing 
this \'linter that Mao introduced the first nml ·most famous 
ot the guerrilla slogans credited to h:l.m: 
When the enemy advances, '\116 ret:reat. 
ll'hen he escapes. we h.arass. 
Vll:um be retreats • we pu:rsue •9 v.'hen he is t..i:cod, ~Hil a.tta.ek. 
Great store was placed in tnis and other slogans. 'l'beir 
roots ~~ere doM;Jp itl Chinese history and the people rez;ponded 
to them. 
Meanwhile, Chiang ro&i-shak continued his campaign 
against tl~e North. After his rnarxiage to Soong Mei-l:i.ng 
be returned to Nanking rxorn Shanghai to resumc1 control ot 
the government post he had relinquished in August, 1927. 
Chiang recognized tiu:ee problems whose solutions t~el'EJ of 
paramount importance to the unif:l.cation of China under the 
9 ~ •• p •. 104. 
Kuomintang : 
1. '!he carrying of the Nationalist campaign into 
Peking. 
2. The control of Communism. 
3. The strengthening of the Nanking Gove:iunent • 
particula:t'ly in the rE:Jalm of foreign affairs. 
ition gave Mao the time he needed to consolidate his 
position. The control of Communism was tl1ereby .made mo:t'e 
difficult. 
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China has alv1ays needetl capital. Wh.iJ.e Chiang was 
in his monastery ret:t'eat during his brief ~etirement, he 
reiterated his belief that China's d.astiny Nas along 
republican lines after the manna1' of '"he United :;."tates.lO 
In order for her to reject socialism, money >lias needed fol' 
investment in private enterprise. sim e there was little 
money for investment in China, funds had to coma from 
outside. 
Socialism was tlle easy way. No foreign support \~as 
needeo. for its .t'ul;f'illment. High up in the mountains of 
Chingkl:l.llShatl t.he Communists started their program ot 
socialization. In Nru:1k1ng the Kuomint;ang sought loans. 
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The difference came in that this had to be a third oonsid• 
eration .Col' Chiang <~hila Mao •ms able to make collect1viza.• 
tion his primary target. 
On April 10, 192Bt the Northern Expedition was 
resUllled t~ith added vigor. E:veryv;here along the route of 
evidence. 11 Do111n 1r1:l.th the Militarists •" "Dmvn od.th the 
Imperialists," 11 Jl.bolif>h the Unequal 'rreatias, 11 cou:l.d be 
seen. But the;)' \vere not quite the <Hame as \vhan they ware 
displayed J.n f1-,n1l:Ovlo Vla:JJ against imperia:l.ism never meant 
in Kuomintang ideology vJar agaimd,~ everything .t'o:r:eign.ll 
The principles laid do~rm in the san ~ ~ ,;t; \~ere still 
follotv0d but the approach differed from th£-1t tal:"..en by the 
radical elements of the Par'by. 
Bai'owo the end of April. San Cbu~m-:f'ang was defeated 
in Shane;tung and by June, Yen Hsi•slwn's 1;roops hoisted the 
Nationalist .flag over the imp;Jrial city of Peking. wu 
J?ei .. fu ~Jas in hiding in :;;:;echutm and Chang 'l'so~lin had met 
death in an explosion outside JY!ukdan. There ~;as in all of 
China the force of Chiang l\Hi•shek and on& t;t1ousand. men 
on an obscure mountain peak do11m soutl:l. 
ll ~ •• P• 196. 
Mao T:::e-tung remained on Chingkanshan throLlgb.out 
1928. In May o:r that year Chu Teh met Mao for the first 
.. time. Chu t:~,s.d fought in the :rebellion against Y:uan 
Shih-kai and had traveled in Europe. He wes one of the 
:first Chinese Gonmtttnists. in Germany. Together these tt.olO 1 
' 
Mao and .Chu, planned a t>i:x•county Soviet linking the 
Hm::w""1~Kbngr;i•K•1antung borde:c dist:cicts. 
The f'orutation of a ,;ovi at i'ollovJ<3d e.r1 . a stablished 
pat'l;ern in most instances. Lf)Xl(3. 111as taken from the. rich 
end given to tb.e po()r. ?easants 'Were encou£agad. to rise 
in :cevolt. A small body of trained "Red n soldiers i'ormoo 
t11e nucleus of the movement. Elections were usually held 
on an oaaupEJ.tional basis. Selections of cand:l.<lates vlare 
rnada by the Communist Party. Both sexes over si:li:teen 
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years of age vJGre given the :eight to vote, and allo;.;oo to 
run f'o:;; office. "Only tnose \llho belonged to ·t;he exploiter 
class v1ere disenfranchised. • • nlS Deputies came :from tho 
poor pea~lants • \vork<J:CS • soldiers, rotudents, and tl'adesmen. 
If the proposed six-county .Soviet failod, an 
alternate plan called for a 1:;ithdrav1al to the uplands of 
YJ..angsi. Botll laade:t•s fought against tho idea of. an 
12 
'Ye.khontoi':t', £Ul.• £1!/.• • p. 89. 
-"~--
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immediate march on Changsha to meet the Nationalist a.rmies 
in open combat, find the other plan that called for a 
retreat south o.f ·tt1e Kwantung border. 
"Our main tasks," according to Moo • '1 • • , 111ere two: 
to divide the lend and to establish .Soviets. Ke 
\vanted to term the masses to hasten these pro,~esses. "1:3 
-------Howe'\i'er_,_n~me:cous disagreemoo. ts were still evident 
within tt1e Communist Party. These d:t:rf'erences 1t1ere orten 
aired• but no procedures <•Jere adopted t;hat could lead to 
any concrete action. During July and AUgust, 1928 t the 
Communist Party held its Sixth Congress in a suburb of 
Mosco''~• The following rasolL1tions were received in China 
that Alltumn: 
At the p:resent time the Party mm't every~Ihere 
propagate among the masses the idea of soviets, the idea 
of the democratic dictatorship of the Il~·oletariat aud 
peasantry, m1d the inevita.bility of tb.e coming revol-
utiona.:r:y ma.ss up:r.islng. It lll\U;t emphasize in its 
agitat,ion tne necessity fo:e ova:rthrovling tl1e ruling 
bloc 1 and the mob:!.l:tzation of the masses for revolution .. 
ary den1onstre:t.ions. • • • It :must oom;istently and 
undeviating:t.y f'ollo~l the :ana of sei:mre oi' ste.te 
power, Or!;'!ianization of.' soviets as ore;ans of. :tnsu:rrection, 
expropriation of? the lnndlords Hnd bi.g property ONners, 
and the expulsion of th<-l f'oreign imperialist •••• 
The fut1.1re grov . e olt1t:!,(>n will place before 
the ·l'arty t:JS an immetHe.te practical tasl{ >e )Jl(:lp n 
tor • !Jnd the carrying through of, a.rmec1 :l.nsurreot:ton 
as tlllil sole path foi' the completion of the bourgeosie 
democratic revolution, and to overthro1r1 the po~1e:r of 
the Kuomintang.l4 
13 Snow • Jill~.• W• 1 P• 152• 
l4 Payne, ~· ill•, p. 107. 
-----------
---~-~ 
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It is a matter for conjecture as to what Ohu Teh and 
i\W.O '£se-tung f(3lt about these resolutions. L'elegates at a 
meeting tl'lousends of miles away from. tl1e scene. spoke o:I.' 
organizing the proletariat. Ho\vever, the. proletariat we:re. 
in the very centers of Kuominte.ng influence. tJJao knew. his 
___ ____,.o...,n).y r10ne la,y with the peasants. For the ·t:!Jno being, at 
least, the cit:l.es tve:N beyond his reach. 
Attar the !'allure o:t:' ·the Canton Upris:l.ng• P1eng J?a:l. 
had led part of tds. troops to Hailofong end there formed a 
~ . t oov~e ·, However, this El.rmy ''""'s soon destroyerl and its men 
soatter.ed. Some of them traveled to Cb.ingkanshan ;;here 
they beol.lllle members of the second Red .!l.:rmy. In the Epring 
of 1928 the 'J:hird lied Army ~1a.s organized by the partisans 
around Kie.n. 
The Fourth Red li.:cmy vla.s formed by oomb:lning the 
;forces of Gil.u Tell limd Mao Tse-tung, Chu 1.~as made commander 
·and tv~.e.o took the oi'fice of Politiaal. Co!llll.dssar. More 
troops arrived in the winter of 1928 after mutinies :l..n H.o 
Chien's army. out of these eme:~:ged the F:l.fth H<ild t.:rmy. 
soviets were established in Gl1ekia.ng o.nd Kiangsu in 
Eventually Kirin Province in Jvlrulchu.ria -wa.s ca_lso penetrated. 
Nationalist troops made !}t least t-wo eonc ~>rted 
efforts to stop this gJJowth by E~.ssault on Chingk<'i:cnshan. 
Unsuccessful in both, n blockade was set up which made 
oonditiOl1s on the mountain very bad. Larger and la.rge.r 
contingents wero tr~own against the Communists gy Chiar~ 
Kai•shak. still the opposition mounted. · ':Vhe "Red" 
movement proceeded at a pac<:~ UUl'ola.ted to l;b~:1 numbers 
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.As BUpplies became cr:I:tically <>hort on the mountain 
top, a plan !or breaking through the blockade was advatlced. 
Mac•s orig:tnal one thousand men had be<Jn supplemmlteo by 
Chu Is two thouoand. Anottw:r e:tght thousand t.cl'med p<Jasants 
1 •. from soL<tl:lo:rm Hunan l:lt;~.d Jo.;tncd :;he gl.'oup. 0 squash became 
a staple of diet and ·t;he slogru;, "Dovm \v.:l.th oap.:l.tali;;m and 
eat squash, '1 111as eohoec1 ruitong the· ·i;roops. As conditlons 
worsened defections to the Kuomintang increased. Ho, to 
relieve this untenable sit;uation• the li'ourtt:, Army took out 
in commend ot' the mountain. 
'fhe men \iho canH• dot~n from Chingk.anshan could hardly 
be cs.lled a coherent • OXl;l;anized group. Rng;ged 1 dirty • 
lice-oover<~d t si;l:Ll >'loiila . :ing :O:ll!llli1el' cottons, bltey i'ac<>d 
snow~bla.uketed tea::·rain. Less than half' of th<:i'lli had rifles. 
15 ~ •• p. 108. 
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They hoped to ae.ptu:re some from the enemy. 
Fortunately for the Col1l!1lunists, this section of 
China vJas eager for ahru1ge. A succession of corrupt 
governors had left tkle Province poverty .stricken. Numerou."l 
secret societies existed to11' the overthrow of the :Kuomintang. 
i'ood tor tM tour thousand marchers. Quite often ·tne man 
lived on roots. Hundreds died from starvai:ion and 
exposure. 
As the Communists moved through Kiangsi many 
engagements were fought with governrnent troops. At Tapotel1. 
half the "Reds" <~ere killed. ':Chis fight was later 
described by Chu Teh as n 11mutt;tal bloodl,;tting Unt~orthy of 
.the nrune battle • .,16 By tl::e and of l''ebruaxy the Hed Army 
had .reached Tunghu and Hsingkuo \~here they ;Joined :fo.rces 
with the local Communists ana organized Soviets. Here the 
·troops were divided to est~i>blisb. Soviets in Yunt:lng, 
Shengheng, and L11ng Yah. 
1,1'ithin the Col1l!1lunist Party the ttvo opposing factions 
continu.e!l their struggle for supremacy. U Li-sanl7 led a 
group that asked for an immediate attack upon the cities. 
16 !W•, p. llO. 
1'7 see Chapter VIII• p. 166, for a biographical 
sketch of Li Li•sa11. 
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His opposition .favored a policy ot oonsolidation in the 
remote villages o.f Kiangsi. ThroL;gb. the whole movement ~Ja.s 
~Joven a dislil'e for discipline tW~.pered by idealism. For a 
year and a half tl'le "Reds" v1a.udered about Kiangsi sometimes 
withou.t purpose except possibly to attract followsrs to the 
________ b~a~nner~~-----------------------------------------------------
In an effort to reconcile these differences, two 
conferences VJere held in Dacembell', 1929 • a.ud 1!'eb:rual'y, 
1950, to discuss the program ot revolt. The fol'mer, the 
Ninth Party Conference of the Fourth Heel lll'll!Y • ;~as held in 
lYest llUkien and paved the t11ay for the establisb.rr1ent ot 
Communist power in Kiangsi. The latter, a local Party 
Oonterence, was called in south I\iang:>i to formalize the 
policy of lund redistribution and quicken the formation 
ot soviets. At this con:t:'erence it Vjas decided to unify too 
local units orga.u:tzed by the Red 1U'my under the Kiane;si 
Provincial soviet Government. EW May, 1930, soviet 
territory in weste;r;n ll'ukien comp:riaed eight dist:ricts and 
in Kiatlgsi an even larger area. The Chinese Heel worlters 
and Peasants ttrmy had grown to one hundred thousand ra~m.l8 
18 "Chinese soviet Congress Galled :for May 30th," 
CUine \'leell:l:y Rqy:t,ew, 52; 502 1 Nay 24 • 1930. 
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Fonr months after Mao le:f't Chingkanshan Pang '!'eh-
huei was forced to evacuate. In July J?eng attacked 
Changsha £Jnd captured that city from Ho ChiEm. 'J:he 
.c::ollll'llunists held. it :tor ton days and ·then vJere fo:rced south 
vJhe:re they Joined forces once more ·witll Mao and Chu ~eh. 
It was decided that Pang's Third Army should ope:rate along 
the K:tangsi,.Hunan bordor ;-Jhile the Four·ttt moved into 
FUkien. 
In June. 1930 1 these t1110 for<HlS, were again combinE!\~ 
into the First i~"tont Army and r.1oved. against. Ghangsha for 
the second time. This action \vas un<lertaken with 
;r;eluctanoe by Mao Tse•tung. At Kutien, in December, he lw.d 
warnea against this campaign and the lvi1ole JJ. .Li-san line.l9 
However, his field commanders despaired of continual roving 
through rugged mountains taking sma.ll villages and so 1vere 
able to overrule his opinions. ll'urther 1 a raid on "Red" 
l;loadquarters in Shanghai revealed orders !'xom the '.J:nird 
International to the Chinese Communists "to ta.lre Changsha. 
at all costs. u20 Ho,,r much influe noe this might have had on 
the decision to launall the attaok is debatable. The:re is e. 
good ciJ.a;nce it had very little. 
19 l?ayne, sm. ~ •• p. 112. 
20 m ~ J!irnes, September 1:~, 1930, p. 10 t2. 
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\llhen this second attempt to taka Cbangsha failed, 
the policies advocated by Li Li•san \>Jere tempore.ril.y 
abandoned. This faUure may have saved the "Red" Al'lllY 
from total destruction for had it succeeded a suicidal 
attack was planned on tl1e Wuhan stronghold. 2l Li ;.ms sent 
-------1;1-o--Mosco:w-for-fur,the:Ls'l::uo.y_and 25L:reJ:3_(;lnt ot' his 
=---------------
·.··· • ·fqlJ.owe:r s were ellm:l.nated. 22 
• "' , ·• · Na.nking determined to stamp out trw Communist surge 
in 1\iangsi. At least five separat;e crunpaigns were Lmder-
teken by the Nationalists to bring this area under 
oontrol,2:5 over nine llundreu thousand troops •011e:re 
mobilized against the Soviet districts. 'J!ha neu~Ussity :f'or 
this number is dascr:l.bad by !:1. H. C!1ang in telling of his 
visit to the :cogion: 
we passed through vUlages raaapture<l. from tl"l.e 
Colllll!.U.Uistt>, but soldiers "~<lore still stationed there, 
ever on the lookout for guauillas. Tne government 
troops under Ch:l.~ Kai-shek ware always in pLu~suit of 
the Communists always OJJ.:ring the day and sometimes dur-
ine& the night. They he.d to cro~;s valleys and 
mountains, but as they penetrated i'arthe:t' into the 
territory tl1.ey could find no trace of then~o24 
The rirst Campaign opened 111:i.th seven Kuomintang 
21 8nOt41 2Jl• £I.U•t p. 161. 
22 Yakhontoi't, 2ll• oi t. , p. 127. 
23 Some writers list eight drives. ~. snow, ~· 
cit., p. 165, footnote 1. 
24 Chang, ~· o;~.t. • p. 216. 
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columns numbering one hundred thousand men driving down 
f'rom the north in December, 1930• along tba !une;f'eng-Kien 
road.• 
----------II------------~R-o~-e-o*-n~~k~ __________ }lr,3o;,-m;-~t\lcc;,=11--------!---------
o!f l(_.o ,.,; "':14-.. "~ 
fOrceS 
Ki~n 
f;Jr.:i:rting Futian the "Reds" ma:rcMcl otrt> of Kian and 
took Tungh.u in a short battle. Hexe they waited. Finding 
Kian abandoned the oomxnander of the Nationalists, Ln Ti~ 
l?ing, stationed troops there and entere(\ the mountains in 
pursuit of the Communists. The cold, thin air 1vas 
25 rayne,~· cit., P• 115. 
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disagreeable to troops unusect to mountain fighting. 
Sporadic skirmishing took place. some of tne adVal1Cing 
columns lost their way. The vlhole expedition was a fiasco. 
At Tunghu a trap vms :>prung on tha .Eigl1teonth 
DiVision. The antire Fittieth Division 1tJas destroyed as it 
thousand enenw troops had been accounteu :f'or in the 
successful Oonuuunist plan with negligible losses to 
tllemselves.26 A major engagement vJas :!'ought near Ningtu 
resulting in another "Re<P1 victory. By the and of Feb;ru~o:y 
the fighting v1as over. 
ln May Nationalist l<orces opened tl:le S(JCond Campai~ 
to destroy the Communists. Action vJas conf'ined to 
approximately tile same area as the .aa:rli<;;r battles. Near 
'r'ul'lghu ·t.he Kuomintang Fifth Army was daoi.m~1ted and ·the 
equipmant of t\'IO divisions captured. Chu 'r'eh, While out• 
numbered on t11o 'Whol~:J :i'ront, managed to bring llis oonsoli• 
dated i'oraes to t11o "Weakes·t. points o;f the 1'\ationolist line 
am· thue have superiority :tor the time necessary to win. 
Intelligence and sometimes a<:rtive support vms supplied by 
·the :friendly natives maldng tho Kuominta.ng task more 
difficult. 
A Third Campaign >~as launched by 'lihe KUomin'\Jang in 
July, 1931. Three hundred thou~and "Whlte" troops opposed 
the Communists,. but onl,.y the highly respected r~inetaentb. 
Route Army was able to actueve a Nationalist victory. 
All other National.ist i'oraas met daf'aat. seventeen of' the 
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----~o:r_iginal_tl·tir_ty-thr-ee-clivi-s:tons-ware-lost-.--C}:er---c-t-hi-rty=.f-1vs---
thousand dasarto:t's joined the Communist :rmnks. l;lith eaoh 
sucoeading inV11sion the "Red 11 strength increase1l. 
On Deptember 18• 1931, tMl Japanese inva.ded 
Manchuria and Chiang Kai•sh.el~ ·t;um<)d his atter~tion to the 
north. 
their polit.ical infiltrat;i.on. On. December llt 1931, the 
Fi:t'i>t Soviet Congl'ess met and dret~ up a Con::rtitutiQn. !>lao 
'l'Se•tung c1as elected. President of the .All China .Soviet 
RapubUc~-a pretentious label for sQ lim:l.ted fll1 orgaruza• 
tion. Faith in the f:d.entlsh:!.p of. Russla \ms reaffirmed and 
an ef'f'ort "as made to r.t<s;ht some of. China.• s injustices in 
tlle field of labor • 27 
During this same P''-lriod trw "Red" Al:my c·Jas xeinf'orced 
by twenty thousand descrters from the :!'t1ent;y .. eighth Route 
27 Ya.kl:l.ontorr • .lm• m_. • P• 128; Chapter X for a 
detailed report of procedure. 
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Army of the Kuomintang. Tang Ch 11ng•tan and 'rsao Pu-sb.en 
lad the uprising at IUngtu. which 'brought these new recruits 
to the Communists. Thus strengthened, and vJith Chiang kept 
busy by the Japanese, the Communists began offensives of 
their own. Chru'lgOhO\~. in Ji'ukien, vJas captured and held 
----~f~or_six_vJ_e_eks_;_suff'i~ient_time_to_organiz<LarLundergr<>und.---
gther battles \'llare i'ought at Hsiang, Lo An, Li Chuan, 
Chien Ning. T1en Ning, ond Kanchow. Direction of: the i~.rmy 
was lett to Chu Teh as Mao devot.l;)d more and more oi' his time 
to political considerations. Chu 's oamps.igns met with 
mixed success. However 1 his initial wins heightened the 
determination of the Kuomintang to push another major 
!'o:roe against the Cormnunists .as quicf~:ly as possible. 
so it was that the Fifth Annihilation Campaign began 
in April, 193:3. Tho Kuomintang n1a.xohed south in t.ru:ee 
columns. Only one column retur;:1ed north. Tb.i:rtean 
thotlsand Nationalist soldiers st:trrendered in one battle. 28 
AJ..tnough this t~a.s a complete rout o:t' Chiang's troops the 
"Reds" seemed to bave lost ·the spa:~:k that had made t:t1eir 
earlier e.f'!orts tactical masterpieces. They had failed to 
solve the problems of the border regions and idealism •~as 
wearing thin after six years of struggle. 
28 Snow, S:Ul• ~·, p. 165. 
_.,..----- ----_-
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Nanking began ita fifth and last campaign of the 
period immediately on tt1e heals of the reverses of t.ha 
fourth. :Four hundred thousand troops 111are thrown into t.he 
fray and in one year, by October, 1934, the "Red" Army was 
inunobillzed. seventy thousand Communists, all that 
remained of' a once potent guerrilla band • t~e:re forced to 
__ c__ __ 
f'lee Kiangsi. 29 
While ti1e :Fifth Campaign was in progress. the 
Second Ne;tional Soviet Cong:cess was l1eld at Juichin. 
On January ~2, 1934, eight hundred delegates mot end heard 
Mao Tse-tung speak in e?J.o•!lng terms of Communist victories 
while admitting eoonondc di.ftioulties. J!'or all their 
victories it ;vas soon evident that the Communist IJJrmy need-
ad assistance on the field. The scorched earth J)Ol.icy of 
Chiang completely demoralized the peasants withOut Vlhose 
active suppol!t tl:le "Reds" were just another small e.rrny 
against a large foe. There could be no 1;/S.Y to salvage the 
dei.'eat short of complete :rebuilding. 
Economic difficulties presented e. di:f'ferent problem. 
Military fot·ces could one day be regrouped, a lost hill 
taken in a. :fight; but a lost ideal may Mve:r again :reach 
the high plane of its previous exist<mce. There is otten 
29 Chang, &a• cit •• P• 219. 
some de:f'iciency \vhen :p<>ople try to .reestablish a set o:f' 
principles. It suspicion supplants enthusiasm, a minor .. 
ity•s ideal cannot af:f'o:rd the change. 
'l'he Soviets have not p:rogressec1 as i'a.r as they 
should ha~e done. New tactics are necessary. A 
struggle must be lvaged against bureaucracy and the 
habit of dictation an1ong so~iet :t.'unctiormries; 
______ .Persuasion_mus~_.l'epl~<HLcl:Lotntion-in-everything-tl:'.at----
1ncludes the masses,30 
nctmitted Mao. 
Mao could have added that new fields were better 
suited to the task. 
------
CHAJ?l'ER III 
ON l'O ciHli."NSI 
1934-1937 
.MAP 3 
HOU'rE OF THJ~ LONG MABCHl 
= 
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At the end of' the F.l.fth Nationel.ist Campa.ign, 
Communist strength had been cut in half. Lacking supplies, 
harassed on all sidas, one hundred. thousand of them 
started. ~:o. journey of s:Lx thousand miles that was later to 
be called the Long Maroh,l Not knov1ing exactly vJhere they 
Kuomintang encirclement and join up •~ith the other Soviets 
in Hunan., Hupeht Honan, Anhui. end Shensi. 'J;housands of 
peasants joined in the flight. Mao.hinery '.'las placed on 
mules only to be discarded as the mal!oh lengtMned out. 
On October 16, 1934• tro1n a point near Yutu in 
southern K:Langsi the order to s1.j~U"t \i&S given. Cou.rageous 
rear-guard action held .up the Nationalists long enough to 
allow the main body time.1'or esoape. Ivla.ny ~mre the talas 
to spring from this epic of human endur~l.llca. No·t until 
1937 were the last of these guerrillas clea1•ed f:rom the . 
• 
provinces, 
Suffering and untold ha.rdsh:tps greeted ttw weary, 
battle•sca:rred veterans o!' the '!\ad Army. Death met them at 
every turn in l~he road and rained do;~n on them 1'rom the 
planes of Chiang Kai•sllek. Thousands perished but other 
l For a complete discussion of thEl Long r-!Jarch ,gt. 
Payne, ~~o ~-~, Chapter 6; Snow, ~ Jta~ ~ Qb~i• 
Chapter • 
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thousands took their places. Still they marched by day and 
by night, fight:l.ng, dying, deserting, growing, sickeningi 
a barefoot 1 ragged • vex-min-.ridden l1Wb1 blindly following a 
cause that 11romis ad a better wAy oJ.' life than any they had 
ever known. 
'!'ales of heroism ware recounted daily • The most ___ _ 
critical incident of the Lo.ng March 1r1as the· crossing o.f' the 
Tatu River. As the "Beds" emerged from the :f.'orasts, they. 
captured the river ·town of lin Jan Ch 'eng and attempted a 
crossing in three f'erryboa.ts, No'l"l the Tatu do01S not; look 
impressive on a map, but it is a sv1ii't river and 1rJider at 
flood.time in iYiay then tha Yangtze, ~>o the attempt had to 
be abandoned and another crossing had to be fOilnd. 
About 140 miles ••est o1' An Jan Ch 1ang, amidst l:!igh 
gorges 1.1l1.ero the river is narrow and de<lP.• thero is an 
iron-ol'W.in suspension bridge callao. tt1e Liu Ting Chiao. It 
was towards tl1at bridge an advanced force drove, stopping 
only briefly to ee.t rand rest. In ·these JlHl'iods polit:i.cal 
attaches unc";asingly lectured on the reasons behind this 
one action. 
The Liu Ting Chiao >~as centuries old. r>ixteen l:!eavy 
chains 1~ere stretched across the river. Thick boards 
lashed over the chains made t:h<l road of the bridge. As the 
uReds" came up thay .found half the boards had been removed 
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and a Nf~tionalist rnaoh:l.ne g~1n planted at the north. approach. 
Thirty suicide volunteers destroyed the machine gun and 
secared th<'J bridge be.fore "11/hi te" rein.forcements could be 
brought up. B:ere was an army >Jith a purpose. No paid 
mercenal'ies tllese men \~ho raced ·over bare cables into a 
hail o£ bullets; they thOught they ~>Jere try:l.ng~tincLa ___ _ 
better China., 
Onward pusheo. the CollJ!Ilunist troops• recruiting as 
t;hey 1r1ent. CJp £rom Kiangsi and ;t;Ukien throt.:~gh Kwangsi, 
Kweicho;;, Yunnan. Szechuan, Kansu 1 and into t;hensi m~cheil. 
the t1orde. 
The Great SrlOvJ Mountain shot~s an elevation o;t l.6,300 
teet on some Chinese maps. To tl1e .footsore "Re<is'-' it seemed 
much higher. Kiangsi•s mountains were foothills compared 
to these-•a mere t1~0 thousand feet. lt is hart'!. to breathe 
at sixteen thOt~sand feet 1.md a man tires easily. About 
forty thousand survived the trip over the mountains and 
joined with ·~he ;Fourth :Front _Red Army at Ta--w:.i in nort11-
~1estern Szechuan .for a much needed rest. 2 
In August, 1935, the Co!!llUUrdsts PU">hed out f'or 
Shensi. lt was H month o.f ra.in and_f_og.-----'l'OJtuar.d.S--..tl'le----
2 Payne, ~· ~. P• 151. 
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s:rasslands and into the soft, damp swa.rnps moved the "Reds. 11 
Hostile natives,3 diseasa. poisonous mud that raised livid 
welts on the flesh, long plains of black and yellow grass, 
e.nd the deathly cold. nights made this the most tortuous 
part of t11e tong March. In October .Pao An was xes.cl:led • and 
the ordeal was over. 
Iiere in $hensi there ~•as time to consolidate 
resouroas. build up the army, establish vill~cgs govern• 
ments, and spread their influence over all of Northern 
China. r .. ess than tw:mty thousand Communists had arrive:1 a.t 
J?ao lln. It seemed !mp:robable ·that this group could one dey 
be a formidable foe for Nanlting. 
Meant>hile• jealousy <5pread through the leadership o:f 
the l\lme;chantat11h the Chinese Com.munist Party. Ghang 
Kuo-t •ao, someM.nJEW vice•chaJ.rman of the f,J.angsi Soviet and 
la.ter cha:tr,;:,an oi' tne Hona.n•Hupeh•Anhwei soviets, disagreed 
with Ivlao •rsa .. tung on the disposition of the Hed /.rmy. 
Preferring to remaixl in Szechuan, he v1ae finally persuaded 
to lead his troops into Kansu and Sl1ensi by Chu l'eh and. 
Peng Teh .. huei. A year later, at J?ao An Che.ng 1 he cont!nuod 
3 One 
September l., 
stripped and 
incident reported in tlm ~ ~ l:J.me:J., 
1935, p. 12~7i ·tells o:t.' six-hundred. 11 l'l.eds 11 
chased by Lolo tribesmen near M.enningshun. 
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his opposition to Mao and in 1938 fled to Hankow. l'he 
defection of Li L:l.~san in 1931 vias of a more t(;lmporary 
nature. Li had disappeared into tl'l.e Soviet Union but 
returned to Cb.ina at the close of' ~forld Wa.r II as General 
Lin l?lao 1s political adviser and viae-chairman oi' the JUl .. 
China :Federation o:f:. Labor. 
In 1934 and 1935 the E;hensi ;.;;;oviet axpancled 
considerably. A tl'a.ining school Has established i'or tho 
Communist .Pa.rty in th.is period ot.· political. indoctrination. 
The 11 Re6s" opened a bank, issued stamps, am. p:l!inted money. 
Land was con;f'iscated and :t>edistributed. All surtaxeB 1rJeJ:a 
abolished. Co-operatives 1tlliJre opened. Pr!mal'y schools 
~HilXe sta:trted. By the mid!lle of 1935 the Soviets controlled 
t\~enty-t'tJO counties in ;Jl1ensi and l{);),nsu.4 It" was into this 
setting that t.he survivors of the Long March came. 
Shensi is a farm:l.ng Pl'OVince. C1:1ttle 1 sh~ep• and 
goats gl'aze on tb.e l1igh, loess hills. It is usually 
peaceful in this part of China. Modern liv:tng is p:ca.cti-
oally unknown. Peasants till the poor soil as their 
ancesto:rs have done :!:.'or thG r1ast thousand years. I•1ar.xists 
could not have picked a more incongruous locale for the 
-----··-
beginning of a Communist s·tate. surrounding cities were 
under the banner o:t' i;lle l\iJ.omint~. 
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Faoed ;dth a peasant society the 11Rads 11 vlisely 
adopt a a a peasant progre.ul of' land and taxes. Hm1aver • tllll 
Chinese Communists re€;a:rded land distribution as me:rely a 
preliminar;)' step jJ:l ·the estab:U_stun5lnt_of_a~mass_basELi'or ____ _ 
inroads in'l:;o indL1stry. The First 1\ll .. China •;oviet Congress 
in 1931 left no doubt as to the ultimate aim or Commun:l.sm 
in China--a compl~>te Socialist State of tre Marx• 
Leninist conception. 6 As 111ith Stalin am Trotsky • so dth . 
Mao '.l!se~trmg &nd I.,i Li•san, it n<.wer vias a question of 
\1hat to clo, but how and v1hen to do it. 
Because the .3oviets had to fight .f.'rom the beginning, 
an a.rmy 1tJS.S of p:d.mr;.ry importance. The potency of any "lWo." 
f:l.ghting force depended on the support ot: tb.e peop~e. cut 
oft t::wm any outside aid v1ith Ill1ssia. having her own 
problems magn:Lfied by a ;vorld in depres<Jion and an 
inadequate li'ive Yee:.r Plan, these Communists t1e:re left to 
their own :resouxces in a pr!Hltically xesou:r.celess J.f'.nd. 
Remoteness txom Nanlting 1 the Japanese menace, and ·~he 
inadequate. peasant program of the Kuomintang helped give 
the 11 Reds 11 a chance for success. 
5 n..1.S.• • p. 212. 
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Rep~esent;ative government of tbe communist variety 
was established \qherever the regime was stabilized. 
Patterned after the Russian system it gave eva~y indication 
ot democracy to the casual observer. suffrage was 
universal but not equal. An attempt was made to balance 
peasant influence by class5.:t'ying the rul'al popUlation into 
categories 1 gl'eat landlords, middle and small lanCU.ortts, 
rich peasants, poor peasants, tenant peasants, rural 
workers, handic:~:a:rt vlorkers, :j,umwn proletariat• and 
professional workers. In the election of the soviets the 
tenant peasants, rural workers. !~dicraft workers, et 
cetera, were given a greater representation than were 
other divisions. 
Central soviet 
~rovinoial soviet 
County Soviets 
Distriut soviets 
Village soviets 
GRAPH 2~ 
S'rRUCTURE OF GOVERNJ>LWIT IN COiVlMUNlST HUHAL ARBAS 
In each area the Collllll.Uniat Party controlled the choice of 
oand.idates. 
At this stage tl'le on:tm s:!.on of the Par.ty >;as more 
important to the revolution then ;~as the. governmental 
O.t'ganization. f.1emberslllp drives '<1ere undertaken in the 
Young Vanguards and Cl1ildren •s Brigades. Women 11Je:re 
banded. into Communist Leagues, anti-Jap1mas;e societies, 
nursing schools. weaving schools, !lril tilling brigades. 
Adult farmers ;1e:re orgruuzed into the Pool' l'aople •s 
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Society and into anti-Japanese societies. Jill ancient secret 
order, the Elder Brother i:iOciety, 1cJas given a place in tm 
social scheme of reconstruction. Peasant Guard<! and 
Partisan brigands took assignei.t positions in the new order. 
Committees were set up under each of the district Soviets 
embracing flll pru%ses or activity in the Communist areas. 
It mattered li·tt:Le to the pea.sant tilling his smal.l plot 
or lMd toot he v1as bo:tng .fit to a social pattern that 
could not permit indivM.ual political liberty and survive. 
Here ~~as a system that promised economic betterment and an 
opportunity to belong. Small 111onde:r. that it tound in lti.m a 
wilUng worker and an ardent supporter. 
Redistribution of the land •~as of great j,mportance 
in the initiation of Commwust policy. By "Red 11 
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definition "any farmer who rented out his land and collected 
most of hill income from itt and not from his own labor • 1~a.s 
a landlord. "6 In Shensi the problem was simpler than it 
had been in the Sou·th. Big estates were o.ftan owned by 
former off:Lc:!.a.ls. tax collectors • e.nd absentee landlo:rds. 
---~C=o~nf_is_c_ation_~ms_easy_. ______________________ - --
Co~operativas ~~ere established tllat vaent beyond 
p:roduotiorl and distribution. Jlnimals and machines vJere 
pooled .tn a common effort. Labor societies 111ere organized 
to plant and ha:~:vest largo axeas quickly. f~\rl':ln tile army 
~Jas used for this work at least one dey each ~ru~ek. The 
Communists >vere taking a step to~tJards tile kolltozes of' the 
Russian farm areas. 
Poll tioally, economically • and ed.ucational.ly, at 
t.'i:rst glance. the Shensi soviets seemed to pres~e a. ne~l 
and better <ll'a tor the Chinese peasant. Ethically, the 
\vest and most Western observers took a dim view of t;he 
moral aspects of Communist control. The:re can be no 
denyir~g the mate:rial failure to promote the economic wen .. 
being of' the people und€r t11e old :regime, but none can 
pra.tse the "Spiritual" rejuvenation of the new. It is in 
this that the soviets tailed. Their economic suooess 
6 ~., p. 216, 
enhances the chance for failure. It' the Chinese • or any 
people, ever reach the point whe;re physical necessities 
are easily obtainable then COJPJ!lunism o1~ ·t11e ~ussia.n 
variety will disappeal'.. In Shensi, as elset•tlere • 
Colll!llunism flourish~1d on poverty and had to expand to 
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------------------ .. -
Two tasks faced the Soviets in thel North~riest: to 
t'll!ed and equip the Had Army • am to bring iul!lledia.te relief' 
to the peasantry. P:rivf:l.te capitalism, State capitalism, 
and socialism existed side by side in the soviets. The 
State owned and exploited heavy industry but allowed some 
competition from. priva"!Hil enterp;rise. undur restrictions, 
in the transaction of land and its products. 7 A third 
competition 111as permitted in the co-operatives wl:le.re 
members competed against p:~:ivate and state capitalism. 
Socialism <~as tl1.e aim of these co-operatives and their 
functions were listoo to attain these ends: 
1. To combat the exploitation of' the masses by the 
merchants. 
2. To combat the enemy's blockade. 
3. To devGlop the natdonaJ_ economy of the soviet 
distriots. 
4. To liaise the economic pol:l.tical level of ·the 
masses. 
7 Mao 'l'se~tung took his lesson from the failure of 
the Russian experiment in 1918-1921 when all capital »as 
abolished in the Uoi~.~>.R. 
6. To prePlil:ra t.he conditions for ~ocie.list 
construction.s 
Consumption, stlles, IJroduction, end credit 
co-operatives 1/Jere organized on all political levels. 
Shares 11le:re priced so that even the lOtiest peasant could 
a!'i'ord to participate 1n tne endea.vo:r and there \'Jere no 
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restrictions placed on tne number of maaibers-.-However.--a---
member had only one vote regardless of' the number or 
s:tw.res he posrH:lssad. Prizes were otf.ered :!.'or efficiency 1n 
mana.gemlilnt; mana.gers being elected by the co~operatives 
with the assistance or the central bureau. The government 
invested and shared 1n these enterprises. 
Trade wa.s a problem for the Northwest area. An 
agrarian economy yielded bulky ra111 materials tl'l.l!l.t were 
dif.f.'icult to transport a.a:ross the marshy i.'luts and up ·che 
:rocky hillsidE>s that passed tor roads. Manufactured 
al'tiales were neede(l. These had to come from ID.lomintang 
areas .for the most part. Soviet currency \vas not 
aooepted outside t;ha Communist zone and a way had to be 
round to get enow;;;h Na.tionalist cunency to pay :for imports. 
8 Snov1, .9Ji1• .w.t_., · P• 222, quoted i'rom og.tl:!.ne Q! 
Co•Ot)eratiy@ Dqvaloi)meut, Department o:f' National Economy, 
November, 1936, ··ayapao, Shensi, p. 4. 
1?o eomplioe.te the situation further, exports had to be 
sold on a depressed market like sn1uggled goods. Xh.e need 
£or money was acute. 
Lin Pa.i-ohu, veter~m of the Long March and 
Communist Commissar o;t' Finance, explained his three-fold 
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program. oi' fund raising thusly 1 a direct tq_~§'l[:i..ed on the..__ __ 
people, volu~tary contributions, and confiscation~ This 
last method provided the biggest and fastest source of 
revenue. but also had the shortest life. For all of Lin's 
efforts• the unfavorable balnnoe continued. No adequate 
solution short of' legitimate ncoess to machine industrial .. 
ization oould solve the d:Uemma.. That the "Retis•• managed 
to survive under such an economic burden attests to the 
tenacity of the movement and to the impoverished conditions 
under \'Jhich the people had lived prior to its coming. 
Illiteracy in the Northwest was sat at about 95 par 
cant :l.n 1935. soviet adtloation at·talnpted to cover all 
phases of human activity. Hotvever, greatest emphasis .vas 
placed on mil.itary education ;~it;h schools oxga.r1::tzad for 
tne in:f.'antry, cavalry, radiomen• medical men, and 
engineers. Teachers tvere scarce, instruction crude, 
socialist propagand.a plenti:l'.'ul. Those who learned to read 
could not doubt t-ts to who had taught tl'lam or their part in 
the great struggle. I~ach peasant knew the Reci lU'my as tha 
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Poor Man's Army, the Red li'lag as the Poor Man • s !iJ.eg. 
These were !ltlllo.ng !:lis f':trst lessons to be repeatecl over and 
over again. Educ11t:.ton in ShQnsi served. the Communists 
~ell. Rudimentary but effective, a tullY developed system 
mi€;ht have been detrimental to tlho cause in the long view. 
_______ ..,s=uperstition pl!cy'ed a v.:!.t~_nar'\l_in_.bhS>_health_habit.,_s __ 
ot this region. Vater was considered harmful, and a man 
bathed but twice in his lif'e-•once at birth and again at 
maxriage. To combat such practices schools t~ere set up 
umer Hsu 'l'eh-11.9 H0111ever, these schools were more often 
used for political indoctrination than the teaching of 
health as suoll. Children learned. their first characters in 
the f'oxm ot revolutionary slogans and then wo;r;ked :t'orwJ>rd 
into stories of oontliot betwaen tte "Reds" and the 
Kuomintong. landlords l!lld peasants. capitalists, and 
workers. 
Let us no;~ leave anensi brie:t:ly and f.iUl'vey the 
happenings in ot'.h<ll' parts of China. The Japanese threat 
~~as beill€; felt all throUgh Asia. and the Nationalist 
Govarll.lllent pr as sed to relieve the sltus.tion. Japan had 
gone into r4runohuria in 1931 and gave every evidence of 
9 See Chap·tar VIII, p. 154, for a biographical 
sketch of Hsu Teh-li. 
staying the:re •. .Despite ti:ds foreign aggression yuallunl$ 
aontinued their Jealous grasp of portions of China. A 
National Ivti.litary Council composed of ll'ang Yu~hsii'tng, Yen 
Hsi•shan, and Chang Usue-liang v1Hl1 Chia11g Kai~shel~ as 
cha.l:~.'tuen Nas short-lived. CJ.v.U 1:mrs broke out .in 
70 
____ _:.::c.:·m.=an==:t:..::tl=n~g• Bzeohuan, and K•~eioho>1 in_l~:.'$1)_j;_o __ a_dd_to __ j;he ___________ _ 
difficulties in the attempt to unify China. In November 
of 1933 a group of Chinese generals led by Ch'en Ming .. ch'u 
declared the independence of Fukien and established a 
government at 17oocho~;. Nanking sent land, sea, arld air 
:f'orces against the city and retook it by January. In 
othe~ southeastern pxovincas. such as Kwangtung and 
Kwangsi, the Nationalists had only nominal control withOut 
effective authority. 
In the late Spring of 1936, as the Japanese ~on~n~ed 
their pressure on thill north, these southern armias took 
the i'ield demanding i;ha.t Chiang Join them in on attack 
s_gainst the invaders. :Fe!! av1h.ile it appear<Jd a clash would 
'be inevitable, as the Ganel.•a.lissimo roode it evident he 
would resist ruzy attempt by these troops to move !10J!th. 
However 1 the southern revolt collapsed ~Jithout ruzy serious 
fighting, the l'esult being tl1e extension of Nationalist 
authority to the Canton regions. Thus, we may see the 
widespread daf0otions in a land that ne0ded unity above 
7l 
all else. ~ govermuent at Nanking being pulled apart by 
internal txoubles, \va:rlo:rds ple.y:l.ng politics .fox power, 
revolt in t;b.e >3outl1• and the Japanese in Nanchuria at'id.ed 
up to a bargaining point for the Collllllunist Party. In 
1936, at Sian. the capit:U oi' Shansi 1 tho crises oama to a 
____ hilJlid •. _~-------------------
'JJo Sian in 1935 had come the Young i'lal'Shall, General 
Chang Usueh-Usng, a.nd appr o.x:l.ma.tely one ~umdrect thirty 
thousand troops to blockade the Red A:r:my in the North-vJest. 
These IJ!al'l.churiaruJ 1 having been i'oxcibly rmnoved from their 
h.omal.and by the Japanese, oon·tinu,~ly agitated :L'or action 
in tl'la·t direction rather than against the CollllllU11ists. 
Consequently, the thl·eatened punitive expedition never 
seemed to get und;,rway. Genal'~ Chang even established. 
friendly relations vli.th Chou I:::n-lai,lO laison oti'ioial for 
the Kungchantung. 
Recognizing the inherent danger in trds state of 
a1'fai.tw, Chiang Kai•shek fle1tJ to Sian on December 4, in 
order to hasten the propoo ed offensive. Instead o:f 
acaomplishin.g tkds • -t;lllll Generalissimo \~as imprisoned and 
held for tourt~;H.!ll1 days by CJ1.ang Hsuea . ,.liang. l!'irst reports 
lO See Chapter VII! • page 161, fo:r: a biographical 
sketch of Chou En-lai. 
ct.' ransom demands· vla:re said to include five points; . 
1. A grant of ~:30 1ooo, 000 to Chang • s army. 2. A new and better garrison area. 
3• Equipment and supplies equal to· those supplied 
to government armies. 
?2 
4. A stron~e:r fwn·t against Japan. 
5. O.:f'fiGers of' Chang's F.trmy to get e;tecutive posts 
in the p:t'Op.Qsetl n<m l:.llti~J·a.panese army· for national 
salvation.u 
H:o\'Jever, ·t;hase speci.fioations raay l:lavlil been hast:l.ly drawn 
tor later reports modified and broadened the demands to 
contain: 
1. A cessation o.f hostilities in tb.e Civil vmr. 
2. A re .. organization of tho Nanking Government to 
include all parties. 
3. Release of' patrict:!.o leaders arrEls.tad in 
Shanghai. 
4. :nel<mse of <J.ll political prisoners. 
5. Guarantee of' the right of. assembly. 
6. Assurance o! the r:!.ght of. the people to cs.:rxy 
out pa.triot1c movements. 
7. Faith.t'ul execution o1' the ~~ill >Of sun Yat~s<m. 
a. A oon:teranoo f'or national salvatic.m.l2 
Ohiang would raeJta no definite oollllllitmants. Mrs. Chiang 
Kai-shek, T. V;, Soonfh and IN'. H. Donald arrived in Sian on 
DeGember 22• to e.f't'aot his release. SUrprisingly enough• 
Chou En•la.i helped in bringing this about.l3 'l'he Commun• 
ists were awa.:r.a of: tho Generalissimo • s ab:tlity to unify 
l1 ruut ~ Times~ December 21, 19361 p. 1:6. 
12 Chang, SJ:i.• W• , 11. 24 9; Ne1• X!Wi; 'l.'imes • January 
19~~7 1 P• 10:2. 
the country against Japan. They also fearecl making a 
martyr of a erson they would someday need to discredit 
before t;h<i Chinese people. 
On Decembe:r 25, lc:J~36, Chitmg Kai•shek lvas freed. In 
the spring oi' ·~he i'ollc wjJ.Jg year • Chou T::n•lai c0as named as 
____ .,C.,olllil~lun...,..,i st l'iJJ:l.r~e s_enta:ti'\l'e_at~Nanking _bringing-in-an-e ra-o:!'.'-------
oloser eo~opero:t;:ton between the "Reds" and tl1.o "l'lh.ites." 
Meam1hila the soviet Government moved !rom Pao An to 
;lenan,. e. site chosen for its h:.tr:Jto.ricul s:i.gnli'icance. This 
city had seen the dov1nfall oi' the last purely Chinese 
dynasty, ths !JLi.n,.q;s. Perhaps lt..ao Tse~tung ;•is had to bogin 
a naw kind of' dynasty ho:ve. In any <'iV<mt, Yenan assumes 
an important niche in tho rise of COJlllllUl'lism in China, a 
springboaxd fox all that follows. 
The years 1934 to .1937 111ere ones of consolidation 
i'or the forces of Communism in China. Mao Tse•tung 1s plan 
for a communis·t; regime 1 built on land reform and poli t-
ical indoctrination, shmved rosuJ.tu. SUppoxt affordM tb!:l 
Communist Army by the people of the area accentu~?.ted its 
effectiVEU16SS • Japanese aggresaion in l"lanchUl'ia, tha 
defection o;t' Chang Hsueh-liang, revolts in t.be south• 
friction >~ith:tn the Kuomintang, and ·!;he remoteness of 
Shensi prev<mtad Chiang Kai•shelr from bringing adequate 
pressure ·jjo bear ou tlli ~> region. Lef't alone, the 
I 
I 
I i 
I I 
I 
-1 
74 
Colll!llunists built a hard oo:r.e of resistance to NEttionalist 
control. 
N.tiNKING AND YENAN 
19::57-1945 
Early in t;l1e Jnorn;tng of' Jnly 7 1 .. ·"'' 7 ,J• .'>JO. f on ·L;ha Marco 
the Sino-Japanese 'i11r in earnest. Nith thi.s overt act 
against the ·~ar:ritory of China proper • the NUJ:l.king auth-
orities had no c11oica but to J:':l.nd a solut.ton to t.he 
Cornrnun:Lst problem. l''our pxomisas ~~bich had been agreed 
upon earlier \Jere published by the Kuomintang on J1.1ly 151 
1937. These included: 
1.. The Chinese Communist Party shr.J.l stxugglG i'or 
the realization of ·the three principles of tl:le 
people. 
2. They will abandon the policy of overthrowing 
the Kuomintang regime, give up the communi.3t mov,>man·~. 
and discard the policy of con:fisonting land by force. 
3. They \~ill dissolve the present soviet organiza-
tion• and by carrying into practice '!;he principles of 
democracy, they dll help to bring r;bout the 
political unity of the t~Jhole nation. 
4. TtJ.ey \dll disband th'; Had Army.l 
.!en waeks a;l.'ter the beginn:l.ng of the war the 
Communists announced ·tl1ei:r vertJion of thesG :promises: 
\ 
._ 
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1. TM Communists propo:oe to abandon the agral'ian 
revolution they have practiced in the past. 
2. 'rb.ey propose not t.o ovortb.rov1 the Kuom:l.ntar~g by 
force. 
3. They pro;ni.se to l'oorganize the soviet GovHrn-
ment 1n the border region as a democratic. local 
govGrnment. 
4. '£hey c1.gree to reorganize the 11ed Army as a 
national revolLltion!'il'Y army. 2 . · 
_______ --.:Tha_dis_cr5lpJ:ln_ci.9_s in those interpretations Inay_ be ____ _ 
laid to a judicious ef'.t'ort on both sides to ••uave face." 
In actual pract~~.ce the Conwunist vexsion vltlS t;he 011e 
'1he "Heds" did not; oi'fe:r much in thu way o;f real 
compromise for aJ.l the iluposing 11Jord.ing of their 
concessiorw. I·Jitll a i'ull scaJ.e inva8iOt:l of. ttv> mainland 
by a 1uajor power undar•~ay, there i'Jas lit;·t;l& oppo:rtun5.ty to 
continue a program or agrarian rofol'm. Secondly, l1ussia 
recognized. Japan as her first enemy in .t.sia. So1ne oi' this 
fear 'Was tranmuitted to the Chinese Coll'.munist leaders 
during ·t;heir r.P,osoo~> stay. It could ba of no benefit to 
overtl1ro111 t;he Kuomintang and tllen fall prey to Japan. 
'l'he ·third ag:~:oement -was neve:c i'ulfilled despite a great 
di<>play of iiilections and balloting. l'he fouxth saw ·tl1G 
Red Army become officially the E:'cghth Hou-te Army tdth a New 
;--
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Fourth Army organized out of the scattered guerrilla forces 
in Central China. outside pressure had brought an uneasy 
truce to the struggling factions within China. 
From 1934 to 1937 both Chiang Kai•shek and ~mo 
Tse-tung hli!.d refurbished the morale .of' their respective 
____ _~,:r_on_ps-'byJan~-e_senting their immediate enemy to be 
---
Japanese imperialism. 'rhe General;tssimo •s "anti-bandit 11 
campaign oJa.s a preparation for the fight against Japan. 
Every pillbox built was a defense line against the coming 
attack from tba Island Empire. so, also, every step taken 
t0\1ards tkle west by the 11Reda" was training for the 
struggle with Japan. 
Even after the attack on LUkouahiao there was no 
slackening ot p~essure on either side. Not until January, 
1938, following the Japanese victory at Nanking did an 
actual "modus operandi" become effective, and then only on 
a limited scale. 
The :formation of the People •s Political Council ;vas 
Sj?mbolic of Chinese unity during the ~1arly period of the 
war. !t first met on July 61 1931.. Of its tvJO hundred 
members • seven were Communists. This group had three main 
powers: (l) to consider government policies and actions; 
(2) to submit proposals to the government; and (3) to 
question high government officials and receive reports !rom 
I 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
tham.3 In the beginninl$ the People •s J?olit!cw.l Council· 
served as a :::1ounding board :f."or national opinion, but even 
this perfunctory use vsas curtailed as disunity spread. 
'!he New Fou:T!th J.\:r:lfi'J ~Jas permitted to engage in 
guerrilla activity on the north and south banks or the 
____ Y.~>ngtze River. Recruits f'l·om the provinces flocked to the 
·~----
colors of' Yah Ting, its commander. Political prisoners, 
peasants, students • and factory workers jointed the surge. 
Mao Tse-tung formulated a theory t~hioh sa\rJ the war 
divided into three periods: (l) Ja.panese o:f:t'ensive • 
Chinese retreat to gain time; (2) Japanese offensive 
blunted against the foothills of Nestern Cl:lina; and (3) 
Japan•s internal and international contradictions reach a 
breaking point. followed by larga*scale Chinese counter~ 
offensives and victory.4 These tactics ~ere adopted by 
the Nationalist Forces in their retreat to the 1:1est. 
ln 1939 Generalissimo Chiang set up a guerrilla 
school vlith some ideas borrowed from the Communist 
Military Academy at Yenan. c;hortly before this Chiang tlad 
madE! a declaration at Nanyo \vhioh showed a change in the 
4 Edgar Snoto, ~Battle ,W ~. P• 178. 
emphasis of ths Government on the cond~ot of tM >vat. He 
said: 
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The people are more important than the army. 
~errilla warfare is more important than positional 
warfare. The political education of the soldiers is 
more important than military education. Propaganda is 
more important than bullats.6 
--------Genal:al.-Yeh-Ghien;;;;:yir..g-,-nnea.n_ ___ ta.cticie.u., --'Jzas-some• ---
time adviser in the new school. Outwardly at least, the 
Kuomintang and I\llMhentlln€; seemed to be moving in the 
direction o!' oompleta b.armony. It looked as though the 
"Whites" were turning 11pink. 11 Military n.eoass.ity lett 
little choice. A capitalist system 11itho~t capital is an 
impossibility. A non-industrial nation attempting to :f.'ight 
a war on an industrial basis is likewise impossible. Fo;r 
all of this, the basic dii':f'eranoas between communist and 
National.ist remained i:r:reconoile.bla. <.."hina presented 
muon less than a united :front against the irlvlilders. 
Throughout 1938 't;he picture o:t.' amicable :relations 
was often vigorously port:rayed.6 By 1939 this thin veneer 
of friendship had worn smooth. As enemy pressure 
slackened, the Kuomintang; turned. to the task of regaining 
5 ~ •• P• 183. Chiang's shift in tactics noted in 
~ Isl.U; ~s, Peoember 15, l938t P• 14:3. 
6 &r!:l, ~ May 1 1 J.958 1 p, 3:5; May 1, 1938, 
p. 37:1i June 12, , p. 30;1; Octobe:~: 7, 1938, p. 16:1; 
November 9, 1938• P• 21;5, 
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control relinquished to other factions in the government. 
Chou .b~·lai• Communist vice-chairman of the Political 
Department o£ the National Ililili.tary Council, 111as deprived 
of all reo.l po\.;er. Bookshops were raided and l:ttel'ature on 
the Eighth Route and New li'Ot.u;th Armies .vas confiscated. 7 
cut off. Arms supply to Communist•led troops was stopped 
eJ.together. A blockade of the Shensi, Kansu, and 
Ninghsia areas w~s initiated by Kuomintang forees.e 
North Ch~a has alNays r<lma.ined a nation apart .f'rom 
the south. It tb.ere had b~:K:n unity in 1938, there had 
been no surrender of' sovereignty. After Sian the Commun-
ists ;>ere left in coxltrol of an area the size of England. 
¥11th the union of the Kuomintang s.nl the Com."'Runist Party a 
-speo:'..eJ. admi:nistJ:ation tvas set up for the ter:ri tory. 
Ienan became the capital of the new provisional goV,ernment 
as ·it l1ad been the oapi tal of the soviet Republic. It 
:remained t>he oente:r of Communist Party ~tctiv:tties as ~Vell 
as headquarte:cs f. or the l.t:l.gl1th Route Army. 
'7 ~ X!;Wf; Urnqs. November 16, 1939, :p. 8:4. 
8 Israel Epsteinw :Che Qiji'il~!.}heg, Reyolgt:l,on !n 
gwr~a, p. 124. 
This c5.ty suffered repeated bombardment by the 
Japanese during the vJar. In spite of the dest:t>uotion. 
conditions ;~e:t'e better than had been enjoyed by the 
Communists at Pao An. 9 Industry, trade, and agrioul ture 
expanded slowly. li\lblio health progressed to the point 
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___ __,~ ... ~h""e.._.r._.e._:plague which was edf;lmic to the regic>_n h_ad_!l9_1; been.__ ___ _ 
felt for two years. 
Eoono:mically the Communist controlled areas •~ere 
faced :with a two~way blockade, .from Japan and f'ro:m the 
Kuo:mintang. In order to overcome the difficulty of supply 
it vJas necessary to establish sel.f-su:f':f.'ioiency in the 
regions of' occupancy. This progl;'am "as launched in 1940 
by ten thousand soldiers of' the One Hundl'ed •r;ventieth 
Division of the Eighth Route.t\r:my unde.r General 'iang Chen. 
T11ese troops turned f.'ar:mel's enlisted the aid of the 
peasM·ts to produce 4,600 1000 pounds o:f :millet, 450 1000 
pounds of. pork• ond l,ooo.ooo pounds o:f potatoes and 
pumpkins by 1943.10 Not only did soldiers i'a.:rm on a large 
scale 1 'but also m!lintained their own smithies • spinning and 
v1eaving factories, ta.ilor shops, o:l.l pressing mills• and 
food preserving plants. 
9 snov1, £m• ~. • p. 266. 
lG Epstein, £m• .91Ji.• 1 p. 262. 
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In the r~hansi•Hunan•Hopei Area soldiero reclaimed. 
l.nrga stretches o:.t:' land in the bnnen Taihrulg .Mountains. 
The Army in Shantung supplied its needs to the ve.lue of 
$56,l56,ooo.oo or about ~?l,OOO.OO for O!l.Ch regular soldier. 
In central Hopei each man was obliged to cultivate one 
sixth of' an acre annually .u J'apanes<~ .attacks often 
coincided with the planting and harvesting seasons. They 
hoped to force the Chinese troops tnto requisitioning food 
from the people and thereby to destroy ·the relationship of 
peasant to soldier vJithout 1r1hich .gue:r.rilln wa:r.fare is 
impossible. Labor l!;Xchtmge Groups foiled th<Jse attempts by 
reducing planting !i'.l:ld harvesting ope:ratlons f'rom six to 
two 1.1eeks. 1-ihat had formerly bean done by the individual. 
peasant on his O>~ll ;f.'arm nm~ was done by tr1e t'Jb.o1e Village. 
Necessity forced community co~operation. 
Agriculture has been the fox emost industry in 
China from tiroo. immemorial. The search tor more arable land 
b.as occupied the efforts of sage and pol:l.1;;!.c:l.en1 conquei'ed 
and conqueror • landlord and peastmt for centurier>. China 
is the lend of flood and drought. Her Dumy rivers furnish 
enough wat<~r for o:rops ~lhen :l.rrigt:l.tion project~; n.re 
developed. 
11 4bid •• P• 279. 
, __ 
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one of the se:rious effects of theJapanesa invasion 
was the deterioration or the system of irrigation. 
Punitive eJ::paditions often found :!.t advan·l;ageous to demolish 
dik!:!ls. Hebuilding tvas difficult I'Jith the lack of 
mechanical equiplllent I'?..Ild decreased manp01:Jer. Hov1ever • in 
____ _.t .... h..-e.___.Pe~:l.~ ao region_Q_f' tl'l_e __ Sb.ansi .. Honan ·Eope:l.J;Gct:ton_ovel? ___ _ 
eight hundred thousand e.ores of n•n~ land 1was oultivated in 
l940·l94l. On t!:1e Central. Hopei plain 197 major dike 
bree.ohes \'Jere mended, one hundred ninety miles of ne•~ 
embankments built, and fifty miles of' r:tvor do-:opened.l2 
1939•1941 were years of tria~ for the fxonts behind 
Japanese lines. h'ith the regular .front inacti va, Japan 
could concentrtcte on flush;tng the guerrillas. At the 
beginn:l.ng of ·the resi!Jtance th<iNl had been unity .in China. 
Now there was no b.ope of getting tmpplies from the 
unoccupied areas contl'ollerl by the Kuoraintang. Consequent• 
ly, the gue:r.rillas had to extend their operations, to 
capture more arms • and to keep the enemy clO busy in so 
many places that hE1 could not concentrate against any one. 
First the Japtmese tried conventional methods of 
pos1 tional vial' • Attacking on a 1vide f:r.ont, they ~;ould 
take some place from the Communists. After finding that 
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all they hP.d gained i18.S land, tl'le Impe:dal Army next 
orga.nizec\ commando ~5ro11ps of about one thousand men to 
o~1rry out quick, deep raids :tnto Chinese terl'ltory designed 
to .snnihilo.te directing oe.nterH and sepl'l.rat;e detacl:llllents. 
The first such strokE~s 'lvere <L>livored in the ;;;pl:ing and 
autumn of 1939, in the southeast wutai Mounta:tn Jtt'ea. 
Lieutenant General Abe, tile highest Japanese colll!D.ander on 
the mainl&.nd, had devieed the tactics and died t:.:rying to 
lllalte them m;wcessful. 
lio. series of foJ::ts v1ere constructeCI. to "str,:;mgle" 
the roving Cbinose troops. 'fhese vH'J:r.e also ummccessf'ul. 
'fhe guen•illas neve:r let ·the JapHnesG: get their baleJJ.ce, 
T11ey ltept the initiative by conr.rtant t?,tto.cl~, alvJays main .. 
taining superio:t'ity in the a:reas of activity. '.Cl1e mili'ti:il 
was pa:rticularly effective in :miping and mine-laying. 
,he:roa.s ~ formerly • tl'l<3 Japanese entered villaa;Gs at, i1ill in 
t;mall. numbe:r. s, they n0111 did so only vlho.n a cmn1Jaign extended 
thrm gb. the te:r.r:tto:r.y. 
F.ri1tlon bc.rtween the Communists end Nationalists 
mounted. Do;m south• t.ht~ Nevi Fo1.arth A:r.my, which hatl. 
achieved ~<o.me lllEH>.suxe of fame fo:r its anti .. Japanese 
resistance in the lown• Yangtze Valley, found itself in 
serious uif.fimllty. 
In contrast to the :>tony mountains and d:ry plains 
o:t: the Eighth Route Army basl!ls north of tllil Yellow River, 
the New l<ourth operated in the rich, green, humid valley 
of the Yangtze among nooded rica fields texraoed along 
gentle slopes. Inter-party strife began in 1938 in this 
!>liiOtor, After the de:f.'ection oi' :f.\n•mer Premier 1 ~lang 
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___ ___,Ching~\'te1,_to_tha_JapsnesE!l,-1t-was-difficult--to-tell-foG---­
from friend. 
Three types of national f'o:~;~ces had held the lower 
Yangtze at that time. The New Fourth numbered ten 
thousand men, the "Loyal and Victorious" Army of 
Kuomintang Secret Service Chief Tai Li numbered e.:t.ghty 
thousand men, Central /U?my troops numbered about fifty 
thousand in ·the area. It ;~as not until the Japanese 
stopped their general of.fensive that the differences in 
the Chinese camp came to the .forefront. The Ne11 Fourth 
continued its program o.f limited offensive against the 
Imperial troops. Kuom1ntang leaders wished to take the 
t.:t.ma to consolidate and rest. 
Late in 1940 Ho Y.:t.:ng-ohin, \mr Minister and Chie.f 
o.f Sta:t'.f to the Central Government, ord<lred the Ne~;1 F'ourth 
to leave its bases behind the enemy l:l.ns s and. to move 
several hundred miles to the nortkl bank of tlle Yellow 
River, there to join 1vith the Eighth Route. 'l'l:le 11 Hads 11 
refused to obey. In January, 1941, Government units under 
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General Shangkuan Yun-hsiang attacked the New F'ourth 1al'ld 
destroyed its organizational arm. .1\~though. its headquarters 
were gone, only one :f.'ourth of its efficiency was impaired. 
Like all forces engaged in guerrilla activities, it ••as 
divided into tactically autonomous dataohments, each 
---~hold_ing_i:ts_o_;m_pocket_o:f'_resistance_and_depend.ent-<>n-----~ 
headquarters· only i'or general guidance, not .i'or supplies 
and day to day direction. 
The. Kuomintang versj,on of this a.f'i'air was one of 
disciplinary action against an insubordinate unit. The 
Kungchantung saw in it a renewal of' Civil :rar. The Net-J 
~ Iim§![!. sa1r1 other possibilities t 
It is not accident or coincidence ttlm.t the most 
recent .flareup bet;1een Chiang Kai-s.tulk and the 
Communists has occurred while Japa.n•s special. Amba.ss• 
ad or is negotiating t11 th Premier and ll'oreign l'tlnister 
Vya.chesloff M. }1olotof'f in :Moscow on a. possible 
aliireement .t.'ollowing on Japan • ~ formal adherence to 
the German•ltalian alliance.l.a 
The qu~rel LPetwean the Chinese ConMunists and the 
Kuomintallii!/ turns upon two demands. :rna Eighth Route 
Army asked to be trans.ferred from its present field or 
operation in the impoverished notthvJestern provinces 
to the richer and more populous Yal:l.gtze V~llley, no1t1 
largely under Japanese control, arguing tlw.t they cot~ld 
fight there more effectively. The Fourth Route Army 
demanded an immediate national convention with a view 
to broadening the basis ot government • • • • 
As to tna Yangtze, a Chinese victory i11hicn ;•ou.ld 
leave Communist forces in possession of the cou.ntry•s 
richest provinces lriOUld scarcely be palatable to the 
government unless it were first assured that those 
.f.'orces £~t loyalty to China above adherence to 
Moscow. 
l'lb.ether o:t pl'i!llary national or international significmnce 
the discord in China was evident. 
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Industrial production in Communist sections 111as 
nat.u:~;ally centere1l in supplying the army. Each c:t the 
nineteen Red areas had at least one base arsenal employing 
from ho hun(lred to one thousand i>orkers.l5 The making of 
small al'lll!il was their t'i:r:st job. Hith an extremely lrtobile 
force there is little need :tor unwieldy tield pieces. 
Then, too, operating so close to the invading army. it was 
necessary to move on an instant •s notice. .11\aSily disman-
tled and easily transported machinery v;as ttte order of ttta 
day. 
Ra•• material.s for arms production came from the <mr 
i tsel:f.'. Japanese rails were torn up steel and Japanese 
oo:mmun1aa.tion lines for copper. Captured ''scrap" 
accounted for almost aJ~ of the meta~s used. 
'l'axt1les v1ere produced largely by the >vomen in tru1 
villages. Conservation came as a matter of course. 
l.4 ~ •• January 22, l94l• p. 2012. 
15 l£pstein, .lUI.• .!lU.•, p. 287. 
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Un!for1n factories were maintained by the army.· Old uniforms 
had to be turned in for salvage before new ones were 
issued. '.!?he cloth ~Jas torn into ~Strips am used f'or 
padding in shoes or plaited into :rope for sandals. '.l?o save 
metal uni:t'orm buttons were made of v1ood. Glazed earthen• 
___ ____c\-l_ar_e_t_o_ok_tt~_plac_lLof_en!l1llalad_metAl_ins1g.n:ta.---------
The Communists printed. their own currency throughout 
the war. Init:i.ally, the .flooding of "Red 11 controlled areas 
with money printed by the Japanese ~ave impetus to the 
printing. Then, in keeping 'lvith the ideal o;f' a selt-
oontainea economy • the practice was continued. f1s in most 
agra:ri~ll'l societies and particularly those that are 
socialized, there is little need i'or coin. &rt<I~r serves 
as well. In the eyes of the state it !larvas better, 1"ol1 
cont:ol is easier. To bribe en indi vid~.tal wi·th a bushel o:f 
grain is congruous. To pay the state with a bushel of 
grain is natural. Taxes in kind had been extracted :f'rom 
the Chinese people for years. 
\'1/ith a governml;lnt constantly alerted to move, ha~ ever, 
it was necessary to have t11e people accept a currency that 
-eould be minted by t;hat government. In this t~ay a base 
could be built for economic salvation in the event of 
military disaster. 
,-
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Txade in China 1r1as carried on among its geograph .. 
ical subdivisions regardless of political affiliations. 
Hostile ·terrain, lack of col.lllllunications, and the tvill of a 
determined people made it virtually impossible for Japan 
to close off its sections. Txade \'las slow and often 
____ -"h.,..a,..zardSLUS_but_e.lvJay-s_acti:v-!;1 o-'l:he-Kttom1nt•~•~-'blookade -irlaS ----
even less effective. Although Nanking protested against 
the "Red" practice qf coining l!loney, there was nothing she 
could do about it. l'.nd ••ithout these issues the Collllllunist 
economy would have been seriously rest:ricted, if' it did 
not collapse. 
Education of the masses was stressed whenever 
possible in Corr~unist areas. Iwu Teh-1116, laid the 
foundation for an educational system in Shensi. Before 
his arrival there had been one hundred twenty schools 
scattered throughout the province. By the end oi' lQ39 
there were '773 primary school~>, seventy-eight model prim .. 
a.ry schools, sixteen higher primary school:;, seven hundred 
obaracter .. study groups, 208 elementary schools, four 
middle schools, three colleges, an art academy, a technical 
training academy, and an Industrial co~operative 
16 Sea Chapter VIII, p. 1541 .1.'0:11 a biographical 
sketch ot Hsu Teh•li. 
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Vooa:tional :training School i'o:r .Boys.l7 These sctlOols, of 
course, devo·ted much of tt1eir time to political indoctdn• 
ation on Marxism and the Communist interpretation o;t the 
Of singular importance .vas the Nu Tzu 'J!a Hsauh1 the 
------ -
.four hund:red girlt> enrolled in such diverse subjeotc: as 
spiml.ing, tho care of infants, and E:nglisl1 and Russian 
gra.mraar. Hel'e1 also, the central theme was Marxism. '!'ha 
higher the school, ·the more intense tb.f.l indoctrination. 
All activities \~e:r.e channelc~d to~rm.rds control by the state. 
1t.'hen Jap~m attaoklild in 19217 the.re l:lru:1 been little 
thought in China of a fight to the end. Kuomintw1g leaders 
hoped tor six nwnt.hs of resistance and a subsequent 
moderation of' Xokyo •s demands. l\lob un"l:iil 19:38 1vas the 
Chinese ).I!Jiniste:r vJithdrEnm. From time to time 11 peaoe 
feelers" were sent .from the JIXis. These we:re !'ejected 
when it became evident that :paa.ae could mean nothing but 
submission to :tUppon.18 :i>ome Kuomintang leaders favored 
peace at any price. A movement ~Jas insl;itutect i•ithin the 
!?arty to b:ring Chiang Kai•shak to terms. The Communists 
17 snow, op. git., P• 27:5. 
16 Ros1nger 1 ~· cit., p. 30. 
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violently opposed this action. They urged a·aontinuanoe of 
the war until the Japanese were driven from the mainland. 
Since China ~ms considerably 1r1eaker than Japan both 
economically and politically. it had to develop methods of 
warfare that would permit the most effective use o.f its 
resources. No better example could be found of a numer~i~-------­
cally inferior, ill•equi.pped :f.'oroe p:rolongix~g a struggle 
than the Communist Campaigns of 1930-19;14 in the Kiangsi 
hills. 
China tor the first time in its long history t~as 
temporarily united in a common cause. What had been 
accomplished by the Communis·t;s in one province could be 
achieved on a national scale by the combined weight o;t· the 
KUomintang and KUngchantang. support .from fo:feign pON ers 
grew as the t~ar progressed. ~J!Ore and more enemy troops had 
to be delivered to other areas, making it e:x:tramel.y precar-
ious for Japan to J.aunch attacks into the interior. The 
pollcy or trading space .for time was successful ag~;.inst the 
Japanese. 
However, the continuing struggle agaJ.nst the 
Communists was further weakened by tlais stratagem. I:f.' the 
det'ense of industrial regions was untenable militarily, 
their def'ense <•las necessary politically. '..l:o give up the 
idea of :t'ightii~g tor positions meant the governrnent tqould 
= 
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abandon its industrialized qoast, Trus would prostrate a 
raation within the government where support had come from 
the industrial, merchant class. Moreover. to engage in 
guerrilla war:t'are • the people would have to be mobilized 
behind the Japanese lines. This aoula. best be accomplished 
by offering them an improved. way .of life. The peasants:__ ___ _ 
could hardly be expected to support the war effort without 
an amelioration of their economic and political position. 
In this also we :f'.f.nd the .Kuomingtang being forced to 
reduce the povJe;r of a class '~hich had supported it• the 
landlords. 
The Eighth Route Army carried much of ·l;he burden 
f'or s~.accessful g\H>rril.la t~ar!'are. 'l:his group was sent to 
Shansi in 1937 where it found a demoralized people in 
leveled villages. 'l'his populace \'l~ls quickly OJrganizad into 
an effective force for harassment of the Japanese Army in 
occupation and for raids on Japanese supply lines. 
F..lnphasis fell on tm cultivation of' peasant support .• 
Land was re~distributad, rents and interest rates reduced• 
and the payment of debts cancelled or extended. Such 
actions helped cement the friendship of the people who 
succeeded in keeping large nQllibers of enemy troops in ·che 
north thereby blunting Japan 1 s drive for conqw st of all 
China. 
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HOvJEIVer. all tiaB not \~El~l with l\lationalist and 
Communist. As early as the spring oi' 19:381 the government 
ha.d refused tha necassat'y oft.\l.cial regist!llat:ion to all 
non•Kuomint~ Yotlt!:l Organizations. Later t!:lat s8llle year 
a military c~ash oacurred in nort11. .Honan between the 
battles ~wre l'eporteel between Communist and Central forces 
in Kansu Provinca.l9 
At the Southeast ShamJi mount~:d.r1 base internal 
friction threatened to ~eave the area easy prey for the 
Japanese. The political history of ·this base involved 
two provincial administrations e.nd overlappoo that of ·the 
Shansi•Chahar•Hopai and .:>hansi•Suizan regions. Difficulties 
with Yen Hsi•s!:lan,20 tMCh!.Jll of Shansi, led to small scale 
civil war in the former province W1iah was finally quelleC. 
by elements of the Shansi Nevi .Army. The Eighth Route 
assumed Jurisdiction over the latter area. 
In l:lou.th Hopei Governor Lu Ghung•lin, t•h.o ht'!d been 
sent in by the central Government, dispersed tha loonl 
administrators and brought back old-line ofi':l.aials. He 
19m~ Uroef$, November 16, 1939• p. 8:4. 
20 li'or a brief resume o:f' this lnan•s activities from 
1912-1946 ct. Bpstein, 5m.• SU,., PP• 167•68, 
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disa:rmed the Militia and entered into an agreement with 
Governors .·Yen of Shansi and Shan Hung-lieh or Shantung. for 
inter .. provincial defense. The Eighth Route Army struck at 
this coalition and in 1940 sat up the .Shansi,.Honan.-Hopei 
Government. 
From its northern base• this Army_ finished out th_..e.__ __ _ 
·~ar against Japan. Because of a shortage of supply, it 
engaged primarUy in guerrilla activities. Occupied cities 
\'Jere e;enerally !WO ided. !''or the most pa:rt the Communists 
were content to harass and let the Japanese come to them. 
Reports :f'iltered out to the ,,Jestern \~orld of battles won 
and lost. Verification •~as dii':f.'icult and otten. impossible. 
Conditions ~;orsened bet;veen Kuomintang. and 
Kunchangtung. Early in 1941 Chungking accused Communist 
troops in North China of refusing to go to the aid of 
Nationalists trapped by Japanese forces in the Ohungtiao 
Mountains.21 The Communists, in turn, accused the 
Kuomintang of. '>lithholding supplies and not figl'lting the 
invaders. 
!~ter the collapse of Allied positions in southeast 
Asia, Japan moved more troops into North Qtina. 'l'he Eighth 
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Route vJas driven out of Central Hopei altogether. Its 
centJJal headquarters :l.n th@ Shans:l. Mountains ><as 
surrounded, and the Chief•of-staf:.f' 1 Tso Chut?.n• was kiUed. 
A ne;~ method of exterminatii:>n ·..vas tried by ·che 
Imperial Army. Forces were concentrated in single villages 
____ f,.o""'r a tb.ree_~month per_iod dul:'J.:OO 1rhich time every irl.ha..,..b ... i _-____ _ 
ta11t ~~as Q.Llestioned~ •rhis was doomed to failure as the 
Eighth Route once again forced the Japanese to deploy by 
attacks on their weakest positions. 
1\.s the :1\rnerican :forces approached the J?hil1ppines 
and the Unite@ States Fourteenth Air Force swept the 
Chinese skies clear o.f' enemy planes, Japan changed hell 
strategy and launched an attack against the Chinese 
regular ;front. In early 1944 the whole Province of' Honan 
!'ell t1£1en Tang En•po • s Central Armies disintegrated. Next 
came the capitulation of Changsha and a move into lla.nyang 
to meet columns coming noxtl:1 from KvJantung. This gave the 
Imperial r,xmy possession of the entire Canton.,.llan.kow 
raihm.y and cut Cl1:!.na in t1r1o. ln 'the South the Japanese 
x!lovt:Kl td.th astonishin~ rapidity. \ilhole .fron:ts collapsed 
as the Ch:!.r1eso armi0s reeled back, often '"ithout l/esistanoa.22 
22 lllpstein, .2.n• ~., p. 326. 
Chungking was a mass o.f' confusion. Rumors pla&ued the 
city. Of.f'ioials worried. People waited for the invading 
islanders. 
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Meanwhile• the Co!ll!l!Wlist forces in the North began 
a series of coordinated attacks i'l'Oill all bases behind 
anything but guerrilla action, these attacks avoided the 
big cities and major Japanese centers. Three objectives 
prompted this oftens:l.ve: (l) to relieve the pressure along 
the regular front; (2) to destroy the net of blockhouses 
built :l.n North and Central China; and (3) to extend 
Chinese areas along the ca;u:Jt so as to provid.e facilities 
.f'or Allied landings. Some measlU'e of success was attained 
in all three • but it remained fo:r those Al.lied troops t 
island-hopping in the Pacific to play the major role in 
their eventual fulfillment. 
Throughout this campaign the Col'll!l!unists expanded 
considerably. In March, lti44• the regulars totalsd .four 
hundred seventy thousand. By lata fall this nwnber almost 
doubled to eight hundred thousand.£3 Opinions differed 
I, 
~ 
I I 
I 
I 
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sharply on their relative worth to the war effort. 
A military review for a Tokyo daily wrote: 
OUr major anemy 1s now the Communist forces. seventy 
per cent of our engagements in North China are fought 
against, them, Chungking Army has lost the will to 
oomba.t,24 
However, when General Okwnura, Japanese Commander-in-Chief 
in China. made fils report-to-tti:Ill-Al:l;te::q:ti'ter-V-J-Day.-h(l)----
es~!ma:ted that the Japanese had lost less than fifty 
thousand men to the g~aen:l..lleu3.2f:) So obscure are the 
raoords and so aonfused was the f':ront it is virtually 
impossible to tell where the true figuret\ lie. 1\nother 
souroe credits the Gommu."lists with ninety-two thousand 
battles in seven years of war and inflicting one million 
one hundred t;housand casualties on ·the enem:y.£6 Still 
another author says, "for every Japanese they claim to 
have killed, they have kllled at least five Chinese. • • a87 
on tha political front things were no bettor. In 
!Ylay of 1944• Lin ChU. .. an, chairman o:t: tM Communist led 
Ghen:si-Ka.nsa-Ningb.sia border region, arrived at Sian for a 
24 Epstein. loa. ~. 
26 Theodore H. \\'llite and Annalee Jacoby 1 'J!hunde;r: w& 21: Qhina. p. 210. 
26 Harrison F?rman. Htmo:t trom Red Qh:l.n&, P• 126. 
27 Lin Yutang1 ~ )lig:tl Qt: t!te Nation. P• 125. 
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conference with Central Government officials to plan for 
closer cooperation between the two groups. Later the.t 
month another Communist, Lin ·rso•han 1 v1ent to Chungking for 
a series o.f' conferences with Chiang Kai·shek. 'rhese talks 
centered on (l) the degree of autonomy for communist-
-~--d-<nr..i-nated-a-r-e~t-;-~f~-)-the-d-eg-rse-cf-pa.rtici-pat-ion-b;y -------
Communists in the Central Government; end (3) the e:K"tant 
or cooperation in the J'apanese '·:ar.28 Very little agree• 
ment was reachec.l in these oonferences. If anything they 
ser'lred to .foous the attention of all concerned on the b!:tsic 
differences between Kunchangtung and Kuomingtaaa. 
It may be significant that one month attar the 
start of these conferences the ban on :foreign conespondents 
traveling in Communist sections \lias lii'ted by Chungking. 
News sent back to the outside i.Jorld \vas for the most part 
complimentary.29 Correspondents praised the economy • 
educational program, and military !'o:rces at Yenan. 
Describing the opening meeting of tha Communh;t-led 
Shensi .. Kansu-Ninghsia Border Mn:dn1stra:tion, these 
newspapermen list eight of the twenty-two members in 
,-
attendance as Communists. others ware ~a.ndlords, minor 
gentry, teachers, a doctor, a soldier, a shop e~erk, a 
tenant-farmer, and a poor peasant. 
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People's councils in the villages numbered fourteen 
at that time. Great emphasis is laid on the fact that of 
---~t-he-9--,9tV7-v-illage-oou-not-l-lors-,-5-.649-are-poo:r:-peas-ant-s~,-----
3,435 are middle peasants, 690 are rich peasants, 502 are 
hired laborers, 394 are work~rs, and the rest are laborers, 
ge~try, and merchants. The Communists number 2,477, or 
24 per oent.30 
1rlhila Chinese Communists initially we're drawn :f'l:'om 
all classes, there is no doubt that the class struggle was 
the f'ounctation of party sucoess. ThOse of the gentry llad 
to submit to the will of the Party leaders. The 24 per 
cent did the l:'uling. Party polioy, if flexible in this 
stage, was nonetheless established by a small group. 
Implementation could come on the looal level but little 
else. 
Harlordism he.s pl~ued China. since the overthl'O>'I of 
tne Mancllus. Clliang Kai•sllek was never able to completely 
unity the country. Certain sections continued to exercise 
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varying degrees of autonomy right through the Japanese 
invasion. In Shansi the m:l.li tary governor 1. Yen Us.t-shan, 
fought a "gentlemanly" war with the Communists. If the 
"Reds 11 caught a .Sha.nsi soldi&r or of:f'ic:tal tl'l.ey trained 
.him for a month Md then sent him back. Y<m trained his 
------'Cornmu.n:ts1:i___9o,p_t!yes !'or only a week. He believed his 
principles ~~ere stronger.3l Suoh ludiorous exrunples of 
I 
local resistance to Communism aided its growth in China. 
In September• 1944, the series of conferences 
between Lin Tso-han and Chiang Kai .. shek •. begun in May t 
finall.y broke do,,m. No progress Nas made in the settlement 
o:t: basic issues. 32 
Early in February, 1945, ChOu Un•la.i started 
discussions with the Central Government at Chungking. 
:Foreign pressure, notably that of the United ,t;ta,tes, had 
been instrumental in bringing this about. American 
Ambassador • Pat:r:iek J. liurley, assisted .in tate negot:tt>.t;tons. 
Still no solutions to th'<l problems could be effected. Vlong 
Shih•ohieh, Information Minister, gave the Nationalist 
3" 
,_ 1\le\~ ~ ~Ul!Uh september 16, l944•J• 4:2, for a 
discus s.ion Of the clif'i'e:renoes in Communis t-Na onalist talks. 
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version of its concessions as follows: 
.J... A readiness to recognize the Chinese Collll!lunist. 
Party as a lawful political party. 
2. Inclusion ot a high ranking Conununist o.f.f'icial 
in the National military eounail. 
3. Inclusion of Corrunun1st representatives in the 
executive Yuan. 
4. Establishment of a collll!littee of three, including 
eqllt\l ste:tus, on it fo.r C~unists. to reorganize and -----~s_upply_the_Col!lll!Uni st_fi.,rmy_., 5 ----
ChOu disagreed with this report saying tkl.e.t Wong •s 
concessions ••ere contingent upon g.reat Communist con-
cessions. Communist troop'J had to be surren<:: el'ed before 
legal recogn:l.tion would ba given ·to the Party. He further 
alleged tnat llllillllM~ship in t;J1.c !'!ational vJilitary Cocmcil 
and Executive Yuan were 1nean:tngless since neither body had 
any po~<ex. 34 So ena eO. anotne:r attempt to reconcile 
divergent views. Neitb.a:r side was idlling to concede on 
issues vital to '~heir ideologies. No comp:rorn:lse could 
pe lasting. 
Ji.S the World ltlar Il: dl'OVJ to a close the ::rtruggle 
bet\~een Conllllunists and Nationalists \10Xstmed. On August 12• 
1945 0 Chiang sent e, messt.ge to Communist armies to hold 
positions and awt,it further orders. 35 Chu Tel1 refused to 
33 ,NeJ,~ Y.PJ1lt Urnes., l''ebruary 15, 19451 p. lltl. 
34 ffew ~ T!~§€, February 16 1 1945, P• 5:1. 
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obay. Instead he called on Gene:ral Yasuji Okanu:ra, 
Comraamler of ·th'a Japanese expeditionary forces in China• to 
sur:cende;~ to h:h troops. Chinese Communist t:t~oops occupied 
vJanping ten miles southeast of 1?'31ping.36 Rapo:r.ts 
filtered in of CommuniGt fighting in Shansi.37 
-------~~'l..,_o_TsJJ-tJ:ln!!;_Has_inv:!.ted_t<LChungld ne;-fo:r-a-f-i."lal ---
attempt a·t settlement of diffe:rences in ·!;he late summer of 
1945. But • ev•'ln as these ta1lts \~ere in p:t•ogress f Yen<Jn 
reported ne;v Communist army offensives in the NnnkirliS 
a:ren.38 Rumors of the mtglltb Army :receiving supplies from 
I~ohuria oi:t~m.llated freely in Nationali.st quarte;vs.3~) 
Littl.e hope could be held for successful :negotia.t:tons in 
this atmosphere. 
So it continued dOllil'l to ·the Close of cO:t;ld Vial' li. 
Puppet f'oroos swt:Ul8 over from Japan to Chungktng enabling 
the Central Govermn<mt to control many cities. The li':l.:rst 
Army occupied C~tnton and the Sixth J~rmy occupiect Elhangl:lai. 
Commun!st .. r~at~ionalist skirmishes :raged in eJ.Gven :Provinces. 
36 ~ ~ T~mas, August 18, 1945, P• 2;1. 
3'7 -~ Umqs, August 21, 1945, P• 1:'7. 
38 - ~ Tilll!\)S t August 29, 1945, P• 1:6. 
39m~ l;:!,me§, October 5, 1945, P• 3~4. 
1!:rt:!.llery and mortars thuntl.erad along ·t;he coastal. E;ncl of' 
China • s GrefJ.t Wa.ll "Jllere Communists blocked the· path of. 
thousands of Nationalist troops into .i.ndq:;tr:tally rich 
Manchura.4° 
~fuatever bonds o:f' unity had been forged by t;he 
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J~1panese invasion, colltiJ:>SEld with t.he s_ul'.l:'_en.der._As_t.be ___ _ 
Kungchantung gained in s1:rength and popularity • the 
I\Uom.intang lost suppo:r.t. ·.~he fight for Ghina, started :l.n 
1920 and interrupted briefly in J.937 1 was on again 1r1ithout 
---~~----
CHAPrER V 
CIVIL 1,~/U\ CON'l'INUES 
1946 .. ],951 
"lllithin forty-eight hours o.f victory t,Pver ·the 
_____ Ja'-'.p._an __ e=ail_ civil 'War was raging_~O:t'Q_ss China._..:I._J.l'or-twooty'----
years the Red Jl'rmy hau flourished on the stony soil of 
China's political front. From the first; fol'oe of three 
thousand men organiaad by Mao ·rse-tung and Chu '.l'eh in 
1928, they had grown to six million strong at ·the time the 
Na.tionalists ware driven from the me.inlnnd. By 1946 tJ:w:r.e 
1r1ere approximately one million two hundred thousand in the 
lUghth Houte and New Fourth Armies. Mother 1ndeterminate 
number operated in the Northeast, the Joint Democratic 
Armies, while about one ndllion five humred ·thousand 
irregulars followed the Communist !'lag. Opposed to these 
Chiang .Kai•shek could muster four million lnen in the armies 
of the Kuomintang end one million irregulars. 
As World war II drew to a close, Chu T'->h ordered an 
offensive by the Chinese Had ~miea to join the Russians 
coming down from the north. Chungking attempted to 
1 'l'. White and A. Jacoby., T!lHnc1er out Q.t: China, P• 
279. 
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oountermand this order by instruotir~ the Eighth Route and 
the Ne'u'J Fourth to remain at tlleir posts. Other units were 
to press the attacks against the Japanese. Yenan 
disregarded these instructions, and the race tor China t~as 
underway. 
______ ___,In.,..__..J\""u,gg.st, 1945, Japan ca.Il_itula.ted to the lil'--"-l=ia_c_d_- ___ _ 
Forces including a soviet Union in the struggle for only a 
weak• but a soviet Union whose proldmity to China in 
general and Manchuria in p~t:l.cular made her a potent 
i'aetor in the control of this strategic area. I•'orty years 
before her armies had lei't the Northe.rn Provinces. At 
Portsmouth her dreams of an FAstern Empire had been 
th\>Jarted. Some wondered i:f' this time she 111as bac1t to stay. 
However. the U,S.<'l.R. had other plans for this 
region that did not include prolonged .military occupat.i,on. 
Her i'irst ob~eetive was to immobilize z,l.anchurian industry 
and then, her second, to establish a government "i'rientlly 11 
to the soviet Union. 'I'M old 'l'sa:rist method of encompass-
ment ~las revived 1vith a ne~J and vital force for implementa-
tion, the Chinese Con~unist A:rncy. 
In september, 1945, the Chinese Government e:t 
Nanking had dispatched a. note ·to Russia and the United 
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States cla.:!.ming; all Japanese property 1n Manchuda.2 
The attitude of the Communi5t :Party 1 it one of' 
una.dulte:ratect Nationalism, should 11ave been in ha:t'mony with 
this pronouncement. Communist leaders hnd long recognized 
the need for Chinese indu stl'ialize.tion. Nevertheless 1 Li 
____ .L;!. .. san,_the_lBader_of_:t.l:HL:l.ndustrial-faotion--of--the 
Kung;ch.antang; 1 nev1ly arxived from Mo&COill• declaJ?et.l in a 
speech at l:Iarbin: 
I feel that the movement of machinery /)5y Soviet 
Forces from iv1anohuria to RusslJal .is not an important 
problem at all. Of course the soviet Union moved some 
machinery bJtt not a large amount oomparea with its 
war losses. 0 · 
As early as August, 19451 negotiations were started 
between Yenan and Chungking in an effort to avoid the 
coming struggle. Mao Tse-tung flew to the Nationalist 
capital for a series of talks, but nothing came of them. 
There was too 1.~ide a gulf to resolve with words. Chiang 
favored a centl'a~hed govermnent 111ith po<ver to appointed 
provincial and district magist;rates. M.ao tvanted a 
2 ~ ~ 'l:;l.mes 1 Mn.rch 15, 1946, quoted in Dallin, 
r§oy;l.gt Rus§Ia .!m!! tu'l! Far ~.:lb p. 845. 
3 Ibid., quoting the J?ij,ilY \'iorlter, New York• July 26, 
1946. The American Reparations Commission set the total 
damage to Manchuden In_ dns_try a_ t _over $21ooo1ooO,OOO; um.tag §tat~§ Javartmen;!i 52.t Sl'll!!.te fmll.et;_n, 946, P• 1154. 
Russia setne value of removed equi~ment a't; $97 ,ooo.ooo; j;mrsmti;ya, January 29 1 1947; quoted nom Dall.:tn, p. 244. 
107 
decentralized organ:i.zation with semi .. autonomy tor the 
village. Neither understood nor a.pprecj.atcd democracy. 
Both probably felt they had the interest of' the Chinese 
people at heart and that they alone held the lrey to futlll'e 
·prosperity. 
On October 11, the Communis't#fLl'_e_tu:r_l1§l!Lt_p_Ye1J~n, ___ _ 
all. hopes for a truce diss.ipahd. 
In January, 1946, General George c. Marshall of the 
United States, ~;as. p:ropm ed as intermediary i.u thB 
Nationalist•Com.rnun.ist dispute • '.t'his plaooo. h.im in the 
embarrassing position of trying to be impartii'.J. vJhile his 
nation supplied one of the parties in the contest. 
All!Ell'ican equipment and training had bolstered too 
Nation~1list hold on the clties. :Co .Hanll:ing had gone the 
Jlme:rican tro.inea Sixth Army o:t' Ch;tq. Into Shanghai went 
the Ninety-Fourth~ A third t'rmy had been f'lovm to Peking 
from Hankot>J, 
Gov<Jrnment proposals for peace st~ggested that the 
People •s Political Council eleot i'ive impartia.l observers 
to 1'orm a m:Uitary insp<iCtion tee.m to lGok into all fl.reas 
of coni'lict. The Communists asked for. an immediate cessa-
tion ot' hostilities with impartial inspeetion.4 On 
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January 10 the J?olH:i.cal Consultative Council m~t end 
promised internal reform. An immediate cease-fire order 
was issuea.5 Nevertheless, reports continued to come in on 
Commun:i.st .. Nntionalist clashes. 6 Agreement vias made 
increasingly dif'ticult a.s both sides fought to have the 
biggest voice in the ad.option oi' the New Co!ll)tl~lltiol'l.-_7~----
0n January ol Chiang Kai•shek pledged full liberty 
to all parties.8 The Communists won thE!! right to carry on 
free, nation~wicllll 1 politice.l activity and a ~tt:rong minor-
lty in the National Coa11tion GoV<Jrnment~ :More impmtant, 
the Commun1st Arrnies were to rema1n in control of their 
ter:ritor:!.es. 9 Maldng the promise Nas easie:r. than making 
the implementation necessary to carrying it into 
completion, V'io:rking against the success of' this pJ.an were: 
(1) ·the"opposing philosophies or the t-wo factions, (2) the 
t'·IO a:l'mies in the f'ield 1 (3) the methods employed by both 
Parties to control territory, (4) the :restlessness of the 
people, and ( 5) the Hussia.ns in Manchuria. 
5 ~ ~ '£;l.me§ 1 January u. 1946, P• 1:3. 
6 New Io~k 41ru§s, .January 17 ~ 1946, P• 16 :3. 
7 w ~ nmes, Jtmua:r.y ::a, l94Gf p •. 2:2. 
8~~,l~. February 1, 1946, P• 1:4. 
9 Ne>> ~ l'j.Ines 1 February 2, 1946, p. 3:5. 
Jl.s the soviet troops witt.l.d:cew from Manchurie., 
Natione~ists and. Gol!llllunists rushed to fill the vacuum. 
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Because of its :pro:xtmity &nd its oco(!pation by :forces 
politioally affable to the Chinese "Reds," this Northern 
Province presented overy,Jl:J.elming advantages to the latter. 
Disregarding ll.m<n:ican a.dvico to corMolid~rt;e llier positions 
------
in the Southt Chie.ng entered the unequal cont~wt. 
Gol!llllunist offensives \~ere Ul'ldertaken in Stwntung, 
Si4"ll1Sit Fm.d Hopei. lcJitb.in a few \\1(3el{S al.l traffic north 
of the Yellow m ver '\vas disrupted 8l.1d 1;he II Hed s" gained 
control of t<o1o thirds of Shansi. Their drive to the 
capital, ·raiy~<an, vms :repulsec1 by the toxm<?.:r 11ll:tr1ord f.Jnd 
nov1 governor, Yen H.si-shan.lO However, the capture o:t' the 
rail\\tay center, I\algan, and a large store or J'apanese 
equipment more than compensatoo for this loss. Its 
pes session ge.ve ·the Communists a sect~;re route for moving 
troops north and effectively cut the lll'l<tionalist line to 
Mancb.uri.a. 
Blocl.ced by the <~hiner>e Had Army from bringing in 
large conM.ngents of Central t:roops, the Generalissimo 
-------
10 Gent-lral Yen Hsi•shan had been retu1•ned to the 
governorship of Shans:!. ~~ith the help of forty thousand 
Japanese tl'oops under General Sumita, foi·mar Japanese 
Col!llllander in Shansi. Na!cl York. :~imas, February 13, 1946• P• 
10:6. 
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unwisely turned to tl'aito:r generals who were completely 
out o.f Sympathy with the peopJ.a. Manchurians had lived 
urcter these same men during the Japanese occupation. 
Changing .flags could not change the memory of unjust acts. 
Supposedly noting upon the request of the c~mtra.l 
Government, Hosoow said thSJ_Bussians!_withdrnw~'~Lfrom ~~~~-
Manchuria would be postponed and intimated its last 
troops would not leave until the Americans la.ft. Anti-
Russian parades were held in lianko1~, Peiping, and other 
Chinese cities. Russian txoops were rushed to xeinforce 
the garrisons at Port Arthur and Dairan.ll Mean"~<Jbile, 
continued Soviet stripping o.f Manchurian industry proceeded 
at an increased pace. Some estimated the removal o.f 
machinery at 50 per cent o.f the tota1.12 
In the South, Communist lea.dership was less 
e.ff'ective 1 Commu11ist propaganda less virile, and Communist 
force less potent. Large cities were securely held by the 
KUominta.ng. A projected coup in Shanghai failed to 
materialize. 'rhe Fourth Army marched north to Mukdan. The 
"Redsu had decided to concentrate their strength in the 
11 New ~ TimsHh Feb:ruary ,;,7, 1946, p. 16:2. 
5t7. 
12 New XQ.t1& ·r:tma!'}, J)ilarch 17 1 1946, Section IV, P• 
lll 
northeast. 
Communist General Lin Piao seized szepinkai on 
March 16, 1946, rour days after the Russians lert the 
city.l:? The Kremlin announced ·chat Hussian evacuation of thJ 
whole province ~1as completed on May 3.14 Seventeen da.ys 
---~late-r-CentJ.I-al-tr-oops-r-eca.ptu-red-Szepi-l"'...kai-and--pushed-to----
within twenty miles of Changchun.l5 A concerted Kuomintang 
orransive was launchecl in the summer of 1946. By March, 
1947, Nationalists warl!l in Yenan. Thxoughout these two 
years it seemed that Chiang '>las winning the 1:1ar. He took 
one hurtired sixty cities. The taking of cities, however, 
proved to be a weak point in the campaign. As General 
Chen Yi of the East China Communist ilrroies declared : 
By orthodox military strategy t.u; should deploy our 
best troops to defend our capital and consider b.ow 
long we can hold it. We are not doing this at all. 
We are considering hO\~ many oi' Chiang's troops we can 
annihilate in their sorties, how long before his 
casualties will force his ;~ithdrawal and how ·t;o dimin-
ish his armies still further in their retreat. \ie 
would never make the mistak-e that Chiang made in 1937 
;~hen he used up all his best troops to defend Shanghai 
and Nankiu.g. 1ivhen these were taken his armies were 
orushed.l6 
13 lliiUi ~ 'J:im!)Hi, May 15, 1946, P• 12:3. 
14 ~ ~ Iirnes, May 22, 1946, p. 10:3. 
15 New York 'J:imes, May 23, 1946, p. 2:6. 
16 Anna L.sti' ong, The Qhinese Congue: Chin§,; pp. 
?302-3. 
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l<'or each. city captured the Generalissimo's striking force 
t-Jas reduced ·by just so many men as >·Jere needed. :for garrison 
duty. ',£he ability of the "Radsn to disperse and regroup in 
aJ:lother area llu.nrJ:reds o.f miles away used t;ne countryside to 
bast advantage, Once aga.in the people had to play the 
____ _..i=mpo rt~mt role or St1J2!2:l.Ying_gove~_t'or the_s;ue_rr il~a__t;_r oop"'s"'.'----
I.f at 1'irst the Conunun1sts .gave groqnd 1 exchanging 
land f'or men. they 1191'8 aided by the l!ld'Gatist at"t;ituc\e Of 
Cl11a:ng•s soldiers. h'hole units S\ll.'renderad without a 
fight. Many did not even bother to d<Jstroy their equip-
ment. The :r1Nenty-sixtll Division. oa.rrying all tn.e 1mplo~ 
mente o:f modern >1ar, vmnt over to the enemy. Kuomintang 
morale reached a new lOti. 
In spito of this • the Nationalists pushed ±'or•1ard 
over the land by sheer vleight of nuJJ!ber:;. Heavy fighting 
was reported in Shantung in the .fall of. 1947. Kuomintang 
victories \•are announced daily \d.th some refermwo to 
Communist drives. '.Che world awaited thG ml•1w of Wfled" 
capitulation. 
Let tls leave for r,n1hile the military r;tory o:r tile 
Civil 'ciar and look e.t the political developments in 1946-
1947. With the failure of American mediation efforts, 
Kuomintang and Kungchantang settled into e. battle of words. 
Chou Jlln•le.:l. di:ra~rted a strong prot,a~;1t against tile 
decisions made by tl:te Central Exeoutiva Committee o.f the 
Kuomlntang coJhich closet! its session in Chunglting on 
Ma.rcb, 17, 1946. He charged that the Nationalist Cl()vern-
ment hHd failed to live up to its promises of' popular 
l'j.gb.ts and libertios, with violations of the cease-fire 
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agreement, and vlith pursning plans '.;o circumvent the.__ ____ _ 
compact for rednction and reorganization of the ~trmies.17 
Differences or opinion on the general theme of the 
constitution ~r1ere given an s.iring. The Kuomintang favored 
a strong central government, \•Jhereas too Communist Pal!ty 
advocated greater provincial autMrity.l8 
On January 11, an agreement had been reached calling 
for five Government armies and one Communist army to be 
stationed in ManchU:da.19 The Communists held out for a 
revision of this agreement, but events in tt1e field 
rendered tltls unnecessary. 
Fo110illing Soviet tdthdravla). f':rom r'lanchuria 1 Russian 
mmspapers accnsetl the United. states of pushing China qack 
into the Htai;us of a ser!Ji•colonitll country. Simc11tarH~ous 
attacks by I'1oscot4 and Yenan on American policy in CJ:1ina 
------
17 N§.i• l2U Times, March 19, 1946, p. 14:3. 
18 NevJ X.QD; T;!Jn~§, March 30• 1946, P• 8:2. 
l9 ~ ~ 'J;j,mee, J'une 11, 1946, p. 15:2. 
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were promoted. If', as I,ord Iverchapel, former British 
Ambassador to China, maintained, the Chinese Communists 
were not a.ffiliated 1dtl1 Russia but vJere .simply a~rnrian 
re:f'ormers.20 their paths ran parallel courses. 
In July a repressive campaign 1r1es unde::;>taken by the 
Kuomintang in its large cities. Book stol'_es !:1n<Lmagazine ____ _ 
stands t~ere searchec\ in :;hanghai. One book store was 
stripped o:r all books with titles tlJ.e.t bore such vJords as 
"democracy 1 11 "people," and "emanci-pation. n2l These tactics 
did more harm th~m eood t<l the Nationalist cause. 
The Kungohantang vJere extremely . touchy on tho 
subject of' American l:.tid to the Central Government. 
Considerable anti .. lunerioan feeling 11as mustered in areas 
under "Red" control. On Ootober 6, t\•JO hundred armed 
Chinese attacked the Marines at Tangku in an a:ctempt to 
get axms and a:romunition. our mili·tary differed on the 
policy to follcw in dealing 1:1ith the whole Chinecm question. 
'!:here \Hll'e those v!l10 :felt 1•e ;;llonld stop ass:f.st:l.ng ·the 
corJ:upt Nationalists ~~hUe others acottsod t;he sohenling 
----·---
20 Ne1~ ~ T3,mes, June 23, 1946, P• 5;1. 
£l })!e:ll! ~ '£tmes, ~fuly 23, 1946, P• 4;6. 
Corrwunists of sabotaging unity.22 
Gene:raL Marshall said: 
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The Colllll!Unists franld.y state that they are Mer:xists 
and intend to v;o:rk towards establishing a· Corrwunistic 
.form of governm<mt in China, though fi:rst \~Orking 
through the medium of a democratic .forn1 or government 
of' the American or British type. 2!.'5 . · 
There were some indications of: this lvhen Mal'sh~lLmadiLhis,_----'--
statement, but correspondent Micha.el Kaon proved the better 
prophet in mai11taininz that the Gllinese Corrwunist8 T.vere 
heading to;mrds a dictatorship of: the nussian typ~.24 
IO.tudents have played a vital rol.e in Chinese 
politics since the cverttll'ow of thE: ~qancnus. In 1915 
they revolted against ·the TvJenty~one Demands of. the 
Japanese Gover11ment. 1919 saiv their protest s.c;ainst 
Vorsailles ~tnd srwrtly thereafter the beginnings of 
Colll!llunist agitation. H:toting bro.ke out in student 
compounds over the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 • 
. Not~ 1 in 194 7 • there ~~e:t'e student demons·!jrations ac;airwt 
the \~entral Govel'nment. 'fhese prot·ssts voiCO(l thd ploa.s or 
zr.; 
nine tenths of the> Chinese people. 0 'rh~l Commtmist :Pm;ty 
------
<14 • ~ :J;'iini'Hh October 19 1 1947, P• 15 :l. 
~.::5 m X2.tlt l'irm:Hh JtJlY 8, 1947, P· 130;4,. 
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was xeady to capitalize on the situation by espousing the 
student cause ~9 their own. Howevex, the people were 
instinctively e.nti•Commurd.st e.nd. could lw~ve been \~on over 
to a txuly reformed National Government.26 
For the fil' st time a neN note entered negoti~rtions. 
The Shensi Red Radio asked for a coallt::ton __ government l~i_t,..h~--­
a provision for i;he punishment of war criminals. '£his was 
genera.lly thought to apply to Chiang Kai •shek. 27 
Internal friction hastened the dovmfall of the 
Kuominh.ng. Constant bioker:l.ng, inept leadership, gra:t't, 
e.nd the vacillating policy towards needed socio-economic 
refor1ns caused the people to turn elsewhere .for relief. 
Chiang took over the pramia:rllhip fr.om T. V. lloong in 
March. Tie;hten.:Lng the :t'eins of government only bllought more 
discontent. Gt~n<>ral elections called in .November were a 
political farce. There was no secrecy in ballotill,{(;. The 
results i~ere a t'oragona conclusion. 
Meanwhile, the Communist Party continued to groN. 
At the end of 1947 estimates placed membership r;>t ti~O 
26 John L. stuart 1 "Observations on North China and Jl!~tnchur1et" United Si;atalij Halations Vlith Ch;J.n;a.,. 30:254, 
AUgust 1 1949. 
27 ~ ~ t.tmas, July J.f,, 194'7• p. 10:4. 
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million people.28 
In 1947 .. 1946 the 11 Hed" Army bega.n its victory drive. 
Gathering momentum 1r1ith each victory. the Communist wave 
rolled down from the north. Ka1i'e:ng, c1;1.pi tal of Honan, 
fell on June 22, 1948. Xsinan, a city of' eight hundred 
thousand, capital ot.' Shantung, .fell in eightd~§_1:;o tt1e ___ _ 
army of' Su Yu. Eit£;ht hunclrerJ mil1.>s north, Changchun 
capitulated afte: a long se:t.ge by Lirl Pia.o. On November 2, 
Mukden. the industrial center of Manchuria "1M occupied. 
Thus, Chinese COmmLtnist territory increased .from 
one ninth of China in 1946 to one fourth of China in 1948. 
The population controllet'i by the "Reds" want from 
one hunired thirty million to t1~o hundred mill.ton,29 
A thousand miles to the south the J~a.st China. People 1s 
Army \4hich had tPJI:en Tsinan, zaoved to Hsucllo"J• gateway· to 
Nanking. l?urther inland Liu Pocheng; swept tovJards Hankow 
>1h1le Peng Teh•bwai advanced en Sian. 
Military succ('lss !'cllov1ed into 1949 with ci'ties 
fe.lli:ng into Communist hands almost at will. Lin Fiao 
drove against Peip!ng and Tientsin. Marcl1ing six huzitred 
28 ~~Times, November 30, 1947 1 p. 40:4. 
29 Ne\v 1m Times, December 19, l94B, Section IV, 
p. 4:3. . 
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miles in t>·amt¥ days • hb toroes took Tientsin on 
January 15, in a t~!enty-s!iiven hour as::~a.ult. De1nonJ.iaad 
National.is·t troops llllXI'enr.lel'ed :tn la.rgf> groups c•r fell beck 
to the ;;,outb. Peipil'$ wa~> oooupi.M1 t~ithout !'iring a sh<lt. 
On Jnnua.l'y l4 • 1949, Nlr:10 'J;'s.,-tung ou:U.<l<l for an 
eigt.rt ... point progrsm £1lllOLt!l~ine; 't!2_t._maqndjj;lQnltl_c_~Jrr§lntlf.ll', ___ _ 
!or Chitmg Kui .. st;<~L~:/iO This Nas in llli:lsponne to a 
proposal by the Uanernliasilllo01 and 1Mlt.ldetl: 
l. Ftmhlling thlll t~ar oriminl'll$. 
1l. tlbrogntinr~ tht.l c:onst;ii;ut:i.on o.r 1~146. 
&. Abolistl:tng the Kuomintang "legitilnaoy ot 
traditional institutions."' 
6. Hato;r:m..tng the agr&~rian oystem. 
7. ,r\orogertil'$ the troet!es o!' ntltil.m!'l.l blilltray<!W.. 
8. O<.:mvok~ a Politi<:~ll C<>:tlS!lltativ~a C:on:f'orenoe 
t1ithout the pe.<.rticipation of ranction1H:y 
elements i!md eu;;tc<blishing a d(Jll\OC::t'atio coal!• 
t:l.on e;ovaramtl!ilnt. 
soven day~' 1a1>H:t' Ollieng rasign<>d atld ·tur.n~!5 the 
Govarnment over to Ll l'slmg .. jen to attell!pt reace 
30 fJtol<!s.:tr ~mtl lAJCh, BRthlt'll Fa:r ii~~;rlislrn :pltet:n;rl•;l,<mMl 
B!:ti1ficnu.. P• 653., y • ""-"=-
31 .llil:li. .X!ll:k nm!Z£,. January 1, 19411, P• 4::3. C!1iant~ •s 
proposals eallad'for upholding ·t;bo Constitu:1on 8 maint!i:Lt!blg 
Dtmooraoy, ma.:l.nta.tning the <llntity ot too A:t'!Jled Fo:r.c~w, and 
msintainin.g a, lll:!.n1mum livin;;J; t>tandard. 
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negotiations 1FJith the Co.llllllun!sts. The "Reds" proposed 
separate settlements .f. or s:.l.xteen Nat5.on.::!list areas: Sian, 
llianking• Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanehang, Ch.angsha, Foooho1~, 
Chengtu, Formosa, Canton, rtunzning, Uaim:trh Taiyuan, LauehOw, 
K1~eisui, and Ul'Ulllehi. Peiping 1qas to be used as the model 
for. an interim government. 
Milit;ary i'ortunes did not ~iait for political 
considerations. In .April a twan·cy-i'our point peace draft 
was submitted to the Li Government·. Its :tour ftmdamental 
demands ~~ere 1 
1. 
2 • 
. Army. 
Uncontested Cl'ossing of' the Yangtze. 
Heo:r.ganiz!il.t1on of all branches oi' the Nationalist 
3. Eventual Co.llllllunist occupa.tion ot all China.. 
4. Abolishment of' the Nanking Government attar the 
formulation of a coalition by a pollt:i.ca~ consultative 
con:t.'erancEil .::s:z · 
AJ.most before the ink v1as dry •· Nanking 1iJ&S in '1Red" hands. 
Shanghai fell the ne:xt month, and by autumn the I>fationalists 
had been driven into south\<Jestern China and Formoso.. 
Chungking oapi tula:tac1 in Decem bel'. l:!;!'feot:t. ve Kuomintang 
resistance on th'l mainland. can1e to a halt. 
On .September 18, l949, eighteen years to the day of 
• 
the ~~~~lukden Incident •'1 the Chinese Communists announced 
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their plan of' gove:rnment for China. :rn Peipi:ng a Political 
Consultative Conf'erence -was convened to establish an 
interim regime until the convocation of an All-China 
People's Congress. Mao 'J.'se•tung was elected Chairman ot the 
Central Cormnittee, :rolitln.trea.u. Military Council, and 
Secretarie.t. Madame Sun Xa.t .. sen, Chang Lan, and Li Chi•sen 
v1ere elected Vice-chairmen. Chou En-lai t1as designated 
Foreign e.ec:reta.ry ~md Jen Pe-shih nrunacl Finance fJliniste:r. 
Liu Elhao•chi33 was Party Leade:r in the Becr<,tarir.t. ChU 
'!'eh :retained cow.rrtEtnd of' the a:rmies. The "diotatorsllip o;f' 
tlle proletar;t~;,t" vJas p:roclaimed. 
It 1949 sanv the advent of t11.e first Marxist State in 
the O:rient, ·the ensv.ing three yea.rs Sl':l'-'l the probability or 
its ultimate collapse. China \1as a nation economically 
destitute ~Jhen the communists crune to power. Plagued by 
twelve yea:rs of constant vJar, her people needed a return to 
peace. "Hed '' methods promised. this could not cOl.lNil for a 
long while. 
As the (Jom!nunist Armies approached. Nationalist 
canters. inflation ran rampant. Baskets ·ware used to ca:rry 
·the deflated Kuom.i.ntang currency. Prices rose at 
33 .:;ee Chapter VIII, p. 167, ror a biographical 
sketch or tiu Shao-clli. 
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astouishlng rates. In an e;i'fort to con·t.l'o:L the economy the 
''Heds'' set up tv1elve companies. '£hese six~ the Cent:ral 
F'oodstufJ:'s Company, the Central Cotton and Cloth Company 1 
the Centl'al Geno:ral Me:rcl-:.?.ndise Company, the Oent:raJ. 
Salt Company, the Cont:ral Coal and Bu:l.ld:i.l1r; Company • and 
the Central Nat:tve J?xoducts Company, conholled domeBtic 
e.ffai:rs. F'ol'oign 1;:rade >vas entrusted to <:ix others; the 
Central Hog Bristles Company, the Ceut.:ral trative Products 
Export Company, the C<mt:ral :F'ats and Oil Company, the 
Central l'an Company, and the Central Mineral Pl'oducts 
Company. 
These trusts handled the bulk oi' tlHl pul:'chase and 
distribution of :rood and other <H;santial goods• pJ.aoeo 
processing oxdexs, and collected finished goods from 
private i'actories on a contre.ct basis. They tllso alloca-
ted xaw matel:'ials a:ld, in conjunction viHh the !!tlnistry of 
Trade and locml gove:rnmont trade bureaus, f:txed mal'ket 
pxices and determined margins or profit. Soma room l'las 
left for private enterprise bu·t undel' govornmental 
presoxibad l'ogu.lations. Human nature probe,bly ge.:ve this 
scheme some serious jol·ts at its conception. Surely, M:ao 
~<Jas :fle:untinc; h:l.story vJhon he m;:,de such an abrupt change. 
An axpandins net1e1ork of cooperatives vJas establlshetl 
to provide a link bet~J<Hm state companies and organized 
groups of sma.ll p:rviate farmers and handicraftsmen. 
Consumer coope:i;atives wel'e set up in factories, schools, 
government offices, and aJJmy units. Mo:re than. ·t;vJenty 
million persons 11'IeJJe enrolled in thi:rty":'foUJJ thousand rural 
and three thousand urban o:rgsnlzc.tions.34 
Throughoti.t April and May, 1950• :t:<>ports of business 
In 
.Jur:~e, ~,lao urge,, Ghinese businessmen not to fear Communism. 
He statecl that. those 1~ho helped the caLtse would not be 
1'orgotten;3a --,i'hey "'1e:re not fo:rgott~?Jn. Their reNard '"as to 
come one year later '-'Jhen all Chinese indt~strial coopara-
tivas we:re ab:3orbed by thlil Government-sponsored All-China 
F'ec1eration of Cooperatives. 37 
Lanc1 distribution has long been the curse of the 
ga.st. Reform under !;he Communlsts took the direc·t; method 
of confisce:t;i<>n from t;he rich and loan to the poor· v1i th the 
state holding titla. Initially successful, this pxogram 
had to be eased somevJhat to prevent thq sp:r.oad of 
34 ~a~~ ~~me~• October a, 1950 1 P• 17:1. 
a5 a X!:W1; ·rim!llS.• A'prll 1s, 195o, P• 44:~); ;Jiay 24, 
1960, p. 19:3. 
36 New Xo~k ~~me~t J~~e 25, 19501 P• 22:1. 
~7 lJieN ~ ~t':!Jn&s. March 6 1 l95J., p. 4:3. 
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resistance. The :Ba.sia Agrarian Reform Lat~ of June 28• 
1950, caused further uphea:~tals. At tbis 'time 1snd had been 
distributed to eighty thousand peasants in .i'iva hund.red 
counties. 38 
That a1.1 is not 1r1ell >~ith the Cqlllll'lunist plan is 
evidenced by disorders on the Contincmt. Guarl'illa bands 
operate in Kweichow, Kwangsi, Yunnan, r>zeotuvan~ Hunan, 
Hupeh, Tsinghai, Sl'l.ensi, and Ninghsia. 39 Further proof 
lies in the tl:1ousands killed by the Communists for politi• 
·--cal ortenses.'G.O Extortion practiced on Chinese abroad41 
38 ~ ~ T~e§, June 11, 1951, p. 3:1. 
39 ~~Times, January l, 1951, p, 3:1. 
40 Nationalists ol~c;imed 210,000 executed in t;h;t:ee 
ProVinces in January, 1951. .~ ~ ~. March 9• 1951, 
P• 3:1. Three hundred shot in Hn>.tow .~., .February 15, 
1961, p. 4:8. Fifteen executed in Canton, Ibid., February 
6 1 1951• p.o 5;1. One hun!lred twe.nty-t11Jo k.i.lled in Shanghai 
ancl Canton, Ib,\d.! APril 3, 1951, p. 3:6. :J:\40 hundred 
eighty-four shot ~n Shanghai, Ibi%•t June 21, 1951, p. 3:5. 
l''if'ty-f'ive executed in N8nking 1 I ia. 1 June 25 1 1951, p. 
5t6. One hundrad fifty-four executed in DhanghH:l., ;tbii;.1 
July 4, Ul5l, p. B1l. Two hundred seventy-seven shot 
Peiping, Ibid., July 20, 1951, p. 2:1. F'orty kUled 1 2 1748 imprisoned In Shanghai, !big. 1 August fJ4 1 1951 1 p. 2:7. T~Jo 
hundred thirty ... saven executed in Peiping, IBid., August.; :'IO, 
1951, P• ::):7; 28,332 "counter-revolutionaries" executed by 
the Colllll'lun:Lsts in KvJantung ove!' a t•m-month pE,riod ending 
Sep·t:ember 3t 1951, Il.x!.d.l fieiJtem'be:r 20. , 1951, p •. 4:5. I•'orty~ 
three shot J.n Ganton. ~. 1 SE.~ptembar 3 1 1951, p. }3 :4. The 
ChfmHl§ Dfil._l,y N§l!l!t rep~ more than one Inill.ion poUUcfU. 
p:r soner~Kwan ung, Ibid., October lO, lt<5l, 1'• 2~6. 
I''or~y-tv1o executed in Chungking, Ib.:tu., Novembe:r 3, 19511 P• 3:7. 
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indicates the poverty of a Governmlilnt faclild with a full-
scale ;1ar in Korea, a herculean task o:r ;reconstruction at 
home 1 and f<'JW friends in the 11JOl'l£l. Intra•PHrty strife 
ha.s added to th~l btt:rden. 
At a convention o.f the Central Committee of' the 
Chinese Communist Party in Peiping;, Jun!i!, 1950, an 
intensive self'-criticism and criticism 'I'JaS held. Only f'our 
leaders were judged to be without blemish: Mao Tse-tung, 
Liu Shao-chi, 42 .Lin Piao, 43 end Je.o Shu .. shu. 44 Plans were 
laid to p<!ri.fy the Party and to complete the unification of 
China. Pm~ges i~ere instituted leading to more disol'der • 
Communist Pa:t:ty membership was stated to be foul' million 
five hundred thousand at this time. iV!ao o1arnoo the 11 Reds" 
to slovJ thei:r. :recruiting lest mo:re undesirables .filter in. 
some relaxation o.f political absolutism was offered 
as inducement to the. mUiCU.E: class to back the Communist 
program. Rec:r.u:Ltmont of non-Communist left-wing parties '~as 
42 Head of the Sino•l2llv1et F:r:tendship Association. 
Held by some to be l\~ao•s successor. 
43 Commandel' of the Fourth Field Army. 
44 .secretary of' the gast China Bureau of the 
Central Committee. 
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allowed on a limited basis. The six parties cl:losen45 
were, o:f cocu.'se, requi:rec! to uphold the policies· of the 
People 1 s Political Consultative oonter1mae, ·No dissansion 
would be tolerated. 
Propaganda techl1iqUe$, eminently successful in the 
vlhole :rise of t;he COlll!llunist Party in China, :r;ere Jc)o,..l....,i._..s__.h,...e..,.d ____ _ 
and used at frequent intervals. Ono sueh, ·t;he complaint 
meeting, shovJed careful planning in the following .four 
steps: 
1. Extensive prepftra:tion t·lith world.ng out in advance 
of main problerns, 
2. Concentration on concrete, persom.tl experiences. 
3. Usa of' slogans to stir the audi<inee. 
4. Cooperative par-ticipation by neighbOring 
schools,46 
11 iJpontaneous" meetings were then called at ~1hich an ex-
change of ideas was encouraged. Artificial creation of 
mass hysteria, became a potent weapon. Organizers were told 
to search for evidence of atrocities. cultural aggressions, 
exploite,tions, and calamities that might be linked to the 
pte~,ttern of the de,y. Gases were so arrm:~ged that 
------
46 Revolutionary Conmdttee of the Kuomintang; China 
Democratic League; China Dornocratic J;ssociHtion i'or 
Ntltional Heoonstruotion; China Peasants and Horkers Demo• 
c:ratio :Party; China Association for Promoting DemocraJJy 1 
Chuisen t .. oaiety. 
46 fiew Iork I.a,me§• January 1, 1951, p, 3:1. 
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psychological methods or pliJrsuasion could. be rohea.rsed on 
cue.47 Jllways a, gJ)od sho;.J 1 tttese demonstrations gave to 
the peasants a feeling of havir.g a voice in th<~. Government. 
Actually, they served to minimize resistance by directing 
energies e.long channels outlined by the Party • 
There is no end to ·the Givil \lax in. sight in the 
sprlng of 1953. Chiang Kai•sJ:Hlk is entrenched on :Formosa. 
11 Reo11 Ch:tna is engased in a major conf'lict \1lith Uni·ted 
Nations !''orcas in Korea. a ~;ar that is Slil.l)pj.ng her already 
vHilEl.k resources. Many necessary c5.vilian projects are lett 
undone. . There 3.s dissatisfaction at home but lit'tle hope 
of evalnating its true stl'e11g'l:>h until so.me later date. r~ye­
witness l!wcounts V(~ry. As Derk :Bodde, Professor of 
Chine.se, University o:t Pennsylvania, writes 1 
After spending a recent year in China under botll 
the Kuond.ntang and the Oonwunists, :r nave no hesita-
tion in saying that tho bullt of the people t;.here • • • 
definitely preferrec1 IVJHo 'Xse-tung, Commun:ism and all; 
to Chiang Kui•shek,48 
!n reply to Doctor Boc1de• John A. Bottorff', says: 
I have lived in Peipin(.l; under t.he Kuomintant.:t: several 
years before Dr. Eodde a.r :d ved • and lived undaJ1 the 
Communists several years after he left. • • • I have no 
hesitation m se;.ying that the bulk of the people the:t'e 
47 m_.~ TWJ~St August 7, 1951 1 P• 3:1. 
48 ~ ~ :f.!ll!Ut August u,. 1950, p. 18i6. 
• • • definitely preferred the Nationalists • Chiang 
Kai•shek and all• to the Oommunists.49 
49 ruw, Iru:l!;. Till!!l11!h August 21• l95o. P• 18:6, in a 
letter to the editor. 
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To assume soviet assistance to Chinese Communism on 
a scale large enough to bring about control of tho urvliddle 
Kingdom" by the "Heels" ~10uld be inconsictent \vith tho facts;, ___ _ 
to deny nussian int<ll:'es't; in ~lnd approval of any metms fOl' 
establishing a Jvlarxist govern.rnent in China 1.~ould be folly. 
!{ussia has coveted parts of China fol:' over tlu:oee hurttred 
years. In 1580 Yermak$ a Cossack brigand • t oolt possession 
o.f.' t3:l.beria. Expansion l:tnde:r the Tsars continued until 
1689 when ·t;he i"lanchus forced wi·thdr~mal from the regions 
of the Antur by the TJ~eaty of Neroh:!.nsk. Here mat;tors 
res·ted :!.n an uneasy truce uni;il 1858. In that Y~le.r 
Jv!uraviev. Governor~Gene:reJ. of Siberia, signed the treaty 
of Aigun vlh:tch fixec1 the 1\L1sso-Cl1inase boundary at the Amur 
River as for as the Ussu!'i.. An additional agreero€nt •~ith 
the Chinese Gova:rmnent secured i;ho tEJrrit;ory oast of' the 
USSIU'i River :Ln 1860. Vladivostok, no·.v J.n the Russia."l 
fold • fur nishad a good port, but not the lce .. frae one she 
desired on tho l?Mific. 
~y the ternw of the 'J~:reaty o:r Shiminosoki ending the 
Sino-Japnnase .·;ar of 1894·1895, Chinu ~~as to coci.e the 
Lia.otung Peninsula itlitla its excellent harbors o:f Fort Arthur 
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and Da1ny to Japan. Russia. Franca, ~~d Garmany protesteu 
this provision P;nd it was never carried to completion. 
In May, 1896• a secret agreement vJas concluded at Mosco,~ 
giving Rtlssia the right to extend the 'J:rens-sib ~aill'oad 
ao:ross Nanchuria. 1md setting up a RL1sso-Cl:tinese Bank for 
consti•ucti.o.n oi' the Chinese ll:astern Railroc.d. Th<m. 
Ilussia occupiecl. Port Arthur and deiDLlllder< a lease on the 
Kvumtung area of th€l Liaotung l'romontory. This was granted 
fo!! a t'Wenty-:f'ivo year poriod. Up to 1904 :Russia spent 
her time 1.n the economic penetration of Manchuria ana. the 
buil<Ung of a pov1erful naval base at Port il.rthur. All 
this vms negated by the T:r!<'laty of Portsmouth at the 
conclusion of the Busso-Japanesa \1ar. 
The Soviet Revolution a..>1d the establishment of. t~ha 
u.s.s.n. seemed for a t1.me to promote a ne~., Hussian policy 
for ·the Far Ii:tlst. On May 31, 1924, she renounced s~l t.he 
11 unequa~" treaties of. the Tsars. No<4 there was to begin a, 
campatgn or ideolog1.oal penetration fostered by existing 
politica.l e.nd economic conditions wh1.ch •.ueJ.•e a continuing; 
pha.sa O·f tho Chinese Hevolution of 1911. Bponsored by the 
Third Int•srnaM.onat, Communist adv:tsers c•1ere at·cached to 
tile Chinese Government at Ganton from 19g4 .. 1927 .1 J!fter 
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192'7 the SoVitJrt Union ~;:)ave little but moral support to the 
Kungchantang tJhiJ.e trainin~£ some of her .future leaders in 
\~hen t;h~; Japnnese invadec1 !4anchuria, ·Russia was 
grHvely conceJ:nec! fol~ the sa.fety of her :t:rontier. 
Threatened also tvas ·the f\Ussien interest in tlw Chinese 
.!~~\stern Ha.:!.lv~ay which '~as fin<:1lly sold to the puppet state 
of Eianchukuo in 1935.2 Realizing the itupo tence of the 
Nanking authol'ities to l-umdlc a.ffairs in ~hioi no:cttie:m 
aggressive moves by ref;:•a.ining :from any action wllich might 
b:t'ing about :full-scale \Va:r.. BGing expedi<m.tly friendly 
to Japan in l·lfmchuria left litt;J.e time fol' ~tssistance to 
ntll':t<arif'.l.S too badly at home to Sl'l8.l'O truam I"Jith a group or 
"Reels" a.t Yenan. Hmvevcr, she cUd aid tl1e Ku,ngchantang 
indirectly by hsr actions in outer Mongolia and SiDkiang3 
t'lbJ.ch f'o:rccd s'till anoth<.n: divcr::d.on on t;he already vJeighty 
program or tho rJo:t;ionalists. It> must h!l.Ve seamed to 
Chiang I~ai•shok ttmt the unifii>d Cl1inoso nation Nas b~Jing 
__ __, .• --
£ H. L. Moore, Gov;tet JYar ~tern Policy., pp. 27·30, 
i'or a brief history oi' the Chinese Eastern Railwa:y. 
3 Aitohen K. \riu, Qkj.ina au«;l t!Ml ~~oviet Uniorh Chapters 
XIV and XITI, fol' the story of f;oviat in:f.'luenrJe in these two 
Provinces. !~Y9rk f1m®!• Feb~uary 9, 1936, P• 3411, 
sta.tes that; .:, · ran:g s rtually under Hussum control. 
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further removed from the ideal o:l.' the 1911 Revolution. sun 
Yat-sen • s "Nationalism" had to struggle against the designs 
of two nations whose policies were ostensibly instituted 
for self':-proteotion. 
0.1' paramount importance to Japan 1s scheme or Empire 
~Jas containment of Huss:ta. With inimical ideolog:tgal. ______ ~-
ooncepts, it vias inevitable tha\t ocmf1iot should 'begin. 
The growth of Collllllunism in t~orthwest China added to Japan •s 
fears. In N'ovember, 1935, General Hayao Tada, Colll!llander of 
the Japanese garrison at Tientsin, declared: 
Should th.e •Reds • in .Shonsi become as strong as they 
i:Jere in l<iangsi they \vould de.finitely ntene.ce peace in 
North China, as it is virtually certain they would 
attempt to corrtroJ.. otner province. s. Iiowevar, :nora 
important is prevention o:r the •Reds t t'xom lJ.n.i!i.ng up 
with soviet Oll4Sll Mongolia and receivirlg aid. from 
Soviet Russia. . 
___ Thi~ _f'e_a);'_o_.t' joint a.c_tiQn 'by tM Qollllllunif.lt!'l ot 
Hussia and China prompted violent reactions on military and 
political levels vlllich Qtherwi<Je might have had. less 
serious consequences. Numerous t~a.rnings against the 
spread of Commu.nism issued from 'l:okyo. However, these 
t;h.rea.ts \rlere directed against the moxe :J.Illl!lediate danger to 
Japanesa expansion. 0 The u.s.D.R., plagued. by j.nternal 
4 Nexl ~ '.t;~mes. November 2, 19:315, p. 5~1. 
"5 New~ "times, li!.arch 17, 1936, P• 15:1; Ma.ren 4, 
1936. p. 16:2. 
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dii'.fieulties,6 was in no position to move effectively on a 
milit<ll'Y f'l'Ont in 1936 .. 1938. Chinese Commu.nist.s could. 
d<~pend on li'ttle help from the soviet Union. 
Russia had an intense interest in the "Sian Affair." 
She realized a unified China could modify Japan's demands 
and make he:!;' ov<n fiontiel' n10re secure. On the other hand,'-·----
the attitude of the so~1t11erners over the abduction of Ch:l.tmg 
convinced Mosco\~ that he was the logical man to bring on 
uni:f'ication, Stalin assumed the Japanese thraa.t to ~1arrant 
first consideration. He saw in the failltt'e of the revolt 
an indicstion of the direction Chinese politics '</Jere 
heading, a trend that t·Jould les.d to ol<.1ser co-operation 
with th"" Centra~ Government and an avoidance of any close 
tie with the Communist movement. 
Sinkiang and outer Mongolia felt the .pressure of' 
l"iussie.n imperialism. In 1939 the U.,s.s.H. admitted the.t 
she considered the frontiers of Mongolia as act1~ally Russiat'l 
frontiers.7 Air bases ware establisnec in both Provinces, 
6 The Communist Party Furge Trials began in 
January, 1937. In 1936-1937 many Sovl!:hozes wer!l abolished 
as failures and Kolldl.ozes (collective i'arms) t~ere expanded .• 
The second Five Year Plan v1as falling short of expectations 
in :t·ts production ot consumer goods and there 1:1as the poss• 
ibility oi' abortion e,s had happened 1\l:l.th the ll'irst .Plan. 
·c\. 7 ~ ~ J:imeth November 16, 193~), p. 8:2. 
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some ·reaching as much as t\·W thousand miles into Chinese 
territory. 8 f. rt>po:rt cii' culated that there wera three 
hundred tb.ousand men inside Sink1ang1 9 presumably led and 
supplied by tb.e Hussians. 
Tha linltup of. poli,tica~ ma.chinery in Sil1kiang and 
Moscow via.S s~wvm by tl").e fe.ct that purg13s of "deviation1sts11 
-in Russio. were accompanied by similar cleanups in the 
:Province. Trotskyist hunts in the ,Soviet capital brought 
"Left Opposi:tion" s~1arches in 'l::Uma. Vlhen Henry G. 
lagoda was shot in IVlosm:>w, the head of. the Buxaau of Pub .. 
lie safety in ;;1;tnltiang. Yagoda's man, l'Ja.s lll<;:el¥i.se 
exc1cutect. Hoi; far tn:!.s xagion had come from Cl1.inese 
control is best illutrt;ratad by ·ti:l<> traveler who sought to 
go thaxe, asked ·che ChUngldng Government for a visa, and 
\iEJ.S told I 
• • • tha:t; a visa ca.n be granted mlly if the 
applicant can obtain a po~t from the ~>oviet :€mbassy 
for travel through Russia. 
Nominally, Sinkia.ng was under ·the rLlle of an old• 
style tuchun, Jheng i:>hih-tsoi. In keeping \vith the 
-4, a .tWrl ~ Ximqs., December 2, 1939, p. 6:2. 
9 New ~ I*mes~ october 3, 1939, P• 1:4. 
10 .tWrl York: '{imes , January 2. 1940, p. 10!2. 
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policies of his office, General Bhang's allegiance varied 
ivith the noliticsl tides. First espousing a B.ussian 
alliance for development o!' .natural rasourct>S, he reversed 
himself in April, l.942, and decla.rea his complete loyalty 
to Chiang 1'\r~i~shek. 'l'>,JO years la.ter he \vas replaoed by 
\'lu Cht:mg-hsin, cliai:rrnan of ·!;he M.ongol~lM and '£ibtJtan 
Affairs Commission. .11. closer sooporation wa~1 agai11 
:l.'oste:red by tt1e Soviet TJnion. rr.d.ner~>l re so1uces, !l'J.l'ticu-
larly tungsten, were exported to the u. :,;.a.H. 
p.f·ter the Japanese ocoupo:t:l.on of ~~n.nchuria numerous 
border clashes took place bett,raen llussian r:J.nd Japt'lnese 
troops. gach I.H>amad to be testing tb.e stl:angth of the 
other with neit!10l' willing to risk WiJ.r. These hostilities 
~Jere brought to a ll!>lt by ~m uneasy truce in 1939. 
Nevertlleless, 11Jhateve:t: sttpplies were shipped into Cl'l.ina by 
Russ.ta during ,vorlci War II came dangerou.sly close to 
contested a;t'eas. 
On August 26, 19451 an Alliance axl.d :F'riendt•hip Pact 
between the U.s.s.R. and the Cn.inese Hepublic 111a,s s:l.gned. 
Supposedly good fox tllirty years, Article V bound the 
contracting pa.rtiras "to work together in close and friendly 
cooperation after thl!!l conclusion of peace.nll Its 
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prinoi.pa.l provisions includ~•d: 
J., 'I'he Chinese lilastt1rn Raih1ay and south ManchUrian 
Railway become joint property of China and ·the u.s, S,R, 
2, Port A;rthur to be used as e. n~tVlll l:!ase i"or both 
parties, 
3, Dairen to be, f:t free port ~1ith a. soviet citizen 
as harbor master, 
4, The U.s,n,H. to guarantee to restore Nationalist 
lead~u.•snip in Menchu:ia. 
5, SinkiatJ.&; to b<~J considered an :l.nteg;ra.l part ot' 
hina.. 
6, outer Mongolia 1% be tree aftEll? the war, if a 
plebesoi·te so directs .• 
As Russian sympathy for Chinese Communism t>las more 
openly manifest, this tl'ee.ty became increasingly \~orthless. 
All througb. the Kuomintang-Kun.gchanta.J.').€; post .. \var struggle, 
Russia postponed impleJnentation of her obligations. Final. 
abrogation canla in the signing of the Traaty of' t'l'iendsh1p, 
Alliance ~md Mutual .Aid ~Jith "Red11 China on February 14, 
1950. Its four main parts called for: 
1. Mutual e.ssistanoe in case of aggression. 
2. The retm:n ot Port Arthur • Deiren, and the 
South t<lanohu:r.'ian Railv1ay to China by tha end of 1952. 
3. l1 credit oJ: $;300 0 000,000 ext<mded to China by 
Russia. 
4. The ratu:m c>.t:' !v.~anchurbn lndusltries.l3 
Possibly the single most potent factor :i.n the 
control of future Chinese action by ·t.he Rttssie,ns has been 
the extent of the education given to the Chinese in Nlosco\v. 
12 N~'" ~ T;l,mef;~t loc. cit. 
l:ii ~ ~ ':C:j,Jnes, Februa.:ry 16, l9t10, · P• · 21:1. 
Thousands of students leave each month for intensive 
t;:ra:!.ning in t,~arx:!.sm under the Comnmnist leaders in the 
,~3ov:!.et capital. 
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L:l. L:t-se.n left China. to reaei ve f'u:ct;her training 
after disagreeing vJith lJlt,lO 'rse-tung on policy in l~l3l, and 
did not :rct•xrn until the closing d&,yll of' 'dorld ''l8,l' II, 
His irmneditl.te resumption of po•,oer could leave little doubt 
as to tha ef'i':!.caoy of his stay ~lith the Me.:rxist hiel'achy. 
In mo:re l'ecent times Chou :En•la:!. and !Jlao :rtHJ-'Imng have 
mad.e pilgrimages. Chou made his trip ln r;eptember, 1939 • 
ten years and thre<:J months bef'o:re Mao could be persuade1l to 
·take the ,jouxney. Thi:; latter visit :resulted in tho 
'f.J:•eaty mentioned above. 
l;Jhat Rt:tssin r~Jcelved for the concessions she made in 
the Treaty o£ 1960 have not been publicized. The N~'i ~ 
;J;ip:les l.isted i\'tosco\,1 as demanding sev<>n ports: ChingvJangtao, 
Ha:!.cholrl, Chefoo, \'feihaiwai, Tsingtao. De.i:ren, and Port 
Arthur in p:r.elimirta:ry nGgotit'.tions. i3he a180 11as repox•ted 
as asldng for lnc:re.ased shipments of' .f'oodrri:Lli'fs from 
Manchuria, a labor force of one half million m•m to be 
ava:!.labl<:l for use in Hussitt, Gnd oonoessj,ons by J?eiping ·t;o 
Sinldan[~, Inner lciongolia, ~·1nnchuria, and Tibet ,14 
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soviet advisers have now infiltrated all :fields of 
Chinese endeavor. Two Russian companies '~ere given the 
right to exploit oil and nonferrous metal resources in 
Ginkiang.l5 An order to abolish the use of English in 
business vias posted •16 In .Shanghai a health program >1as 
launched using Hussian aquipmant.l7 ;3·i;alin 1s pictures of._..t"'a"'n~--­
took precedence over Mao's at public damonstrations.l8 
li'Or awhile~ at lea.st • the unity seemed colnplete. 
Moscotr~ he.d followe'l tVJo distinct lines in her rela-
tions t1i'tll Nationa.list China from 1937 to 1949. One had to 
do tdtl:< Yanan. and through Yenan, t•Jith ChUngking; ·the 
other had ·to do 1r1ith Chungking directly. One >va.s 
Communist policy, the other a. policy of a state tovmrds 
another state.l9 strict intsrpretai;ion of the 1945 Trea.ty 
had led to usurpa:t;ion of pov1er by tile Conl.!nunists in 
Manchuria• i~ithdrawal of Hussian troops at a tim~" ~Jhen 
events :made Nationalist occupation of th.is region impossible, 
' 15 ~ xork I3,mes, March ;;n. 1950, p. 10:5. ,, 
"16 Nevi~ ;J:imes 1 Apl'ill6, 1950, p. 44:3. 
'-\ 
17 ,He1!J ~ '&:tmas, May 24, 1950, P• 19:3. 
,,-\ 
\V . 
18 Ne1:1 ~ Ume!j, August 27, 1950, p. 5:1. 
~\ 
19 ::>. Okazaki, "Moscot;, Yenan, Chungking," Paoif:Lc 
;t~i'f'ai;'s, 14:107·12 1 !'!arch, 1941. 
mat;erially aided the "Rod" cause. The stripping o.f' 
liiJanchurian industry helped in a negative walr' since the 
Chinese Communists could not have used it any~1ay, at least, 
not tor some time. Russian abendornnent o:t' arms in 
positions tvhore the Kungcbanteng could easily sequester 
them further helped ·tne ".Reds. 11 
Attacks in Russian newspap\')rS on l\iationr>.list .. 
policies heightened the rupture bett4een the two. groups. 
An article in the 'Val' mm, ~'ior\j;iw CJ.a§~ for June 191 l£44 1 
implied the necessity :t'or Chiang to unite his forces tvith 
those of Mao.20 £zvesti~ criticized Cldang in his 
prosecution of the w>.r against the Japanese,2l Red Star 
added its voice to the e.fi'ort.22 Pravda charged that 
Chinese corruption in Government led to the defeat o;f' 
·Kuominta.ng t • .roopa.23 These could hardly be ·the utterances 
of a state ready to enter a ·treaty o.f alliance ~>J:i.th 
another state in good faith, especially V!h<m tbat :r&ate is 
a dictatorship in absolute control of the press. 
~~o NaJa! X9.t1t :Cimes • J'lme 20, 1944 0 P• 10;4,. 
2l. NqvJ Io.rk T.1,lll\il!h December 3, 1944 t p. 136:8; Decem* 
bar 4, 1944, p. 14:6; June 4, 1945 0 p. 2:6. 
~ im:l, ~ Xinae§, March 14, 1945, p. 10:3. 
23 ~~'rimes, Fcibruary 19, 1945, P• 4;4. 
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lf tne U.i3.1,:.R. playe.cl. a oomparatively minor role in 
Chinese internal activities betv1een 1945 ancl 1950• her role 
as 11Big J3rother•124 to the Chinese Colll!llunists has been more 
than adequately :fulf.tlled in foreign affairs. On every 
major political issue Mao Tse-tung and Joseph Stalin 
presented. a. unit;ed front to the world. J'vlao has denounced 
the Atlantic Pact.25 circulated the stook.holn:1 Peace 
Petit.ton, and vowed to follow the doviet international. 
policy.26 
In January • 1948, tv1a.o urged the forme.tion of an 
As.:!.an Cominform in order to better the articulation 1:Jith 
vJorld Collllllunism. 27 The central .Execut.t ve Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, in July 1 Hdopte<t a resolution 
supporting Russia•s stand on the defection of' I•lflrsha.ll 
'.rtto~ even tt1ough seven months previous Mao had said he 
planned doing some o:t the same things. Said. Mao: 
The obJects that the ne111 dll!mocra.tic revolution are 
to eliminate, are only i'eudalism e.nd monopoly 
24 This name is used in a Chinese Comnumist Hand• 
book published by the Hopeh~Hunan-Shantung District 
Headquarters o.f t;M Chinese Co:mmunist Party, New ~ 
Times, January 14, 1948• p. 11:6. 
,'"· 25 ijew York Times, April 5 1 1949, P• 138:3. 
'~26 !J<H·J .~ 'l:ime§, December 17, 1949, P• 1;1. 
" 
''27 !WJt ~ '£imes, ,J"anua:ry 2, 1948• p. 11:2. 
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capitalism • , • • Because o.f too backwardness of 
China • s economy H will still be necessary to permit 
the e:dstence .for a lone; period ot the capitalist 
economy represented. by the broad petty bourgeosie and 
the middle bOt;u:ge.osia, even a:f"ter the n~:rticntvide 
victory of the Hevo1ut1on.213 
This incongruous reversal is explainable only on the 
assumption of increasecr Iiuss1an influence. 
--------:sov±et-Ru-ss-1-a-t-J.&-s-·t.tl;-ken-u-p-t-he~cas-a-fa-x-seat-i-ng~-----
"Red" China at the United Nations. ·rhe United states has 
been her major adversary. British recognition o£ the 
J?eiping Government on January 6 1 1960• one month aftor 
recognition o.f the Peiping Government by India and Burma, 
seemed .for a time to n1ake hal' position stronger. H011JE!Ver, 
the tvar in Korea has changed. all that. 
X.1ea.nwhile• the Na.tionalists i"Jait on l''ormosa. 
United Nation bombers raid along t.he Manchurian border. 
The Kremlin uses the Chinese t~henever end vloorever it cm'l 
to further its aims for t10rld aont;rol. 
28 ~ ~ :J:irnel\! 1 July 12, 1948• p. 1011, quoting from a speech made by tvla.o 'rse .. tung to the Central Execu-
tive Cormnit·t;ee in DlaC(lJ'!lber 1 1947. 
Cil!U'TER VII 
CONCLU~1IONS 
The Chinese CommurJist Party cannot raise the living 
standard in China without substantially jeopardizing its 
hold on ·che people. A mcnolithic state exists because 
economic consicte:ratiom> overshadot~ political usu:rpation 
of pov1er. ;Jilen men a:t,>e .fed and properly clothed in the 
industrial society that theo:retioany is the base of. 
Communism, they turn to some o·cher governments~ .form. 
ColllJm.:trlism in China he.s an emotional side tlla.t led 
its believexs into the long fight rox surviv.al. Communists 
fought for a cause. They believed in the right of their 
1~ay and they still believe in it. Howenr, as Dallin 
points out; in i1is §g'[i§!< &~!isaoa !.i!ll!! th!f .W ~. devotion 
to--a cause is not enough to make that cause ;just or make it 
succeed.1 Japanese kamikaze f'liexs willingly sacrificed 
tb.ei:r lives i Hitler's s. s. legions :t'ought long and 111ell; 
med:teve.l \;itch html;s aroused sincere religious i'anatacism. 
In each <ilase these ~Jere a dedicated winority. Others W3l'e 
SI-Iayed to the bmmer for a limited time. 
1 David J. Dallin, Sov;j,qt !1ussit;t and '!lh!i! Far East, 
P• 226. 
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So it has been in China. 11 hard, closely-knit core 
has ruled since 1927. ll'ollowers have multiplied as 
economic conditions worsened. 
hlhen the North Koreans crossed the thi'rty-eigP,th 
parallel, they started a tlame in Asia ttmt has consumed 
much of th~ resources of' an impoverished continent. 
China's entry has prolonged that engagement and lad to her 
alignment against the United Nations. This could be a 
fatal step to a young government. 
However • history shot4S people uniting for foreign 
war. This may be happening in China, even in the face of 
continuing reports of increased guerrilla e.otivity. liiith-
out the Korean ''ie.r thel'e might be even more unrest. 
The Chinese leaders have forfeited their chance for 
the rapid ellleliora.tion of' a long-suffel'ing people. Korea 
is a major war to tha ind.ustrial United l~tates. ~>Jhat must 
it be to ag;l'arian China'? Ji.'Ven >vith the help o:t Russia she 
cannot hope to keep the peace 1at home in any sustained 
campaign. Time is needed to consolidate agriculture, build 
industry, ~mCJ. stimulate conunerce. 
According to T •. z. Koo • four ta.ctors have been 
favorable to the gro1,1th of Communism in China. 
1. A disinte~ration oi' the rural economic system. 
The t:11end of· farm ·\vorker:; to the cities. 
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2. Warlord rule impoverished the land. 
3. Chinese intellectual life has long been 
familiar with communal organization and the equaliza-
tion of property, particularly land. 
4. Pl'essu:~~o from Japan and the uncertain internation-
al situation.s 
'l'o these we \~ottld add the ineptness o.f the KUomintang in 
keeping in ·tcmch >vith the people and their needs and the 
Me.rxism. 
Chinese "!leo" leaders are not agrarian reformers in 
·the sense ot our 1930 editorials. They are Marxist. !Jo 
denial o.t' this basio t:'act has ever come from .Peiping. On 
the contrary, every word, every action bears evidence to 
its truth •. As Edgar snow pQt it1 
My personal feeling in the matter is that liberals 
who build up hopes that the communists of China are 
different and only reformers and have abandoned 
revolutionary methods to achieve their program are 
doomed to ultimate disillusionmE!nt. • • • Their 
religion remains international socialism and if 
conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they 
believe necessary in order to stay on the locomotive 
of history.3 
From 1920 to the present. the thllead of in:tlernational 
Communism l1as ivot:tnd thllough the deliberations of the 
Kungohantang. :If' • in soma points, certain leaders seem to 
2 T. z. Koo, ··"Communism Bound to Fail in China," 
i(hina \:ea!Q.~ ReVI,ew, 65:495, August 19, 1933. 
3 ~gar Sno~;. Thq ~ttlfl tor J\Sia, P• zso. 
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have deserted the fold• it has been a tempora:!.'Y Gxpedien·t 
brought on by some economic, political, or military factor 
without effaot on the ultimate goal. Disagreement bat\'Jeen 
.Mao 'l'se•tung and Li Li-san has .never concerned ·the aim of 
Comrnunism, only the means of achieving tha.t a.im. 
Communist ideology has ~~lways been the motivating cause. 
\1/hile Li wanted to use the •~orkingmen in the cities to 
advance !'larxism, Mao wanted to use the farmers. Land l'e• 
form was a good stimulant because it was so badly needed. 
Mao was the man t;o use this wedge because he understood 
the farmer•s problems. So far his progrrun has been 
suocessi'ul. 
However, there are certain th:tngs \~hich are 
unfavora.ble to Chinese Communism that ;je need to consider. 
The social an<1 ethical code o.f her people has been one of 
the strongest opposing forces. Virtues o:r filial piety, 
respect for olt1 age, obedience, tolera.nce, and mutual 
benevolence betv<een man r1nd m.e.n td.ll be ha:l:'d to circumvent. 
Twenty centuries of teachings by the sages cannot be 
eclipsed in twenty years. 
some argUJJlel:lt may be ad.venoed for the socializing 
implications of Communism through Confucius. In tb.e 
&n~ects we read: 
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Ts ze-kung asked about gove:nment. The Master said: 
'The requisites of government a:e that there be 
suf'!'ioienoy o;f' food, su:t'fioienoy of milita:y equipment, 
and the confidence of tl'J.e people in the rulel'.' Tsze• 
kung said• 1!1' it cannot be helped, !U').d one of these 
must be dispensed vJith, 1vhich of the three should be 
.t'orgone first 11 1'J.'he milite.ry equipment,' said the 
Master. 'l'sze•kung again asked, 'If it cannot be 
helped and one of the remaining two must. be. dispensed 
with, which of them should be i'orgone? • The Mastilr 
replied, •Part vlith the food. From of old; death has 
-------be.en-th<:1--lot-o.f-al-l-men-;-bt:tt-i-f-the-peoPle-ha.ve-nc'-------
faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the 
state. •4 
The duty o:t:' ·the government to supply food is the essential 
point. 'l'his phase of ~1lao' s program of lend redistl'ibution 
has historical. significance, albe::J.t remote. Con:l.'ucius 
pre:l.'arred to let even this go to keep the confidence of the 
people. 
No Communist state dares disband its military • A 
military gova:rnment cannot keep the confidence of' the 
people. If its f'ood supply do,;;s not match its promises, 
the Communist state will soon lose the confidence of the 
people. This remains an unrasolved dilemma. 
The will oi' the Chinese people has n<wer had a forum 
for expression in its long existence. D:rives towards 
· . nationalism manifest in the politics of seventeenth and 
Eighteenth C6ntury I~urope have been notably absent in 
4 ililliam D. Gould, G. B. Arbaugh1 and R. F. Moor a • Ql'ieijtal fhi,losophies, P• 125. 
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Chinese history. \11th the overthrow of the Manchus in · 
19ll, some semblance of.natlonal stirrings was evi~enoed• 
bt;rt the local tone end reversal to tiarlordism in the next 
decade negated its· continuity. liNen sun Ye:t; .. stom, the 
cc1<Jotic idealist. frien.c1 of the common man., at·iaempting by 
benevolent propa.:J;anda in hJs ~·t>Jin ghu ll_'"·t_,_o~ev._o""l,.,v~e:-_· _.a,.._.------~ 
dictum of the B;OOd life w.:!.thout recourse to the practical• 
· ities or large sections o:f his homeland, met >vith failure 
in the eor;fusion of its implementation. 
Democracy t-1as poorly imitate(] under the Kuomintang; 
it has no chance under Communism. Elections do take place 
in "Hed 11 China and res1.D.ts ;;ould seem to indicate that non• 
Communists outnumber Communists in elected bodies.5 
However, parliamentary controversy continues to concern 
adaptation to local conditions ol' basic priMiples laid 
dc1n1 by Party Haadquarters, rather ·t.han those principles 
·themselves; the raethods of carrying out, :r:a:ther ·than 
d•,cisions. for or against i'unclan1ental lines ot' yolicy; and• 
f'inally 1. rnat tors concerning the ability, e.f.ficienoy, and 
honesty of personnel, the evaluation of popular e:ttitudes, 
the assessment of results 1 al1cl future pote.ntialit.:tes o:r 
5 111'l1e Chinese Communists and Their Programme •" 
~iorld J:ogau. 5:71, F'ebrua:ry, 1949. 
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aotion. The impetus continues to come from the top. A 
chain of' oorrunand extends through the Communist . Party into 
the organizations of' elected of':f'icials at every level. 
Irregardless of his political label, every officer foll.o11S 
the dictates of the Kungcnantang or he no longer is an 
official. 
In closing. le·t us consider the Communist aims as 
published in the ~ flag Dai~~ New~ in 1930. 
l. JJ;xpulsion of foxeigners. 
2. Jl;limination of,' militarists. 
3. Est&.blishmant of government run by laborers, 
peasants, and soldiers :f':ron1 the ranks. 
· 4. Oonf'isaation of all banks. 
5. Abolition of all unequal treaties. 
IS. Cancellation of' aLl loans. 
7. Union witll the •world prolata:ria.t • and l:loviat 
Russia .• 
B. Adoption of an eight hour day. 
~. Labo:r: insurance and une1nployment t',lomptmsation. 
10. Oon:f'isoation of all factories who refuse to obey 
Communist rule. 
ll. Nationalize.tion o:t land arul churches. 
12. Abolition of the land tax.6 
Very few o:f' these aims havo be<>n car:ded t;o aomple• 
tion, 'l?b.e Hussin~s seem to have more polftJer than any other 
foreign group over had. Communist militarists have been 
substituted :f'or the warlords. Government by "laboreu. 
peasants, and ;;oldiers from the ranl{s" is a paper govern-
ment ;;ithout sovere:J..gnty. Old tres:t:l.es have been abrogated, 
6 !IYew 1$1'.1£ Times, iJeptember 28, 19m, Seat5.on III, 
P• 4t3. 
but new ones have been entered into \d,th Bussie that 
threaten to bo even more reprehensible. Loans have been 
negotiated "teJith the Soviet Union. '.rhe Korean war has 
postponea almo<>t all social legisle:tion. Land deeds are 
placed in the :repositori.es of villages and controlled by 
the ColllDlunists. Taxes have probably inareased, if not 
through impositions • certainly through ••loans" to the 
regime. 
149 
The "Radii victory has bean fraught !41th negatives, 
substitutions, and militarism. China deserves better. 
CHAPI' EH VIII 
I. CHEN TU•HSIU 
Chan Tu•hs:l.u war; born in 1879 to a family of 
the classics~ pattern o:r the Chinese educational systom at 
an early age m1d turned his energy to reform. Seeing how 
the 1/lest had enforced its ~~ill on China, b.e dete:rmi:ned to 
master the teohnic,.il kno111ledge of tile Occident. At t;he 
age of' tt1enty•o:na he vJent to Tokyo to enroll :l.n ·the 
l:U.gher Nol'mal Bahool in prepaJ:<ation for hi;; l:l.:t.'G wo:rk as a 
In 1907 he lett Japan :tor l''ranoe whexe he formed a 
strong at·taal:lment for the 1rrench people. Ha returned to 
China in 1910 cotlV:l.uced that only radical changes could 
save his country. In succession he became a high school 
principal • seorata.ry ·to the governor of' Al1lli1e1 Province 1 
and, .finally, oommiss:l.oner of education in tho provincial 
government. 
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Yuan Shih-kai •s rise to pm~er led to a "Second 
Revolution" by sun Yat-san in 1913. Although not of the 
KUomintang, Chen supported this movement, and upon its 
failure 111as .forced to flee the country. tt'hen Yuan •s power 
.f'aded in the st:umner ot 1915, Chen returned to China, 
settling in t,he F·renah concession of .Shangha.i. Hero he 
started a newspaper, ~ :;{outn, ~Jhioh promised a. thorough 
overhauling of' morality, education• and economics. 
Insisting on a return to "plain language," for the next 
five years he led !:'- oampldgn against the literary abuses 
of classicism. 
Chen was made dean of the College ot Letters at 
Peking University 1'Jhere his librarian was r.i '.Ca-chao, 
later to become co-rounder t~ith Chen of tlle Chinese 
Communist Party. These two men started the tieeklj( \(i£:l,tt2 as 
a political organ in an etfort to preserve the cultural 
emphasis ot the Nmi :;{O!Jth, and in so doin(~ made the College 
of' Letters a "hotbed" of' revolution. 
\!/hen Germany • s :rormer interests in l~hantung 1r1e:re 
tt~rned over to Japan at Versailles, riots broke out in 
Peking. Students from the University st;orm•Jd through the 
streets and into a party given by lea.d.<'ll'S of ·tt1:1 pro-
Japanese faction, Held responsible !'or these disorders, 
several pro:t\~;ss\9rs, including Chen, were foroad to resign. 
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He was then imprisoned for eighty-three days. 
Chen's conversion to Communism came in the spring of 
1920 at a meeting t~ith Gregory Voitinsky ~ ;:;eoratary-General 
o:t the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. As a result of 
this conf'•erenoe 1 t11.e ChimJse Soo1a11st Youth Group was 
' ' 
organized.. >'lith $5,ooo.oo a month coming from the 
Comintern, other br~mohes were founded in princip!ll.l 
Chinese eitias. 
P.ressux•e from the Russ3.an "advisers" resulted in the 
calling of the National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China on J'uly J., l92l, in the F'renoh Concession o.f 
Shanghai. Chen 111as in Canton at ·chis time end did not attend 
the gathering. Nevel!theless, he oJas aleoted cha.irman o:t: 
the Central Exeolltive committee--a group charged with 
establishing perfect laison \~ith tb.e Communist International.. 
Always the teacher, Cll<m accepted the position o:r 
dean at the College ot' Letters at Stla.ngh.ei University. ·rhe 
Party undertook to tra.ns:form the University into a train-
ing school for revolutionists. Chen assembled a fao~lty 
competent for this job, Included was Ch1u Chiu•pai, Chen's 
sucoesso:11 in the J?al!ty. who had just returned t'l!om MoscoN, 
Chen •s influence in tho Communist J?ar.ty waned almost 
before the organization got started, His leadership or the 
New Litel!ature Iv!oV~lment and the May Fourth Movement ~Jere to ' 
' 
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be his greatest achievements. Others were destined to lead 
the Party he fathered to power. 
Throughout the period of Conununist•Kuomintang 
alliance .from 192:3 .. 1927, Chan disagreed wj;th prominent 
members oi' the lei't•wing. He and Borodin could not agree 
on their assessment of tile Kuomintang. He and !vlao 'J.'se-tung 
disagreed on the place of' the peasant and the proletariat 
in the revolution. 
Following the oou'R of Chiang K~1i .. ailek, Chen l'<'lsigned 
from his Party offices and retired to Shanghai. Drifting 
further and furtnar ~n1ay f.:rom Stalin ortilod.oxy, he ••as 
formerly expelled from the Chinese Communist Party in 
November, 1928. From tru1t time until his deatll in 19431 
Chen :remained violently anti-RUssian. Al:rested in 1932 on 
the charii5e that llis activities constituted a threat to th.e 
Chinese Republic, he openly xe•aff'irmed his faith in 
Co11ununism. :i:'entenoad to :fifteen years in prison, he was 
released in 1937 by a gfmeral ammlSty l,';l'amted political 
prisoners at t;ha beginning of th® Japanese War. 
Chen Tu .. hsiu used his four years in pri<>on doing 
research on philology and spent his later years writing a 
treatise on the characters engraved on bones used by the 
ancient Chinese !n divination. Hit; last work \Vas •:mtitled 0 
On the ~a.nint) lW! Gl!j.§!}:l,:t;ioatio:g 2t: C\mracl(ers. 
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II. H:SU TE!l•LI 
Hsu Teh-li, elder statesman of the Kungahantang• 
teacher of' Mao tse-tung, receivarl his early training in the 
Classical tradition. A n"'tive ot Changshe. 1 he taught for 
many years in tlmt Hunan city. 
i,lfrren ttre-ai1IJ.ngo-to westernizat-i<>n fiNrt oameabout. 
Hsu enrolled in a six•n1onth Bhort-Course Taacher Training 
School at Ning~hsiang. He was exposed to pleas !or the 
doctrines of Dun Yat•sen but did not burst into revolu-
tionary ardor. Hsu preferred tea.ching. 
Returning to Changsha on completion of his 
teacher-trtiining course • Hsu started a school :ror young 
iuen. Here revolutionary concepts were given a place ·dth 
conventional training in ideographs and composition. 
subtlety, arlti-monarchie.l ideas wore incorporated into the 
presentation of all subjects. 
Not satisfied >·sith his Normal School li<'Ork, Hsu 
successively taught at a girls 1 school in Changsha, 
studied primary education in J·!il.pan, during 1r1l'licb time he 
met Bun Yat-son and joined the T1ung-meng l:luit and ostabUsh• 
ed e, project to educate laborers in night courses. 
After the 1911 Hevolution, he gained prasti~e in 
the educational field as director of the Changshe First 
Normal ,9cnool. He even survived the counter-revolution oi' 
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Yuan Shih~kai in 1913. However, within five years his 
unorthodox methods end radical agitation caused his removal 
from his post e.nd subsequent slight to Shanghai. J!'rom this 
city he embe.rksd fox :Paris and Berlin to join in the groups 
that \~ere to be so vital. to the Chinese Communist Party in 
the f'uture. 
Hsu Teh-1i remained in Europe for three years. on 
his :return to China he joined the Kuominteng and became co-
leader of the Ii;xeoutive Conunittee of the Ch.angsha Branch. 
Identified with the extreme lert-wLr.g, Hsu often disagreed 
with Chiang Ke.i-shek. ~lhen the Hed Flag was raised at 
Nanohang, he cast !us lot with General He Lung and .fled to 
Hong Kong. 
A.t the age o;t: fifty-one, Hsu t~as ordered to Mosaow 
for :t'urther study. H.e attendet"l f'un Yat-sen University, 
the training center :t'or revolutionary leaders or tre Far 
East. Sho;r:tly the:r:eaf.te:r he was assigned. as commissioner 
of education for the soviet Areas in China, one of the 
civil affairs nosts vJhich controlled domestic activities 
' 
during the vmr. 
asu 'J~eh-U has not l'ir>en e.s high as some of his 
friends in th<.l J?arty heirarob.y, but his influance has been 
profound. .1\.li~ays the pedagogue, his students carry on his 
training, tel.k about his work, and revere his \~ord. 
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III. MAO '£&E-'£UNG 
~~o Tse-tung was born in 1893 to a family of farmers 
in the Cha.ngsha valley. Bts father had pro~pered over the 
years, advancing to a point financially >Vhere b.a could 
assure his sons an education. Determined tlw.t Tse-tung would 
into the night i hovJever 1 revolting against ttlis training, 
the youth showed tl1f> complete diBragard :f'Ol' money otten 
associated 1r1ith those \~ho ha.ve not had to earn it. 
Mao attended private school .t't•om the age of' eight to 
thirteen. His liking for the old popular novels sorely 
tried the patitmce of his teachers. He is reported to have 
given up l1is reading of. these novela when he StWJ that it ~Jas 
al1>Je.ys the gr<>at man, the prince • who was dominant. Next 1 
he turneo to the revolutionary Journals of sun Yat .. sen and 
Liang Ch 1i•Ch 1ao. 
In July • l\!21, Mao Tse-t(mg f.o:rmally joined the 
Chinese Communist l?al'.'ty. After coming to Sh.allghai to 
participate in the esta.blistm1ent o:f' ·~he Party and .report 
on the peasants oi' Hunan Province, he re·t.urneri to Changsha 
as chief· of tlle Hunan Committee of. tile Communist Party. 
Since Hunan is predominantly agriculturl'll. Mao organized 
peasant unions in direct contradiction to th'll Comintern1 s 
edict for ooope:re.t:ton with the Kuomintang. Moxeover • the 
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InternationHl insisted that the .firm base o.f any Bolshevik 
revolution must be ·t;he urban prolete.ria.t, The cities vlere 
the center or pO\•Jer. Mao saw 1 t differently. 
Late in 1923, Ma.o ~~EW accused of devia.tioni~:>m, 
severely repr:l.ruanded, and fell from tt1e l?arty • s good 
gx•aces. With a promise to mend his ways, he attended the 
First 'Nationa~ Cong:r<l!lS of the Kuomintang in the 1.dnter of 
1924 and later served on ·~he F.xecutive Committees of the 
.shanghai :SL1reaus of bot!1 the Communists and the Nationalists .• 
He I' as appoirrted head of the Pa:rty 1 s Hunan :Peasant 
Bureau in 1926 and irmae(lia:tiely returned to his old unorth· 
odox fixation, In a report entitled, .Qu the !Zee;s~mt l'loyemenit, 
in ~iUAWat he v1rote that "all revolutionary part:l.s s • • • 
1~111 be put to the test by these L.PeasauW masses. n2 
Fiejected by the l9iZ7 Fifth Congress o.f the Communist Party 1 
·t;11is report ef'fect.ed a split ths.t out Mao on: :t.'rom the 
¥'arty until 1931. After organlr.:tng thlll abortive Autumn 
Crop Uprising in Hunan in 1927 1 he fled into tha country-
side hunted by i;he Kuom:lntang and in disfavor with '\~hat 
remained of the Communist Party. 
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:Mao ·,w,s captured. by a company of militia but 
escaped by bribing 11is captor. Joining a band of fugitives 
on the f..iangsi border 1 he quickly 1•ose to leadership of the 
group. These t'J<Jo battalions became the co:r.e oi' the force 
Mt~o led to Chingkangshan in southern Kiangsi and later 
became the cadre o.f the Red Arrlly. hlh11e Chu J:eh and Mao 
Tse•tung built theiJ: def<lnsive strength in the Kia.ngsi Jlrea, 
the Kungchantnng v1as annihilated as an effectively working 
forclil. Li J.J. .. san still pressed for control of the cities 
but military reverses discredi"Ged his ambitions. 
ln 1931 the Party transferred its Headquartars.to 
tho Kia:ngsi soviet. During a J.w.lt in the Long M.':lrch• four 
years lat<lr • Nlao was elected its ehief'. Today he is 
chairman of all ruling bodiaH of the Corumunist Party. 
There :ts no one to challenge !:.tis position. 
IV. C!ID TEH 
Chu 'l'eh came of a >1e1l-to-do femily in no:rth<lrn 
Sz.echtvan. ltls early life \oJ/3-S devoted to .preparation for an 
official positlon through ttte tj,me•honored study oi' the 
Classics. \Jhen, in 1906, the Court abolished ·t;he examina• 
tion system, Chu determined on acquiring ,,estern knowledge. 
Finding his taste ran to physical rather ·than the 
:tnt eJ.le c·tual, he enrolled at Yunnan Mili taJiy In" ti tut;e 
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\vhere he made a good record, Upon g:raduation in 1911 he 
jointed the Yunna11. Army of Ts 1ai, soon to be ttachun oi' 
that Province, ani to reward Chu for his sexvices by 
appointment l'tS commander of his alma mater, the Yunnan 
J'ilili'tary !n:;tit;ute. 
From here on Cl1u 's fo:rtunos prospered, until, in 
19131, he was named Cornmission•~:r o.f f'Dlice for• 'Yunnan. 
'l'his post ,zave him ai'fl•!!Gnce in tne community, and Chu Teh, 
in tl'Ue warlord style, maintained a splendid establishment 
complete with retainers, concuM.l1es, and motorcurs. His 
success cvas short .... lived, howevex, !'or his enemy, th<'l-
deposed ml~itary governor, T'e.ng chi~yao• retook th~l 
Province by milHaxy force H!ld Chu vtas forced tc floe to 
Chungldng. l'l'inding it politically inexpedient to vwrk for 
the :rulers in this area, he tr-aveled to canton and 
Shanghai. In tb,ose cities, outside the pall of' interior 
smugness, he embraced t.ht1 causa of Sun Yat-sen and ideal-ism 
of t1:10 young men, 'ang Ohing->-Jei anc: Chiang Ka.i-sllek. 
Chu \vent to Germany in 1924. lJhile t;h<ll'e b.e ;vas 
introduced to Communism. He. Joined ·the Party in 1925 and 
returned to China at; the beginning of the follo\dng year. 
Bent to Chungklng, he accepted the of;f'er of command of a 
division by G<m<lral Yant.£ Shen that had been made him on 
his previous visit. Keeping his Purty a!'.f'iliatJons secret, 
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Chu ~lasted. no time in indoctrinating these ·troops toward 
Marxist ideology. 
When the Northern U:Xpedition sta.rted he joined 
forces with Chu P1e1-te• his former chief and classmate at 
Yunnan Military Institute. At Nanchang on August 1, he 
revealed himself as a "Red" by rejecting Cb.u F'ei•te•s 
order to suppress the rebellion. 
After the failurl!l of the swatow Commune. Chu •reh 
began his work or building a Communist Army in China. 
Retiring to the Canton-Hunan bol'der with less than one 
thousand impoverished men, he joined the army of Fan 
Shih-sheng. accepting the post of regimental con'Unender. 
By close cooperation \'lith the dissatisfied peasants 
of' the area, Chu extend• d the region under his control. In 
May, 1928, he attached his forces to those of ~1!to Tse-tung 
on Chingkanshan and took over the military leadership of 
both groups. Three years later, on October 7, l9::S1, at ·ehe 
First Congress of soviet Representatives in Jui-chin, Chu 
Teh was appointed Commander~in•ClU.ef of the Ne\~ :J!'ourth 
Army. :):ntermittent guerrilla campaigns ware waged against 
Nationalist forces with some measure o! success. 
After the Japanese invasion of July, 1937, and the 
subsequent alliance of Communists and Nationalists, Cllu 
'.Nab. was named collllllander of the Eighth Route Army. 
-
.= 
'I'hroughOut world ;e:'ar ;ci Chu stuck to his policy o!' 
harassment without engaging the Japanese in large .. scale 
battle. This umJillingness to engage the enemy in 
decisive comba.t v<id,med the breach developing bet;veen 
ChUngking and Yena.n. 
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At the 1t1al' 's end Ch.u l'ei'used to obey Chiang • s order 
to surrender Japanese troops to the Kuomintang, Instead 
Lin Piao ~~as instructed to adve.nce on Ililanchuria and unify 
pro-Col!llllunist forces there. The drive that >-Jas to take the 
t~hole mainland a\>Jay from the Nationalists 1~as underway. 
Today Chu Teh is first vice-president oi' the Central 
Government Collllllittee. The Korean War ha~> Elnh!J.nCed the 
power of ·t;he military, Ht~le by generals is still the 
accepted practice. 
Chu•s prestige has not diminished. He remains 
Chinese Col!llllunism•s first soldier. 
V, CHOU El~·L.III 
Most oi' Chou's young life \~as spent in Manchuria. 
!~s a son of an official, his early study •~as with the 
Classics, Realizing the need .for Westernization, he for-
sook Confucius and enteretl Nankai University. Here Chou 
agitated against the govermnent and organized the "AvJalren 
Club" to furtha:t: tllis movement. 
I ~-
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In 1920 he v1ent to France • partic.1.pating in the 
meeting wlliah finally founded the Paris Branch o.f the 
Chinese Communist J?a:cty. ~firming recognition in the rallil:s 
o.f intel'national Golll.W.unii.lm, Chou \~as r<in•arded on his return 
to China by appointment as secrete.ry of canton Branch or 
__________ t~h~e~l?~a~r~ty~·L_ ____________________________________________________ _ 
This -was the year for establishment of the hhampoa 
JVJilitary Academy and Chou TI:n-lai found a place on its 
faculty in the all-important Political Training Department. 
From this position he v1as able to spread Marxism throughout 
the officer corps. However, the virus did not spread 
easily or well, and Chou v;as soon assigned to organize 
terrorists in shanghai tmdar the direction of Chen 'I'u·hsiu. 
After the abortive uprising of l!i~irah and April, 1927, 
he fled. to Nanchang. \'iitl'lin the ne:.r•t few months his banner 
f'le1>1 in a number oi' minor proletarian revolts, &tll doomed 
to failure. 
Chou -went to Moscow as a member of the Chines~ 
delegation to the Oomintern in 1928. The following year h0 
was again in Cbinu, this time as chairman of the O:rganiza• 
tion Bur€ aU and st~ppo:rter of Li Li-san. When Li •s 
policies were abandoned, he was transferred to the Milit;ary 
Affairs l3ureau, a post that 1r1as to become as lmportant as 
his previous one. Strangely enough. the purge of the 
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nTrotsky 11 faction did not seriously affect Chou•s career. 
At Ju:Lchin, in Ul3l, Chou entered the service of 
Mao Tse-tung and ChU Tah• the new ma~rte:rs of the \";hinese 
Communists. He became ch!i!.irman of' the ne~1 Politburo and 
a:l.'ter the Long J\l.tarch took on the .functions or a foreign 
_____ m..,..inister :for the rebels at Yenan •. _______________ _ 
As folieign minis tell, he entered into negotia:t.ions 
wit.h Chiang Kai•shek at .Sian during ths Genel'alissirno •s 
captivity by Chang Hsueh•liang. Here he concluded an 
agreement for joint purticipacion in the war agains·t Japan. 
Bho:rtly chel'et1fter • hG t,;as Bent to NankirJB; as Communist 
repl'esentati·ve to i~ha "United. Front.'' 
Th:r:oughout th.a wal' • first in Nanking an:l later in 
Chungking, Chou -worked for the coalition goval':nmerrt as a 
tvadge towal'ds ge'vting ovantual "Red•• oontl:'ol. Failing in 
this, milite.ry victory in 1949 gave him ttl\l top administl'a• 
tive post in the Chinese Conununist Governrnsnt--Premier of 
the .state Admi:nlstrative Council. In his capacity a.s 
I•ore:i.gn !'linister, he helped bring <cbout the "Treaty of 
F:riandsn:l.p and J1llianca" bat>1aan China and t~he 13ovie t Union. 
!io;~ Qhou llln•lai concerns himself with gettin& "Had" 
China. a seat on the United Nations. So flU' his ei'fo:rts in 
this reg~\rd have been frustl'ated. Bas:i.caJ.ly Chou lacks 
understanding of. tl:llil ~~est and its motives. Blinded by 
Russian propa.ganda, he pursues a foreign policy that 
alienates the whole v1orld. 
Yet, Chou has done lllany an about-face in his long 
public life, If someone else should start, Chou En-lai 
might follow. 
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VI-. -LI1'Cl?"!AO,-----------------
Lin Piao is one or the few graduates of the \Vhampoa 
Military Academy in the ranks or toe Communists. Born in 
1908, his family operated a small textile mill in Huangan. 
nevolutionary ideas came early in Lin•s lii'a. He migra.ted 
to the industrial city of V.'Uaha.ng and joined the "Social 
't!el.fare Club, 11 a group immersed in \/esterniza.tion. It wa.s 
an easy step 'lio membership in the Communist Youth League. 
After graduation from Whampoa, Lin >1as commissioneo 
in tha Citizens 1 Ravoltltionary Army of the KUominteng. He 
abandoned his Nationalist career in August, 1927, when he 
led his troops to Join the "Red" insurgents at Nanchang. 
l''ith Chu 'hh he marched to Chingkangshan. 
Un comm~1nded the First Army Group on the Long .March. 
On arrival at 'Yenan, he was appoin·i;ed Director of thiil Red 
aca.demy ,. and in 1937 was given command of the One Htmdreo 
Fifteenth Division. During ivorld war II Lin •s reputation 
grew as m master tactician. Plans of battle for the Eighth 
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H.oute Army. a:r.•e Ol'lildited to him. 
l~t the Je.panese surrender in 1945, Lin Piao received 
the job of securing Manchuria to the Communists and 
establishing in that Provine(!) a i'ormidable base for opera-
tions southward. Pushing out, his troops were instrumental 
in bringing the offensive against Chiang to a successful 
conclusion. \vl1en the Nationalists were driven :from the 
mainland, Lin undertook the capture of Eainan in 1950. 
one measure of Lin Piao•s prominence in Communist 
China may be gained by recounting the number of posts he 
holds in the Peiping Government. He is Commander of the 
l<'ourth Field Army, Chairman of the Gentre.l Gt>:l.ne . ..!idm:lnistra-
tivlil Area, Commander of ttlil Central China. Military Area, 
secretary of the regional Communist Party Eureau, and Chair• 
man of the Financial anti. Economic Bureau for Central China .• 
Yet • the story of Lin Piao bas been ca.ught up in the . 
maelstrom of worlc\ events. His Fourth Jl"iel.d Army has 
S\lfferad enormous .casualties in Korea. Rigid control of 
communications be.s probably caused little te,rnisbing of 
Lin's :reputation. As long as he follows the Party's dic-
tates this will remain so. 
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VII • LI LI •SJlN 
The firebrand of Chinese Communism, the advocate of 
quick victory through the proletariat, Li Li-san first ceme 
into efi"ecti ITiil control of the Party after Chen Tu-hsiu' s 
removal in August, 1927. His policies C!arried through tt10 
attacks 011. Changsha in opposition to the wi~;hes of Mao 
·rse-tung. For f'ailure he ~ll!lS strippecl of his Party offices 
and exiled to Moscow in 1931. 
During the years the Chinese CollllllUnist Party 
struggled in rural areas, Li rerr.ained in Russia. Not until 
the soviet Army invaded Manchuria did he return to his 
homeland. Here, in 1945, Li •s political life in the 
Communis·t regime began again. The .Party had a firm peasant 
base and could now use his lmo1r1ledge in the cities it was 
soon to conquer:. Appointed political adviser to Lin Piao, 
he followed that General to victory in the ensuing 
campaigns against the Nationalists. 
Held in a\>eyanoe by his Kremlin masters, Li is now 
af:f.'orded the oppol'tunity to do the l'<ork he most wants to do 
--organize the workers in the cities. As vice-president of 
the General Federation of' Labor, his task is becoming 
increasingly important to the "Red" Government. !i.'ven Mao 
Tse-tung a.ppea.rs to be swinging towards that idea. 
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REJlations between Mao end Li au oordial as of the 
moment. At a recent Congress of the Asian trade unions, Li 
praised ~'Iao •s leacllilrship and humbly confessed. his 0\1n 
transgressions. In spite of this dispJ.ay of humility, Li 
still looks. tovw.rd Mosoo~1 too often for meny Chinese. 'rhe 
analogy between him and JJ:a.stern guropean Cominunists who 
were shipped. back .from the u.s • .s.n. is striking. 
''!hila !"lao and J,i are striding together at this 
moment, neitJJ.ar•s life would.·indicata that eithar could 
change basic behavior pa.tterns. Ostensibly, Li has assumed 
the role ot passive tollol~er. He will clo so until the 
K;reml:!.n <h1lOl'aes otherwise. J.~i Li~san may be tb.e ·.rroJan 
Horse in the Chinese Communist Camp. 
VIII • LIU SHAO-CIU 
Born in Hunan, L1u Shao-ohi began his stud:t.es in 
preparation fo!! a teaching ce.!!<H~l' in the.t Province. Jmter-
:f.ng the Chengsha First Normal Sctlool, he was a classmate oi' 
.Me.o ·:rse ... tung: and came under the radical influence of Hsu 
Teh-11. Upon graduation. Liu went to Shanghai filled with 
revolutionary zeal and there joined the Socialist Youth 
Group ot Chen Tu-hsiu. 
Liu Shao-chi's early efforts on behalf of the Party 
concerned themselves with tho labor movement. liis first 
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assignment was to the coal lllinflls of' Kiangs:!.. so successful 
was his agi·tation for reform that he 'tJaS transt'<ll:r:ced to the 
Headquar·tars of the Labor £Jecretariat. Thrown into the 
web of intxa-.Pl'J.rty strife• this group p:roducecl large, 
militant unions. The All•Ohina Labor Federation was. 
o:rganized \'lith Liu as vice-president. 
When Chiang cleaned the Oo!lllllunists ou·t; of the 
Kuomintang in 1927, Liu probably went to J)!losc0¥1 as so many 
of ·the other "Reds" did. flo1ri®V<al' • his 1t10rk from 1988 to 
1931 is not recor.dad. In the latter year he turns up 
again as an organizer of. underground unions in Ch~~ghai. 
By 1932 111e find him installed as Chairman of tt1e All-China 
Labor Fedel•ation in its nevi ooenter at Juichin, the :Kiangsi 
••.Red 11 capital. 
In this capacity Liu organizer1 laborers into three 
categories: (l) IJea.sant unions, (2) unions of sales clerkS 
and handicraft workers, and (3) unions of coolies and. trans-
portation "10rkers. These organizations W3re Cl'eated to 
11 assist positively in the creation of the Red Army. 10 
Leadership within the unions was eonsts.ntly juggled to 
keElp this aim paramount. Improvement in VJOrld.ng con<'l.iti..ons 
was not an end in itself, but purely a maanB of' moving the 
workers into a position to help in gaining the Communist 
rise to power. 
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After the Long March, Liu once again dropped from 
sight. P:resUlllably on his second visit to Moscow, there was 
little nGed fox his peculiar brand of.agitation in 
ngricultural Shensi. 
\liith the union o1' Kuomintang and :Kungchantang in 
1937 1 we find him on the $cane, this time engaged in 
rallying the ShaP.ghai workers to the cause o.f anti-
Japanese aggrassion. Fox•ced underground, he ~~orkcd 
consistently for the Communist Party'. s eventual seizure of 
control. 
'l:b.G lied-Nationalist split in 1941 brought Liu back 
to Communist axear.. He \vas el1~vated to i;he .$ccretariat of 
th® ::!entral Committee t\~o years later, that body tha.t 
conducts tho everyday business of the Party. In 1944 he 
was given a seat in the Political Bu:reau. Liu had arrived. 
Liu Ghao-chi •s sponsorship of a revised Party 
Constitution at Yenan :l.n June, 1:145, ma:rl{s his most 
notorious achievement to date. C:redited as among th(~ 
principal designe:rs of' this document Wtlich establishes t11e 
supremaoy of Party machinery over too.t of' the .statcl 1 he 
ploads tor a centralism of po.'l er in the Central_ Comm:l.ttee. 
\'lh.ile tl:te :Party Gongross may choose the Central Committee, 
this same Central Collllllittae may postpone :!.nd<J.finitely the 
meetings of a Party CongrliJlilS • thus negating; :1. ts .pow e:r. 
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On foreign .policy Liu has be&n a "Vigorous ad"Vooate 
of the Kremlin line. He l'hmounced Tito in 1948 e.nd makes the 
United .States snd imper:l.alinm synonomous. His. proposed 
philosophy separates :'ovi<~t Nationa1isrrl i'xom that of -J;he 
i;les·t. i:Oomet:!.meR t11e actlons of Moscorl leave him hard-put 
f'or expla..l'lations. Nevartbeless • so long as China 1>1alks 
111lth Russia, tiu Shao-chi 111111 remain a potent .force in 
Chinese polH:ical J.:l..fe. 
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